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the pleasures which spring from philosophy are the only pure pleasures: other pleasures are for the most part merely negative, consisting in a momentary release from pain. He that drinks only escapes the pain of thirst for the moment, but he who has become conscious of mental emptiness and feels himself replenished by instruction, is nourished by a food more real and true. Further even the inferior pleasures cannot be fully enjoyed except by one in whose soul reason is supreme. Thus we conclude that it is best for every one to be governed by the divine principle of reason residing in his own soul; but if not, that this government must be imposed upon him from without; that the worst of all conditions is to be unjust, and then to evade the penalties by which injustice might be cured and the soul restored to health.
In the Tenth book Plato reverts to the subject of poetry and imitation, and lays down the rule that the only poetry allowed in the model State will be hymns in honour of the Gods and of virtuous men. He then introduces a consideration which, he says, adds tenfold force to all that has been urged in favour of justice, viz. the immortality of the soul, for which he gives the following as a new and additional proof. Whatever perishes, perishes in consequence of some particular vice or disease which belongs to it. If there be any thing which can withstand the corroding effect of its own special vice, that thing would be indissoluble and imperishable. The soul is liable to the disease of injustice, but we do not find that it ever dies of this disease. We must conclude therefore that it is imperishable. Thus, in considering the natural consequences of justice, we must not limit ourselves to this life, but must raise our eyes to the eternity beyond. As we have proved that justice is in itself best, we need no longer fear that we shall be thought to base its claim on mere accessories, if we view the facts as they really are, and confess that the just man will always be seen in his true character by the Gods, and will be loved and favoured by them, however he may seem to be neglected with a view to his better training in virtue in this life. For it is impossible, we shall say, that he whose chief object it is to grow like to God, should ever be really neglected by him whom he resembles.
And as for man, we shall say that, in the end at any rate, justice and injustice will be detected and will receive their due deserts of honour and dishonour. And yet these rewards are nothing in comparison with those which await the just in Hades, as we gather from the story of Er, who was permitted to return to earth after visiting the unseen world, and brought back with him the report of all that he had witnessed there.
In dealing with a book so pregnant and suggestive as the Republic, it is difficult to know where comment is likely to be most useful. The few remarks which I am able to make will have reference (1) to Plato's intention in writing the book; (2) to the circumstances which may have contributed to give it its special form and colouring; (3) to the anticipations of later thought and especially of Christian thought which may be found in it; (4) to the more striking examples of divergence between Plato and the prevalent views of his own or of later times.
(1) Some have held that the object of the writer is fully given in the name by which the book is commonly known, and that whatever travels beyond political philo
sophy is to be regarded as a part of the scaffolding of the dialogue, or put to the account of Plato's incurable love of rainbling. Others have been equally sure that the model State is a mere piece of machinery for the exhibition of Justice. Others have considered that its main object was to put forward a new theory of Education. The true view is given in a sentence of the Laws, 'our whole State is an imitation of the best and noblest life?' The root or foundation of this perfect life is righteousness, which is no spontaneous product of human nature, but must be fostered by careful training; and that life cannot be fully manifested except in a community.
Next follows the subordinate question, 'Did Plato mean his State to be a practical model, or did he mean it for an ideal, which might guide or suggest legislation, but could not be actually realized in practice?' His own language seems to waver ; thus, while in vi. 502 it is stated that it is indeed difficult to carry out this ideal, but certainly not impossible, if the government were in the hands of philosophers; in ix. 592 Socrates, in reply to Glaucon's remark, that such a city is not to be found on earth, claims no more for it than that perhaps a pattern of it may exist in heaven for him who wishes to behold it, and beholding to organize himself accordingly; adding that it is of no importance whether it does now, or ever will, exist on earth. This double aspect of the State, in which it
appears at one time as an improved Greek city, at another as the ideal society, the Baolleía Ocoû or civitas dei, reminds one of the double meaning of Jewish prophecy, by which the changing fortunes of the little
Leg. VΙΙ. 817 πασα η πολιτεια ξυνέστηκε μίμησις του καλλίστου και αρίστου βίου.
Israelite kingdoms are made to bring out fresh features of the great Messianic idea.
(2) The impulse which Plato received from the circumstances of his times is partly negative, from the state of affairs in Athens and in Sicily, partly positive, from Egypt, Sparta and the Pythagorean brotherhood. To the natural distaste of the philosophic student for the rule of the unthinking Demos, there was added a distinct reprobation of some of the existing customs or institutions of Athens, as for instance the seclusion of women,-a feeling which seems to have been widely spread among the Socratic School, perhaps owing in part to the influence of Aspasia,—and then, above all, in Plato's case, indignation at the ingratitude shown towards his master. If this dislike of the rule of the many led him at times to sigh for a paternal despotism, his experience in Syracuse taught him that there was one thing worse than an unprincipled democracy, and that was a selfish and unprincipled tyranny. In Egypt with its fixed system of castes and its long unbroken traditions, in Sparta with its Lycurgean discipline, he beheld the supremacy of Law, the sacrifice of the individual for the good of the whole"; in the brotherhood of Pythagoras he saw the same discipline joined to higher and wider aims, not merely the attainment of order and strength in the body politic, but the perfection of human nature as displayed in its best representatives.
(3) One of the most striking anticipations of later thought to be found in the book is the comparison between the constitution of the State and that of the soul, and the consequent building up of ethics upon the
1 See Grote's chapter on the legislation of Lycurgus.
foundation of psychology. The State is a moral unit; the soul is a composite being, which is then only in a healthy condition when each constituent element is in due relation with the others, and performs its proper functions aright. Just so Bp. Butler in his Sermons insists that we do not fully explain the moral nature of man by giving a list of its various parts or elements, but that it involves also certain natural relations between these parts; that it is the function of reflexion or conscience to govern, and of the other elements or principles of man's nature to obey. Plato's psychological analysis is no doubt very defective. He entirely omits the benevolent affections, which form the instinctive basis of virtue, and limits the emotional part of man's nature to the appetites and the sense of honour, which last however he disguises as a quasi-malevolent affection, thus narrowing it down to one of its secondary developments. Still, here, as elsewhere, he supplied to Aristotle the starting-point for a more accurate analysis, and in giving prominence to spiritedness, or the sense of honour, as a main help to right actions, he has been truer to fact than the great majority of subsequent philosophers. The specification of the four so-called cardinal virtues makes its first appearance in Plato, who assumes it as a thing generally admitted, though he also endeavours, not very successfully, to show that it may be inferred from the nature of the State and of man. His conception of Olkalogúrn, the will to do what is right, is too broad and general to justify its being placed on a level with the other more specific virtues. In this sense it really includes them all; for, if reason performs rightly its work of thinking and governing, the man will be wise and