and from their often asking the word, by which only they were able to know one another, a strange confusion of sounds was heard, which occasioned no little disorder; not to mention that they, by this means, divulged the word to the enemy, and could not learn theirs; because, by their being together, and in a body, they had no occasion to repeat it. In the mean time, those who were pursued, threw themselves from the top of the rocks, and many were dashed to pieces by the fall; and as most of those who escaped, straggled from one another up and down the fields and woods, they were cut to pieces the next day by the enemy's horse who pursued them. Two thousand Athenians were slain in this engagement, and a great number of arms were taken; those who fled having thrown them away, that they might be the better able to escape over the precipices.

SECTION XIV. THE ATHENIANS AGAIN HAZARD A SEA-FIGHT, AND ARE DEFEATED. NICIAS AND DEMOSTHENES SENTENCED TO DIE, AND EXECUTED.

THE Athenian generals, after sustaining so great a loss, were in a great dilemma, and did not know how to act in the present discouragement and despair of the troops, who died daily, either by the diseases of the autumn, or by the bad air of the fens near which they were encamped. Demosthenes was of opinion that it would be proper for them to leave the country immediately, since they had been unsuccessful in so important an enterprise; especially as the season was not too far advanced for sailing; and that they had ships enough to force a passage, in case the enemy should dispute it with them. He declared, that it would be of much greater advantage to oblige the enemy to raise the blockade of Athens, than for them to continue that of Syracuse, by which they exhausted themselves to no purpose; that he was certain they would not be reinforced by a new army; and that they could not hope to overcome the enemy with the weak one under their command.*

Nicias was sensible, that the arguments his colleague used were very just; and he himself was of his opinion: but at the same time he was afraid, lest so public a confession of the weak condition to which they were reduced, and their resolution to leave Sicily, the report of which would certainly reach the enemy, should complete the ruin of their affairs, and perhaps make them unable to execute their resolution when they should attempt it. Besides, they had some little hopes left that the besieged, being themselves reduced to great extremity by their absolute want of provisions and money, would at last be inclined to surrender upon honourable terms. Thus, although he was in reality uncertain and wavering, he insinuated, that he did not care to quit Sicily, till the Athenians should have first sent orders for that purpose: and that otherwise they would be highly displeased; that as those who were to judge them, had not been eye witnesses of the state of things, they would be of a different opinion, and at the instigation of some orator, certainly condemn them: that most of those men, who now exclaimed with the greatest vehemence against the difficulties they laboured under, would then change their note, and accuse them of having been bribed to raise the siege: that knowing so well, as he did, the disposition and character of the Athenians, he chose to die gloriously by the enemy's sword, rather than be ignominiously condemned by his fellow-citizens.

These reasons, though they appeared very strong, were not yet able to convince Demosthenes; and it was still his opinion, that the only proper choice they could make, would be to retire. However, as he had been unsuccessful in his former opinion, he was afraid of insisting upon this; and he was the more inclined to come into that of Nicias, from imagining, with many others, that this general might have some secret resource, as he was so firmly resolved to stay. Gylippus, after having made the tour of Sicily, had brought a great body of troops with him. This new reinforcement terrified the Athenians exceedingly, whose army diminished daily by sickness; and they now began to reThucyd. 1. vii. p. 531-520. Plut. in Nic. p. 538–542. Diod. 1. xiii. p. 142.

pent their not having raised the siege, especially as the besieged were preparing to attack them both by sea and land. Besides, Nicias no longer opposed this resolution, and only desired to have it kept secret. Orders were therefore given, as privately as possible, for the fleet to prepare for setting sail with the utmost expedition.*

When all things were ready, the moment they were going to set sail, wholly unsuspected by the enemy, who were far from surmising they would leave Sicily so soon, the moon was suddenly eclipsed in the middle of the night, and lost all its splendour; which terrified Nicias and the whole army, who, from ignorance and superstition, were astonished at so sudden a change, the causes of which they did not know, and therefore dreaded the consequences of it. They then consulted the soothsayers, who, being equally unacquainted with the reasons of this phenomenon, only augmented their consternation. It was the custom, after such accidents had happened, to suspend their enterprises but for three days. The soothsayers pronounced, that he must not sail till three times nine days were past; these are the words of Thucydides, which doubtless was a mysterious number in the opinion of the people. Nicias, scrupulous to a fault, and full of a mistaken veneration for these blind interpreters of the will of the gods, declared that he would wait a whole revolution of the moon; and not return till the same day of the next month; as if he had not seen the planet very clearly, the instant it had emerged from that part which was darkened by the intervention of the earth's body.

