revelation (naturae lumen) which shows us the excellency of virtue, the dignity and freedom of man, and the existence of a Divine Being'.

But though nature gives us light, so far as is needed for action and for life, it does not satisfy our curiosity on speculative matters: it does not tell us, for instance, what is the form or the abode of the Deity, or whether the soul is material or immaterial. Cicero however believes, in common with all but the Epicureans, that God is eternal, all-wise, all-powerful and all-good; he believes with Plato and the Stoics that the world was formed and is providentially governed by Him for the good of man; he believes, in accordance with Plato but in opposition to the Stoics, that God is pure Spirit3; and he thinks that Fin. v. 59 (natura homini) dedit talem mentem quae omnem virtutem accipere posset, ingenuitque sine doctrina notitias parvas rerum maximarum et quasi instituit docere et induxit in ea quae inerant tanquam elementa virtutis ; ib. v. 61 indicant pueri, in quibus, ut in speculis, natura cernitur; Leg. 1. 24 animum esse ingeneratum a deo...ex quo efficitur illud, ut is agnoscat deum, qui unde ortus sit quasi recordetur ac noscat; Tusc. I. 35 omnium consensus naturae vox est; ib. I. 65, 70, V. 70, Consol. fr. 6, De Fato 23 foll., Tusc. Iv. 65, 79.

1 Tusc. I. 27, 30, 66, Rep. VI. 13, Leg. 1. 59 qui se ipse norit, primum aliquid se habere sentiet divinum, ingeniumque in se suum sicut simulacrum aliquod dicatum putabit, tantoque munere deorum semper dignum aliquid et faciet et sentiet ei intelliget quem ad modum a natura subornatus in vitam venerit, quantaque instrumenta habeat ad obtinendam adipiscendamque sapientiam, quoniam principio rerum omnium quasi adumbratas intellegentias animo ac mente conceperit, quibus illustratis sapientia duce bonum virum et ob eam ipsam causam cernat se beatum fore.

2 Tusc. I. 70, N. D. 1. 60.

3 Tusc. 1. 66 nec vero deus ipse qui intellegitur a nobis alio modo intellegi potest, nisi mens soluta quaedam et libera, segregata ab omni concretione mortali, omnia sentiens et movens ipsaque praedita motu

the same is true also of the soul, which is an emanation from Him and which, 'as we have been taught by our ancestors, and as Plato and Xenophon have shown by many excellent arguments,' is destined to enjoy a blissful immortality in the case of the wise and good'. Perhaps that which has most weight with Cicero is the practical consideration, 'if we give up our faith in an over-ruling Providence, we cannot hope to retain any genuine piety or religion; and if these go, justice and faith and all that binds together human society, must go too".' He is also fully convinced that reverence is due to what is old and long established, and that it is the duty of a good citizen to conform to the established church, to accept the tenets of the national religion and observe its customs, except so far as they might be inconsistent with the plain rules of morality, or so flagrantly opposed to reason as to come under the head of superstition. Thus, while he is himself a disbeliever in divination, and argues convincingly against it in his book on the subject, yet, as a statesman, he approves the punishment of certain consuls who had disregarded the auspices. "They ought,' he says, 'to have submitted to the rule of the established religion." He cannot approve of the in

sempiterno; Rep. VI. 26 foll. Yet he does not altogether deny the possibility of the Stoic view, that God is of a fiery or ethereal nature, Tusc. 1. 65.

1 Tusc. I. 70, Lael. 13, Cato 77 foll.

2 See N. D. 1. 4 with the passages cited in my note, II. 153, Leg. II. 16.

3 Divin. II. 71 parendum fuit religioni, nec patrius mos tam contumaciter repudiandus, and just before, retinetur et ad opinionem vulgi et ad magnas utilitates reipublicae mos, religio, disciplina, jus, augurium, collegii auctoritas.

genious defence of divination by the Stoics, any more than he does of their elastic allegorical method, which might be stretched to cover the worst absurdities of mythology. Religion is to be upheld, in so far as it is in accordance with the teaching of nature; but superstition is to be torn up by the root. Unfortunately Cicero gives no precise definition of the latter opprobrious word, nor does he distinctly say how the existing religion is to be cleared of its superstitious elements.

