preferable in the life and character of Brutus. If that, faid he, be true, then must we derive it, not from the fuccefs of his endeavours, but from their truth and rectitude. He had the comfort to be conscious, that his cause was a just one. It was impoffible the other should have any fuch feeling. I be lieve, faid I, you have explained it.

SUPPOSE then, continued he, (it is but merely an hypothefis) fuppofe, I fay, we were to place the Sovereign Good in fuch a rectitude of conduct, in the Conduct merely, and not in the Event. Suppose we were to fix our Happiness, not in the actual attainment of that health, that perfection of a focial state, that fortunate concurrence of externals, which is congruous to our nature, and which all have a right to purfue; but folely fix it in the mere doing whatever is correfpondent to fuch an end, even though we never attain, or are near attaining it. In fewer words; What if we make our natural state the standard only to determine our conduct; and place our happiness in the rectitude of this conduct alone? On fuch an hypothefis (and we confider it as nothing farther) we fhould not want a good, perhaps, to correfpond to our preconceptions; for this, it is evident, would be correfpondent to them all. Your doctrine, replied I, is fo new and ftrange, that though you have been copious in explaining, I can hardly yet comprehend you.

Ir amounts all, faid he, but to this; Place your happinefs, where your praise is. I asked, where he supposed that ? Not, replied he, in the pleasures which you feel, more than your difgrace lies in the pain; not in the cafual profperity of fortune, more than your difgrace in the cafual adverfity; but in juft complete action throughout every part of life, whatever be the face of things, whether favourable or the contrary.

BUT,..

But why then, faid I fuch accuracy about externals ? So much pains to be informed, what are purfuable, what avoidable? It behoves the Pilot, replied he, to know the feas and the winds; the nature of tempefts, calms and tides. They are the fubjects, about which his art is converfant. Without a juft experience of them, he can never prove himfelf an artist. Yet we look not for his reputation either in fair gales, or in adverfe; but in the skilfulness of his conduct, be thefe events as they happen. In like manner fares it with the moral artist. He, for a fubject, has the whole of human life health and fickness; pleasure and pain; with every other poffible incident, which can befal him during his existence. If his knowledge of all these be accurate and exact, fo too muft his conduct, in which we place his happiness. But if his knowledge be defective, muft not his conduct be defective alfo ? 1 replied, so it fhould feem. And if his conduct, then his happiness? It is

true.

:

You fee then, continued he, even though externals were as nothing; though it was true, in their own nature, they were neither good nor evil; yet an accurate knowledge of them is, from our hypothefis, abfolutely neceffary. Indeed, faid I, you have proved it.

HE contined-Inferior artists may be at a stand, because they want materials. From their stubbornness and intractability, they may often be disappointed. But as long as life is paffing, and nature continues to operate, the moral artist of life has at all times all he defires. He can never want a subject fit to exercise him in his proper calling; and that with this happy motive to the conftancy of his endeavours, that the croffer, the harsher, the more untoward the events, thegreater his praise, the more illuftrious his reputation.

ALL

But

ALL this, faid I, is true, and cannot be denied. one circumstance there appears, where your fimile feems to fail. The praise indeed of the Pilot we allow to be in his conduct; but it is in the fuccefs of that conduct, where we look for his happiness. If a ftorm arife, and the ship be loft, we call him not happy, how well foever he may have conducted it. It is then only we congratulate him, when he has reached the defired haven. Your diftinction, faid he, is juft. And it is here lies the noble prerogative of moral artists, above all other. But yet I know not how to explain my felf, I fear my doctrine will appear fo ftrange. You may proceed, faid I, fafely, fince you advance it but as an hypothefis.

THUS, then, continued he―The end in other arts is ever diftant and removed. It confifts not in the mere conduct, much lefs in a fingle energy; but is the just result of many energies, each of which are effential to it. Hence, by obftacles unavoidable, it may often be retarded: nay more, may befo embarraffed, as never poffibly to be attained.

But

the

in the moral art of life, the very conduct is the End ; very conduct, I fay, itself, throughout every its minutest energy; because each of these, however minute, partake as truly of rectitude, as the largest combinations of them, when confidered collectively. Hence, of all arts this is the only one perpetually complete in every inftant, because it needs. not, like other arts, time to arrive at that perfection, at which in every inflant it is arrived already. Hence by duration it is not rendered either more or lefs perfect; completion, like truth, admitting of no degrees, and being in no fenfe capable of either intenfion or remiffion. And hence too by necessary connection (which is a greater paradox than all) even that Happinefs or Sovereign Good, the end of this

moral

moral art, is itself too, in every inftant, confummate and complete ; is neither heightened nor diminished by the quan-tity of its duration, but is the fame to its enjoyers, for a moment or a century.

UPON this I fmiled. He afked me the reafon. It is only to observe, faid I, the courfe of our inquiries. A new hypothefis has been advanced: appearing fomewhat ftrange, it is defired to be explained. You comply with the request, and in pursuit of the explanation, make it ten times more obfcure and unintelligible, than before. It is but too often the fate, faid he, of us commentators. But you know in fuch cafes what is ufually done. When the comment will not explain the text, we try whether the text will not explain itself. This method, it is poffible, may affsist us here. The hypothefis, which we would have illuftrated, was no more than this: That the Sovereign Good lay in rectitude of Conduct and that this Good correfponded to all our pre-conceptions. Let us examine then, whether, upon trial, this correfpondence will appear to hold; and, for all that we have advanced fince, fuffer it to pass, and not perplex us. Agreed, faid I, willingly, for now I hope to comprehend you.

RECOLLECT then, faid he. Do you not remember that one pre-conception of the Sovereign Good, was to be accommodated to all times and places? I remember it. And is there any time, or any place, whence Rectitude of Conbe excluded? Is there not a right action in pro

duct may fperity, a right action in adverfity? May there not bea decent, generous, and laudable behaviour, not only in peace, in power, and in health; but in war, in oppreffion, in sickness, and in death? There may.

AND

AND what shall we fay to those other pre-conceptions; to being durable, félf-derived, and indeprivable? Can there be any Good fo durable, as the power of always doing right? Is there any Good conceivable, fo entirely beyond the power of others? Or, if you hefitate, and are doubtful, I would willingly be informed, into what circumftances may fortune throw a brave and honest man, where it shall not be in his power to act bravely and honestly? If there be no fuch, then Rectitude of Conduct, if a Good, isa Good indeprivable. I confefs, faid I, it appears fo.

BUT farther, faid he : Another pre-conception of the Sovereign Good was, to be agreeable to nature. It was. And can any thing be more agreeable to a rational and focial animal, than rational and focial conduct? Nothing. But Rectitude of Conduct is with us Rational and Social Conduct. It is.

ONCE more, continued he; Another pre-conception of this Good was, to be conducive not to mere-being, but to well being. Admit it. And can any thing, believe you, conduce fo probably to the well-being of a rational, focial animal, as the right exercise of that reason, and of those social affections? Nothing. And what is this fame exercise, but the highest Rectitude of Conduct? Certainly.

-A

CHA P. III.

ON CRITICISM.

HARRIS.

ND how did Garrick speak the foliloquy last night? Oh, against all rule, my lord, moft ungrammatically! betwixt the fubftantive and the adjective, which should agree together in number, cafe and gender, he made a breach thus, --stopping