made, but it is quite apparent that when the cars were near together the transfer of passengers was made, and the dispute was whether plaintiff was one of the passengers so transferred. In that case no evidence of transfer was required except the knowledge of the second conductor, whose duty it was to see and know who were so transferred. Under those circumstances, the passenger had the undoubted right to insist upon his passage without further payment.

If plaintiff had obtained a "change off" or transfer, and lost it, or if he had purchased a ticket and lost it, or if either had been accidently destroyed, it would be absurd to hold that he was entitled to a ride upon stating to the conductor that he had such transfer or ticket, but had lost it, or that it was accidentally destroyed. It is apparent that in the present case plaintiff possessed no other or different right from that which he would have possessed had he procured evidence of payment, which had been lost or destroyed. In the one case his contract to ride would be complete, but the only written evidence he had would be lost; while in the other his contract might be equally good, but he had neither asked nor obtained any evidence thereof, to show to the conductor in charge of the other car or train, which must serve as a voucher in his settlement with the company. It is a novel doctrine that one may compel the agent of another to accept without question, and without opportunity to investigate, his verbal statement that he has a contract with his principal, and especially where frequent frauds upon the principal must inevitably result as the consequence of such a doctrine. It was the plaintiff's reasonable and clear duty to pay his. fare, and seek redress from the defendant for a violation of his contract.

In the case of Frederick v. Railroad Co., 37 Mich. 346, Mr. Justice MARSTON said:

"There is but one rule which can safely be tolerated

with any decent regard to the rights of railroad companies and passengers generally. As between the conductor and passenger, and the right of the latter to travel, the ticket produced must be conclusive evidence, and he must produce it when called upon, as the evidence of his right to the seat he claims."

The

In Hufford v. Railroad Co. plaintiff paid his fare. language of the Court in that case, that "it was the duty of the conductor to accept the statement of the plaintiff until he found out it was not true," must be held to apply to the circumstances of that case, where the plaintiff had a ticket. That statement would be most unreasonable in the case of one having no ticket.

Several authorities in support of the rule above stated will be found cited in Frederick v. Railroad Co. The rule, and the reason therefor, are very ably stated in Bradshaw v. Railroad Co., 135 Mass. 407, and are also supported by the following cases: Yorton v. Railway Co., 54 Wis. 234 (11 N. W. Rep. 482), and authorities there cited; Peabody v. O. R. & N. Co., 21 Or. 121 (26 Pac. Rep. 1053); McKay v. Railroad Co., 34 W. Va. 65 (11 S. E. Rep. 737).

Inasmuch as the court should have directed a verdict for the defendant, it is unnecessary to discuss the question of damages.

Judgment affirmed.

The other Justices concurred.

THE PEOPLE V. JAMES HARRIS, IMPLEADED, ETC.

Criminal law-Concealment of stolen property.

A charge of aiding in the concealment of stolen property, knowing it to have been stolen, in violation of How. Stat. § 9142, is sustained by evidence showing that the respondent aided the thief in converting the stolen property to his own use; citing People v. Reynolds, 2 Mich. 422.

Error to Wayne.

(Hosmer, J.)

Submitted on briefs

November 17, 1892. Decided December 2, 1892.

Respondent was convicted of aiding in the concealment of stolen property, and sentenced to the State prison for 4 years and 10 months.

are stated in the opinion.

Conviction affirmed.

Hamilton Baluss, for respondent.

A. A. Ellis, Attorney General, for the people.

The facts

MCGRATH, C. J. The information contained two counts. The first charged defendant with the larceny of a horse; the second, aiding in the concealment, well knowing it to have been stolen. The jury found Harris guilty under the second count.

It is insisted that the testimony tended to show that he was guilty of larceny, but did not tend to show that he was guilty of aiding in the concealment; and the case of People v. Partridge, 86 Mich. 243, is relied upon. In that case the testimony tended to show that respondent had actually committed the offense charged in the first count, and the offense charged in the second count was an assault

without intending to commit the crime charged in the first. In the present case, Harris was some miles away when the horse was actually taken, and the jury have undoubtedly found that he was not actually or constructively present when the crime was committed. 1 Whart. Crim. Law (9th ed.), § 927. But the proofs tended clearly to show that Harris knew that the horse was stolen; that he was actively engaged in assisting in the disposition of the horse; that he had represented to persons to whom he and his associate were endeavoring to sell the horse that they owned the horse, and, again, that his associate owned the horse, and that the horse was poor in flesh because his associate's children had been driving and caring for the horse; that, when arrested, he claimed to the sheriff that " we bought the horse," and, again, that his associate owned the horse.

The testimony clearly brings the case within the rule of People v. Reynolds, 2 Mich. 422, where, referring to section 9142 of the statute, making it an offense to "aid in the concealment" of stolen property, knowing it to have been stolen, the Court say:

"The evil intended to be guarded against by the enactment of that law was to prevent persons from rendering important, efficient services to a felon, in aiding him in the concealment of stolen property; and that aid must be deemed quite as important and efficient which would enable the principal felon to convert the stolen property to his own use, or which would enable him to remove the property beyond the reach of the owner, and thereby prevent its recaption, as if he had effected the same object by aiding and assisting him in depositing it in some place of secrecy. * * Any disposition of the property which would have a tendency to conceal it from the observation of the owner is within the meaning of this law, and it cannot be presumed that the thief could convert the stolen property to his own use without using means to conceal it from the owner; therefore it will follow that the

*

charge of concealment may be well sustained by evidence tending to show that the defendant aided the thief in converting the stolen property to his own use."

The conviction is affirmed.

The other Justices concurred.

THE PEOPLE V. THILO KEUнN.

Criminal law-Homicide-Self-defense.

One is not obliged either to enter his house or lock the door before shooting a party who is advancing towards him in a threatening manner when he is standing near the door, if, in view of all of the circumstances of the case, as they appear to him at the time, he honestly believes that he is in imminent danger of great bodily harm, which can only be avoided by acting in self-defense at once, and before retreating.

Error to St. Clair.

(Mitchell, J.) Argued November 17, 1892. Decided December 2, 1892.

Respondent was convicted of murder in the second degree, and sentenced to the State prison for 22 years. Conviction reversed. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Stevens & Merriam, for respondent.

A. A. Ellis, Attorney General, and Cyrus A. Hovey, Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

DURAND, J. The information filed in this case charges. the respondent with the murder of Wesley McDonald on September 15, 1891, at the township of Port Huron, in St. Clair county. Upon the trial he was convicted.