But he was not allowed time for this. The news of the intended departure of the Athenians being soon spread over the city, a resolution was taken to attack the besiegers both by sea and land. The Syracusans began the first day by attacking the intrenchments, and gained a slight advantage over the enemy. On the morrow they made a second attack; and at the same time sailed with seventy-six galleys, against eighty-six of the Athenians. Eurymedon, who commanded the right of the Athenian fleet, having spread along the shore to surround them, this movement proved fatal to him: for, as he was detached from the body of the fleet, the Syracusans, after forcing the main battle, which was in the centre, attacked him; drove him vigorously into the gulf called Dascon, and there defeated him entirely. Eurymedon lost his life in the engagement. They afterwards gave chase to the rest of the galleys, and run them against the shore. Gylippus, who commanded the land-army, seeing the Athenian galleys were forced aground, and not able to return into their stoccade, landed with part of his troops, in order to charge the soldiers, in case they should be forced to run ashore; and to give his friends the more room to tow such galleys as they might have taken. However, he was repulsed by the Tyrrhenians, who were posted on that side, and obliged by the Athenians, who flew to sustain them, to retire with some loss as far as the moor called Lysimelia, which lay near it. The latter saved most of their ships, eighteen excepted, which were taken by the Syracusans, and their crews cut to pieces by them. After this, resolving to burn the rest, they filled an old vessel with combustible materials; and having set fire to it, they drove it by the help of the wind against the Athenians, who nevertheless extinguished the fire, and drove off that ship.

Each side erected trophies; the Syracusans for the defeat of Eurymedon, and the advantage they had gained the day before; and the Athenians, for their having driven part of the enemy into the moor, and put the other part to flight. But the minds of the two nations were very differently disposed. The Syracusans, who had been thrown into the utmost consternation at the arrival of Demosthenes with his fleet, seeing themselves victorious in a naval engagement, resumed fresh hope, and assured themselves of a complete victory over their enemies. The Athenians, on the contrary, frustrated of their only resource, and overcome by sea, so contrary to their expectations, entirely lost courage, and had no thoughts but of retiring.

Thucyd. 1. vii. p. 521-548. Plut. in Nic. p. 533. Doid. 1. xiii. p. 142.

The enemy, to deprive them of all resource, and prevent their escaping, shut the mouth of the great harbour, which was about five hundred paces wide, with galleys placed cross-wise, and other vessels fixed with anchors and iron chains; and at the same time made the requisite preparations for the battle, in case they should have courage to engage again. When the Athenians saw themselves thus hemmed in, the generals and principal officers assembled, in order to deliberate on the present state of affairs. They were in absolute want of provisions, which was owing to their having forbid the people of Catana to bring any, from the hopes they entertained of their being able to retire ; and they could not procure any from other places, unless they were masters of the sea. This made them resolve to venture a sea-fight. In this view, they were determined to leave their old camp, and to intrench themselves on the shore, near their ships, in the smallest compass possible. Their design was to leave some forces in that place to guard their baggage and the sick; and to fight with the rest on board all the ships they should have saved. They intended to retire into Catana, in case they should be victorious; otherwise, to set fire to their ships, and to march by land to the nearest city belonging to their allies.

This resolution being taken, Nicias immediately filled a hundred and ten galleys, the others having lost their oars, with the flower of his infantry and drew up the rest of the forces, particularly the bowmen, in order of battle on the shore. As the Athenians dreaded very much the beaks of the Syracusan galleys, Nicias had provided harping-irons to grapple them, in order to break the force of the blow, and to come immediately to close fight as on shore. But the enemy perceiving this, covered the prows and upper part of their galleys with leather to prevent their being so easily laid hold of. The commanders on both sides had employed all their eloquence to animate their men; and none could ever have been prompted from stronger motives; for the battle which was about to be fought, was to determine not only their lives and liberties, but also the fate of their country.

