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famous classification of the four Causes, the strictly formal (είδος, το τί ήν είναι, η πρώτη ουσία), the material (ύλη, το υποκείμενον, το εξ ου), the efficient (το κινούν, το vd'or), the final (rékos, tò ou éveka), which are really four kinds of antecedent conditions required for the existence of each thing. For instance, in order to the production of a marble statue by Phidias there is needed (1) the pre-existence in his own mind of the ideal form which is subsequently impressed upon the stone; (2) the existence of the stone; (3) the act of carving ; (4) the motive which induced the sculptor to make the statue, as for instance the desire to do honour to the God whose statue it is. Or again, we may illustrate Aristotle's doctrine on this point, and shew how the three aspects of Form tend to run into one another, by considering what was the cause of the virtue of Socrates. The material cause here is the existing Socrates with a yet unrealized potentiality of virtue; the formal cause is the virtuous ideal presented to his mind; and this formal cause will also be the efficient cause, in so far as it tends to actualize itself in the concrete Socrates, and the final cause, in so far as the virtuous character is its own end. But the opposition of Form and Matter is not confined to such simple cases; it covers the whole range of existence from the First Matter, which is mere potentiality of being (dúvajcs) at the one extreme, to the First Form which is pure immaterial actuality (évépyela), the Divine Being, at the other extreme. The intermediate links in the chain are matter or form according as they are viewed from above or below, as marble for instance is form in reference to stone generally, matter in reference to statue; vitality is form in reference to the living body, matter in reference to rationality. In this way Matter becomes identified with the logical Genus, Form with the Differentia : as Matter can only attain to actual existence in some concrete shape by the addition of Form, so the Genus is by itself only potential, but attains actual existence in its Species through the addition of the Differentia'.
1 This curious phrase, applying most properly to the creative idea in the mind of the artist, is thoroughly characteristic of the plastic genius of Greece. We may ask, in regard to any work, Tí cotl; what is its actual nature? or we may ask ti viv; what is the idea it was intended to embody? And by putting this in a substantival form, 'the being what it was intended to be,' we get an expression for its essential nature or true definition; see Trendelen. burg's note on the De Anima I. 1, 2, Waitz on Anal. Post. I. 11. Every concrete object is a combination of pre-existing matter and form : matter being regarded as indefinite, without character or quality, (cf. Met. VΙΙ. 10, p. 1036 α. η δ' ύλη άγνωστος καθ' αυτήν), all that is characteristic in the object must come from the other element, viz. form, which may therefore be described as that which the thing was, previous to its state of concrete existence. Thus a house consists of bricks or other materials adapted to a certain end, but the thought of this adaptation preceded the actual existence of the house : so, in nature, the tree is a combination of materials grouped according to a certain law or form, but this law was pre-existent in the seed before it was made manifest in the tree, and again it pre-existed in the parent tree before it received a latent embodiment in the seed.
The First Form of Aristotle, like the idea toù dyabou of Plato, is also the First Mover, the cause of the upward striving of the universe, of the development of each thing from the potential into the actual; and this not by any act of creation, for He remains ever unmoved in His own eternity, but by the natural
1 See Zeller III. p. 210, Bonitz on Arist. Met. IV. p. 1024 b, Grote Arist. II. 341.
tendency which all things have towards Him as the absolutely Good, the object and end of all effort, of all desire'. The universe itself is eternal, a perfect sphere the circumference of which is composed of the purest element, ether, and is carried round in circular motion by the immediate influence of the Deity. In it are the fixed stars, themselves divine. All above this Primum Mobile is the abode of divinity, in which there is no body, no movement, no void, and therefore no
The lower planetary spheres have a less perfect movement and are under the guidance of subordinate divinities. Still, throughout the whole space, from the outermost sidereal sphere down to the lunar sphere, all is ordered with perfect regularity according to Nature. It is only in the sublunary region extending from the moon to the earth, which is fixed in the centre, furthest removed from the First Mover and composed of the four inferior elements with their rectilinear movements, centripetal or downwards in the case of earth and water, centrifugal or upwards in the case of air and fire, that the irregular forces of Spontaneity and Chance' make their appearance, and impede or modify the working of Nature. Yet even here we find a constant progressive movement from inorganic into organic, from plant into animal, from life which is nutritive and sensitive only into life which is locomotive and finally rational in man. The human soul is. a microcosm, uniting in itself all the faculties of the lower orders of animated existence, and possessing, besides, the divine and immortal faculty of reason. As each thing attains its end by fulfilling the work for which it is designed by nature, so man achieves happiness by the unobstructed exercise of his special endowment, a rational and virtuous activity. Pleasure is the natural accompaniment of such an activity. Virtue, which may be described as perfected nature, belongs potentially to man's nature, but it becomes actual by the repetition of acts in accordance with reason. It is subdivided into intellectual and moral, according as it is a habit of the purely rational part of the soul, or as it is a habit of the emotional part, which is capable of being influenced by reason, but not itself rational. Every natural impulse is the potential basis of a particular virtue which may be developed by repeated actions freely performed in accordance with the law of reason so as to avoid either excess or defect. Since man is by nature gregarious, his perfection is only attainable in society, and ethical science is thus subordinate to political science.
1 Aristotle's words Kuvei is épülevov (Met. XII, 7), remind us of the yearning after the First Fair, treated of in the Symposium and other dialogues of Plato.
I have here given the briefest possible summary of Aristotle's general system, as it is contained in the Physica, the Metaphysica (so called as following the Physica) and the Nicomachean Ethics. Of the latter and of the Politics I have added a fuller analysis below, in order to enable the reader to compare them with Plato's Republic. In the remaining works we have a sort of encyclopaedia of science. The Organon' contains the theory of deductive reasoning. It includes (1) the Categories in which
1 There is an excellent edition by Waitz with Latin notes : Mr Poste has brought out an English translation of the Posterior Analytics and Fallacies, with introduction and notes. See also Trendelenburg's Elementa Logices Aristoleae.
all predications are classified under ten heads, Substance (ovola), Quantity (Tócov), Quality (Trolov), Relation (Trpós th), Place (1100), Time (tóre), Situation (kelolai), Possession (Zxcvv), Action (Touc@v), Passion (Táoxetv). Their use may be thus illustrated, 'Socrates is a man, seventy years old, wise, the teacher of Plato, now sitting on his couch, in prison, having fetters on his legs, instructing his disciples, and questioned by them'. It has been often pointed out that the classification here given errs both in excess and in defect, but it has the merit of being the first attempt of the kind. Trendelenburg suggests that it was borrowed from the grammatical division of the Parts of Speech. The end of the Logical treatises is the De Interpretatione, dealing with the Proposition, in which the distinction between Contrary and Contradictory, and between Possible and Necessary (Modal') Propositions, is for the first time clearly explained. In the 3rd, the Analytica, we have the doctrine of the Syllogism set forth with as much completeness as in Whately or Aldrich, together with an account of applied reasoning under the two heads of Demonstration (åródecţis) and Dialectic (Salektiņ). It further distinguishes between Induction (étraywyń), arguing upwards to Universals from Particulars, which are yvwpquarepa njuîv, more familiar and intelligible to the learner or investigator, and Deduction (ovlloywuós), arguing downwards to Particulars from Universals, which are púoel ywpquotepa, naturally and in themselves clearer and more intelligible. But though Aristotle thus derives the major premiss of the Syllogism from previous Induction, he has nowhere attempted to state the laws of the Inductive process, as he has done those of the Syllogism. He only tells us that the general idea, which