In regard to ethics Cicero openly disclaims the negative view of Carneades', and only wavers between a more or less thorough acceptance of the Stoic doctrine. In general, it may be said that he has a higher admiration for the Stoic system of ethics and theology than he has for any other. Thus he calls it the most generous and masculine of systems, and is even inclined to deny the name of philosopher to all but the Stoics. He defends their famous paradoxes as being absolutely true and genuinely Socratic, and finds fault with Antiochus and the Peripatetics for hesitating to admit that the wise man will retain his happiness in the bull of Phalaris*. Similarly he blames the latter for justifying a moderate indulgence of the various emotions instead of eradicating

1 Leg. 1. 39 perturbatricem harum omnium rerum Academiam, hanc ab Arcesila et Carneade recentem exoremus, ut sileat; nam si invaserit in haec quae satis scite nobis instructa et composita videntur, nimias edet ruinas.

2 Tusc. III. 22, IV. 53.

3 Paradoxa § 4 mihi ista napádoğa maxime videntur esse Socratica longeque verissima, Acad. 11. 135. Arguing as a Peripatetic in the De Finibus IV. 74, Cicero takes the opposite side.

4 Tusc. V. 75.

them altogether'. At the same time he confesses that Stoicism is hardly adapted for this work-a-day world; it would be more in place in Plato's Utopia"; when it is attempted to apply it to practice, common sense speedily reduces it to something not very different from the Academy or the Lyceum. Indeed we often find Cicero arguing that the difference is merely nominal, and that Zeno changed the terms, but not the doctrines of the original Socratic school of which these were offshoots3.

I proceed to give a very brief survey of Cicero's philosophical works, all composed, with the exception of the De Oratore, the De Republica and De Legibus, within the last two years of his life. His object in writing them was to give his countrymen a general view of Greek philosophy, particularly of its practical side; and he claimed that in doing this he was labouring for the good of his country no less than, when he had been most active as a speaker in the Senate-House and the Forum*.

1 Tusc. IV. 38, mollis et enervata putanda est Peripateticorum ratio et oratio, qui perturbari animos necesse dicunt esse, sed adhibent modum quendam, quem ultra progredi non oporteat. Modum tu adhibes vitio? and § 42 nihil interest utrum moderatas perturbationes approbent an moderatam injustitiam &c; compare III. 22 and Off. I. 89. On the other hand in the Academica II. 135, where Cicero represents the New Academy, he defends, though in a somewhat perfunctory way, the moderate use of the emotions.

2 Fin. IV. 21, Tusc. v. 3, ad Att. II. 1.

3 Fin. V. 22, restant Stoici, qui cum a Peripateticis et Academicis omnia transtulissent, nominibus aliis easdem res secuti sunt, Leg. 1. 54, 55.

4 N. D. 1. 7 foll. with my notes, Divin. II. I, quaerenti mihi multumque et diu cogitanti quanam re possem prodesse quam plurimis, ne quando intermitterem consulere rei publicae, nulla major occurrebat quam si optimarum artium vias traderem meis civibus.

The earliest of this later group was the Hortensius, written in 46 B.C., but now lost. This was followed by several oratorical treatises. The De Consolatione, also lost, was written on the death of his daughter in 45. Then came the Academica, of which only a portion has come down to us. In this, as has been already mentioned, Cicero defends the doctrine of Probability, as enunciated by Philo, which may be regarded as a softened form of the scepticism of Carneades, against the 'Certitude' of Antiochus, the champion of the Eclectics. The Academica would be reckoned with the Topica and the rhetorical treatises, as coming under the head of Logic'. Under the head of Ethics we have (1) the De Finibus3, a treatise on the Summum Bonum. In the 1st book the Epicurean doctrine is expounded by Torquatus; in the 2nd it is controverted with Stoic arguments by Cicero; the 3rd book contains an account of the Stoic doctrine by Cato, to whom Cicero replies with an argument taken from Antiochus in the 4th book, in which he endeavours to show, first, that all that is of value in Zeno's teaching is really Socratic, being derived from his master Polemo, and secondly, that the innovations of Zeno, where they are not confined to the use of an unnatural and paradoxical terminology, involve a contradiction between the prima naturae with which he starts, and his final conclusion that virtue is the only good; in the 5th book the doctrine of Antiochus himself-it will be remembered that this is an amalgam of the three anti-Epicurean systems-is expounded by the Peripatetic Piso.

1 Divin. II. 4, Acad. I. 32.

2 On the plural, see Madvig's ed. Praef. p. lxi n. It is uncertain who introduced the idea of a Summum Malum to correspond with the Summum Bonum.