ground of our belief in the interminableness of images, not vice versa. When we further remember that these countless images are supposed to travel intact all the way from the intermundia, (see Cic. N. D. 1 114 ex ipso (deo) imagines semper affluant, and Lucr. vi 76 de corpore quae sancto simulacra feruntur in mentes hominum divinae nuntia formae,) and to be incessantly thrown off from bodies which were themselves scarcely more than images, we shall not wonder that some of the Epicureans failed to rise to the height of the credo quia impossibile which their system demanded, and fell back on the easier doctrine of Democritus, asserting the divinity of the images themselves, and deriving them not from the deities of the intermundia, but from the combinations of etherial atoms floating in the surrounding air'. 1 This seems to me to be the easiest explanation of the much disputed words of Diogenes x 139, ἐν ἄλλοις δέ φησι τοὺς θεοὺς λόγῳ θεωρητούς, οὓς μὲν κατ' ἀριθμὸν ὑφεστῶτας, οὓς δὲ καθ ̓ ὁμοειδίαν ἐκ τῆς συνεχοῦς ἐπιῤῥύσεως τῶν ὁμοίων εἰδώλων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποτετελεσμένων ȧv0ρwπоeldŵs. Hirzel in his Untersuchungen zu Cicero's philosophischen schriften, pp. 46–90, whom Zeller follows in his last edition, p. 431, has shown, in opposition to Schömann (De Epicuri Theologia, contained in the 4th vol. of his Opuscula), that there is no reason for altering the text, and that we must accept it as a fact that there were two classes of gods recognized in the Epicurean school, one possessed of a separate individuality and having their abode in the intermundia, the other existing only in virtue of a continuous stream of undistinguishable images which in their combination produce on our minds the impression of a human form. Zeller thinks that the latter are meant for the unreal gods of the popular mythology, which, like the centaur and every other human imagination, must have their origin in some corresponding image; but the words of Diogenes seem to me to be less appropriate to the very concrete deities of the Greek pantheon than to some vague feeling of a divine presence such 199 Leaving the question of immortality, we pass on to speak of the Epicurean belief as to the shape of the Gods. They derided the spherical mundane God of the Stoics, and held that the direct evidence of visions, no less than the general belief of mankind, testified that the Gods were in the likeness of men. But this might also be proved by reasoning, for experience showed that rationality was only found in human form; and besides, the human, being the most perfect form, must be that of the most perfect being. Some of the later Epicureans went on to describe in detail the manner of life of their Intermundian Gods. They lived in houses, ate and drank celestial food, needed no sleep, for they were never weary; their chief enjoyment was conversation, which probably went on in Greek or something very like it: in fact they were in heaven what the Epicurean brotherhood was, or strove to be, on earth'. Such Gods were worthy of our reverence and imitation, but they were not objects of fear, as they neither could nor would do us harm. While Epicurus agrees with Aristippus in making pleasure the sole natural end of life, the standard of good, as sensation is of truth, he differs from him in attaching more value to permanent tranquillity than to as might be caused by the idola of Democritus. parallel passage in Cic. N. D. I 49. Compare also the 1 See Philodemus, quoted by Zeller, p. 434 foll. 2 Some of the Epicureans seem to have allowed to their Gods a certain influence over the happiness of men; see the passages quoted from Philodemus Tepì evσeßeías in my note on Cic. N. D. I 45, especially pp. 86-89 (Gompertz) 'the Stoics deny that the Gods are the authors of evil to men and thus take away all restraint on iniquity, while we say that punishment comes to some from the gods and the greatest of good to others.' See too Lucr. VI 70. momentary gratification, and also in preferring mental pleasures to bodily, as involving memory and hope, and therefore both more enduring and more under our control. Still bodily pleasure is the groundwork and foundation of all other pleasure, as Epicurus says (Diog. x 6) ‘I know not what good means if you deny me the pleasures of the senses;' and Metrodorus 'all good is concerned with the belly' or, as it might be expressed in our own day, 'the summum bonum is a healthy digestion' (Cic. N. D. 1 113). Virtue is not desirable for itself, as an end, but only as the means to attain pleasure. The wise man, i. e. the virtuous man, is happy because he is free from the fear of the Gods and of death, because he has learnt to moderate his passions and desires, because he knows how to estimate and compare pleasures and pains, so as to secure the largest amount of the former with the least of the latter. The distinction between right and wrong rests merely on utility and has nothing mysterious about it. Thus Epicurus says 'Injustice is not in itself evil, but it is rightly shunned because it is always accompanied by the fear of detection and punishment'.' 