how dangerous it is to truft the best of men with too much power. Where was there a braver army than that under Julius Cæfar? Where was there ever an army that had ferved their country more faithfully? That army was commanded generally by the best citizens of Rome, by men of great fortune and figure in their country; yet that army enflaved their country. The affections of the foldiers towards their country, the honour and integrity of the under officers, are not to be depended on; by the military law, the administration of juftice is fo quick, and the punishments fo fevere, that neither officer nor foldier dares offer to difpute the orders of his fupreme commander; he must not confult his own inclination: if an officer were commanded to pull his own father out of this house, he must do it; he dares not disobey; immediate death would be the fure confequence of the leaft grumbling. And if an officer were sent into the court of requests, accompanied by a body of mufketeers with screwed bayonets, and with orders to tell us what we ought to do, and how we were to vote, I know what would be the duty of this houfe; I know it would be our duty to order the officer to be taken and hanged up at the door of the lobby: but, Sir, I doubt much if fuch a spirit could be found in the house, or in any houfe of Commons that will ever be in England.

SIR, I talk not of imaginary things; I talk of what has happened to an English houfe of Commons, and from an English army; not only from an English army,but an army that was raised by that every houfe of Commons, an army that was paid by them, and an army that was commanded by generals appointed by them. Therefore do not let us vainly imagine, that an army raised and maintained by authority of Parliament, will always be fubmiffive to them:

if an army be fo numerous as to have it in their power to over-awe the Parliament, they will be fubmiffive as long as the Parliament does nothing to disoblige their favourite general; but when that cafe happens, I am afraid that in place of the Parliament's difmiffing the army the army will difmifs the Parliament, as they have done heretofore. Nor does the legality or illegality of that Parliament, or of that army alter the cafe; for with refpect to that army, and according to their way of thinking, the Parliament difmiffed by them was a legal Parliament; they were an army raised and maintained according to law, and at first they were raised, as they imagined, for the preservation of thofe liberties which they afterwards deftroyed.

It has been urged, Sir, that whoever is for the Proteftant fucceffion must be for continuing the army: for that very reafon, Sir, I am against continuing the army. I know that neither the Proteftant fucceffion in his Majesty's most illustrious house, nor any fucceffion, can ever be safe as long as there is a ftanding army in the country. Armies, Sir, have no regard to hereditary fucceffions. The first two Cæfars at Rome did pretty well, and found means to keep their armies in tolerable subjection, because the generals and officers were all their own creatures. But how did it fare with their fucceffors? Was not every one of them named by the army, without any regard to hereditary right, or to any right? A cobler, a gardener, or any man who happened to raife himself in the army, and could gain their affections, was made emperor of the world: was not every fucceeding emperor raised to the throne, or tumbled headlong into the duft, according to the mere whim, or mad frenzy of the foldiers?

WE

years,

We are told this army is defired to be continued but for one year longer, or for a limited term of years. How abfurd is this distinction? Is there any army in the world continued for any term of years ! Does the most abfolute monarch tell his army, that he is to continue them for any number of or any number of months? How long have we already continued our army from year to year? And if it thus continues, wherein will it differ from the standing armies of those countries which have already fubmitted their necks to the yoke? We are now come to the Rubicen; our army is now to be reduced, or it never will; from his Majefty's own mouth we are affured of a profound tranquillity abroad, we know there is one at home; if this is not a proper time, if thefe circumstances do not afford us a fafe opportunity for reducing at least a part of our regular forces, we never can expect to fee any reduction; and this nation, already overburdened with debts and taxes, must be loaded with the heavy charge of perpetually fupporting a numerous standing army; and remain for ever expofed to the danger of having its liberties and privileges trampled upon by any future King or Ministry, who shall take it in their heads to do so, and shall take a proper care to model the army for that purpose.

SIR JOHN ST. AUBIN's SPEECH FOR REPEALING THE SEPTENNIAL ACT.

MR. SPEAKER,

THE

'HE subject matter of this debate is of fuch importance, that I should be ashamed to return to my electors, with

out endeavouring, in the best manner I am able, to declare publickly the reasons which induced me to give my moft ready affent to this question.

THE people have an unquestionable right to frequent new Parliaments by ancient ufage; and this ufage has been confirmed by feveral laws, which have been progreffively made by our ancestors, as often as they found it neceffary to infist on this effential privilege.

PARLIAMENTS were generally annual, but never continued longer than three years, till the remarkable reign of Henry VIII. He, Sir, was a prince of unruly appetites, and of an arbitrary will; he was impatient of every retraint; the laws of God and man fell equally a facrifice, as they stood in the way of his avarice, or disappointed his ambition he therefore introduced long Parliaments, because he very well knew, that they would become the proper inftruments of both; and what a flavish obedience they paid to all his meafures is fufficiently known.

If we come to the reign of King Charles the First, we muft acknowledge him to be aprince of a contrary temper: he had certainly an innate love for religion and virtue. But here lay the misfortune-he was led from his natu, ral difpofition by fycophants and flatterers; they advised him to neglect the calling of frequent new parliaments, and therefore, by not taking the conftant fenfe of his people in what he did, he was worked up into fo high a notion of prerogative, that the Commons (in order to reftrain it) obtained that independent fatal power, which at last unhappily brought him to his moft tragical end, and at the fame time fubverted the whole conftitution. And I hope we fhall learn this leffon from it, never to compliment the crown with any new or extravagant powers, nor to deny the people thofe rights,

which by ancient ufage they are entitled to,; but to preferve the juft and equal balance, from which they will both derive mutual fecurity, and which, if duly obferved, will render our conftitution the envy and admiration of all the world.

KING CHARLES the Second naturally took a furfeit of Parliaments in his father's time, and was therefore extremely defirous to lay them afide. But this was a scheme impracticable. However, in effect, he did fo: for he obtained a Parliament, which, by its long duration, like an army of veterans, became fo exactly difciplined to his own meafures, that they knew no other command but from that perfon who gave them their pay.

THIS was a fafe and moft ingenious way of enflaving a nation. It was very well known, that arbitrary power, if it was open and avowed, would never prevail here. The people were therefore amufed with the fpecious form of their ancient conftitution: it exifted, indeed, in their fancy; but, like a mere phantom, had nosubstance nor reality in it ; for the power, the authority, the dignity of Parliaments were wholly loft. This was that remarkable Parliament which fo juftly obtained the opprobrious name of the PENSION PARLIAMENT ; and was the model from which, I be-' lieve, fome later Parliaments have been exactly copied..

At the time of the revolution, the people made a fresh claim of their ancient privileges; and as they had fo lately experienced the misfortune of long and fervile Parliments, t was then declared, that they fhould be held frequently. But, it feems, their full meaning was not understood by this declaration; and therefore, as in every new fettlement the intention of all parties fhould be specifically manifefted, the Parliament never ceafed ftruggling with the crown, till the triennial law was obtained: the preamble of it is extremely