The battle was very obstinate and bloody. The Athenians being arrived at the mouth of the port, easily took those ships which defended the entrance of it; but, when they attempted to break the chain of the rest, to widen the passage, the enemy came up from all quarters. As near two hundred galleys came rushing on each side, in a narrow place, there must necessarily have been a very great confusion; and the vessels could not easily advance or retire, nor turn about to renew the attack. The beaks of the galleys, for this reason, did very little execution; but there were very furious and frequent discharges. The Athenians were overwhelmed by a shower of stones, which always did execution from whatever place they were thrown; whereas they defended themselves only by shooting darts and arrows, which, by the motion of the ships from the agitation of the sea, did not carry true, and by that means the greatest part of them did very little execution. Ariston the pilot had given the Syracusans this counsel. These discharges being over, the soldiers, heavily armed, attempted to enter the enemy's ships, in order to fight hand to hand and it often happened, that while they were climbing up one side, their own ships were entered on the other; and two or three ships would be grappled to one, which occasioned a great perplexity and confusion. Further, the noise of the ships that dashed one against the other, the different cries of the victors and vanquished, prevented the orders of the officers from being heard. The Athenians wanted to force a passage, whatever might be the consequence, to secure their return into their own country; and this the enemy endeavoured their utmost to prevent, in order that they might gain a more complete and more glorious victory. The two land-armies, which were drawn up on the highest part of the shore, and the inhabitants of the city who were there, ran to the walls, while the rest, kneeling in the temples, were imploring Heaven to give success to their citizens. All these saw clearly, because of their little distance from the fleets, every thing that passed; and contemplated the battle

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as from an amphitheatre, but not without great anxiety and terror. Attentive to, and shuddering at every movement, at the several changes which happened, they discovered the concern they had in the battle, their fears, their hopes, their grief, their joy, by different cries, and different gestures; stretching out their hands, sometimes towards the combatants to animate them, and at other times towards heaven, to implore the succour and protection of the gods. At last, the Athenian fleet, after sustaining a long battle, and a vigorous resistance, was put to flight, and driven against the shore. The Syracusans, who were spectators of this victory, conveyed to the whole city, by an universal shout, the news of this victory. The victors, now masters of the sea, and sailing with a favourable wind towards Syracuse, erected a trophy; while the Athenians, who were quite dejected and overpowered, did not so much as request that their dead soldiers might be delivered to them, in order to pay the last sad duty to their remains.

There now remained but two methods for them to choose; either to attempt the passage a second time, for which they had ships and soldiers sufficient, or to abandon their fleet to the enemy, and retire by land. Demosthenes proposed the former; but the sailors, in the deepest affliction, refused to obey, fully persuaded that it would be impossible for them to sustain a second engagement. The second method was therefore resolved upon, and accordingly they prepared to set out in the night, to conceal the march of their army from the enemy.

But Hermocrates, who suspected their design, was very sensible that it was of the utmost importance not to suffer so great a body of forces to escape; since they otherwise might fortify themselves in some corner of the island, and renew the war. The Syracusans were at that time in the midst of their festivity and rejoicings, and meditating nothing but how they might best divert themselves, after the toils they had sustained in fight. They were then solemnizing the festival of Hercules. To desire the Syracusans to take up arms again, in order to pursue the enemy, and to attempt to draw them from their diversions either by force or persuasion, would have been to no purpose; for which reason another expedient was employed. Hermocrates sent out a few horsemen, who were to pass for friends of the Athenians, and ordered them to cry aloud, "Tell Nicias not to retire till daylight; for the Syracusans lie in ambush for him, and have seized on the passes.' This false advice stopped Nicias at once; and he did not even set out the next day, in order that the soldiers might have more time to prepare for their departure, and carry off whatever might be necessary for their subsistence, and abandon the rest.