'Justice is nothing in itself; it is simply an agreement neither to injure or be injured. One chief means of attaining pleasure is the society of friends. To 1 Diog. X 151. ἡ ἀδικία οὐ καθ ̓ ἑαυτὴν κακόν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὴν ὑποψίαν φόβῳ, εἰ μὴ λήσει τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων ἐφεστηκότας κολαστάς. 2 Diog. Χ 150. τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιόν ἐστι σύμβολον τοῦ συμφέροντος εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτειν ἀλλήλους μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι. “There is no justice or injustice for animals or for those tribes which have not been able, or have not chosen to make such compacts: ovк καθ ̓ ἑαυτὸ δικαιοσύνη, but a kind of compact in regard to mutual association extending over certain localities.' enjoy this we should cultivate the feelings of kindness and benevolence. Epicurus does not recognize any claims of a wider society. He considers it folly to take part in public life, and Metrodorus dissuaded his brother from such a course in the words 'it is not our business to seek for crowns by saving the Greeks, but to enjoy ourselves in good eating and drinking' (Plut. Adv. Col. 1125 D.). What has been said will sufficiently account for the dislike entertained by Cicero and others towards the 'swinish doctrines' of Epicurus. I subjoin a few other quotations from his writings, some of which may help to give a more favourable impression of the man and explain Seneca's admiration for him. 'We think contentment (avτáρkela, self-sufficingness) a great good, not with a view to stint ourselves to a little in all cases, but in order that, if we have not got much, we may content ourselves with little, being fully persuaded that those enjoy luxury most who need it least, and that whatever is natural is easily procured, and only what is matter of vain ostentation is hard to win. Plain dishes give as much pleasure as expensive ones, provided there is enough to remove the pain of hunger; and bread and water are productive of the highest pleasure to one who is really in want. The regular use of a simple inexpensive diet not only keeps a man in perfect health, but it gives him promptness and energy to meet all the requirements of life, while it makes him more capable of enjoying an occasional feast and also renders him fearless of fortune. When we speak then of pleasure as the end, we do not mean the pleasure of the sensualist, as some accuse us of doing: we mean the absence of bodily pain and of mental anxiety'.' 1 From the Epistle of Epicurus to Menoeceus in Diog. x 130. 'Man cannot live pleasantly without living wisely and nobly and justly, nor can he live wisely and nobly and justly without living pleasantly'.' 'The wealth of nature is limited and easily procured, the wealth of vain imagination knows no limit?.' 'Fleshly pleasure, when once the pain of want is removed, admits of no increase, but only of variation3.' 'Great pain cannot last long, lasting pain is never violent. In chronic diseases the bodily state is on the whole more pleasurable than painful*.' So far we may recognize a genuine Epicurean sentiment. In the two quotations which follow there is an imitation of Stoic bravado. Epistle to Idomeneus.. 'I write this to you on the last day of my life, a happy day in spite of the agonizing pain of my disease, for I oppose to all my pain the mental pleasure arising from the memory of our former discussions. My last request is that you will befriend the children of Metrodorus in a manner worthy of your life-long devotion to me and to philosophy"." 'Even in the bull of Phalaris the wise man would retain his happiness".' 'Courage does not come by nature, but by calculation of expediency". 'Friendship exists for the sake of advantage. But we 4 Diog. X 140, Plut. Aud. Poet. 36 B.; Cic. Fin. 11 22, si gravis brevis, si longus levis. 5 Diog. x 22, Cic. Fin. 11 96. 6 Cic. Tusc. II 17, Diog. X 118. |