The enemy had time enough for seizing the avenues. The next morning early, they possessed themselves of the most difficult passes, fortified those places where the river was fordable, broke down the bridges, and spread detachments of horse up and down the plain; so that there was not one place through which the Athenians could pass without fighting. They set out upon their march the third day after the battle, with design to retire to Catana. The whole army was in an inexpressible consternation, to see such great numbers of men, either dead or dying, some of whom were left exposed to wild beasts, and the rest to the cruelty of the enemy. Those who were sick and wounded conjured them with tears, to take them along with the army, and held by their clothes when they were going; or dragging themselves after them, followed them as far as their strength would permit; and when this failed, they had recourse to tears, sighs, and imprecations; and sending up towards heaven plaintive and dying groans, they called upon the gods as well as men to avenge their cruelty, while every place echoed with lamentations. The whole army was in as deplorable a condition. All men were seized with the deepest melancholy. They were inwardly tortured with rage and anguish, when they represented to themselves the greatness from which they were fallen, the extreme misery to which they were reduced, and the still greater evils from which they foresaw it would be impossible for them to es

cape. They could not bear the comparison for ever present in their thoughts, of the triumphant state in which they had left Athens, in the midst of the good wishes and acclamations of the people, with the ignominy of their retreat, aggravated by the cries and imprecations of their relations and fellow-citizens. But the most melancholy part of the spectacle, and that which most deserved compassion, was Nicias. Dejected and worn out by a tedious illness; deprived of the most necessary things, at a time when his age and infirmities required them most; pierced, not only with his private grief, but with that of others, all which preyed upon his heart; this great man, superior to all his evils, thought of nothing, but how he might best comfort his soldiers, and revive their courage. He ran up and down in all places, crying aloud, that matters were not yet desperate, and that other armies had escaped from greater dangers; that they ought not to accuse themselves, or grieve too immoderately, for misfortunes which they had not occasioned; that if they had of fended some god, his vengeance must be satiated by this time; that fortune after having so long favoured the enemy, would at last be tired of persecuting them; that their bravery and their numbers made them still formidable, be ing still near forty thousand strong; that no city in Sicily would be able to withstand them, nor prevent their settling wherever they might think proper that they had no more to do, but to take care severally of themselves, and march in good order; that by a prudent and courageous retreat, which was now become their only resource, they would not only save themselves, but also their country, and enable it to recover its former grandeur.

The army marched in two bodies, both drawn up in the form of a phalanx; the first being commanded by Nicias, and the second by Demosthenes, with the baggage in the centre. Being come to the river Anapis, they forced the passage, and afterwards were charged by all the enemy's cavalry, as well as archers, who discharged perpetually upon them. They were annoyed in this manner during several days march; every one of the passes being guarded, and the Athenians being obliged to dispute every inch of their way. The enemy did not care to hazard a battle against an army, which despair alone might render invincible; and the instant the Athenians offered the Syracusans battle, the latter retired; but whenever the former would proceed in their march, they advanced and charged them in their retreat.

Demosthenes and Nicias, seeing the miserable condition to which the troops were reduced, being in extreme want of provisions, and great numbers of them wounded, judged it adviseable to retire towards the sea, by a quite contrary way from that in which they then marched, and to make directly for Camarina and Gela, instead of proceeding to Catana, as they first intended. They set out in the night, after lighting a great number of fires. The retreat was made in great confusion and disorder, as generally happens to great armies in the gloomy horrors of the night, especially when the enemy is not far off. However, the van-guard, commanded by Nicias, retired in good order; but above half the rear-guard, with Demosthenes at their head, separated from the main body, and lost their way. On the next day the Syracusans, who, on the report of their retreat, had marched with the utmost diligence, came up him about noon; and having surrounded him with their horse, they drove him into a narrow place inclosed with a wall, where his soldiers fought like lions. Perceiving at the close of the day, that they were oppressed with fatigue, and covered with wounds, they gave the islanders leave to retire, which some of them accepted; and afterwards spared the lives of the rest, who surrendered at discretion with Demosthenes, after having stipulated, that they should not be put to death, nor sentenced to perpetual imprisonment. About six thousand soldiers surrendered on these conditions.

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Nicias arrived the same evening at the river Erineus, and passing it, encamped on a mountain, where the enemy came up with him the next day, and summoned him to surrender at discretion, as Demosthenes had done. Nicias could not persuade himself at first, that what they told him concerning that