selfish one which is often popularly ascribed to Utilitarians, or the wide one which most Utilitarian philosophers themselves maintain.

In the former case-that of Egoistic Hedonism-we have something not materially different from the ultimate motive of Hobbes, which is purely selfish, any intermediate consideration of the good of others being merely a means to the one self-regarding end.

In the latter case that of true Utilitarianism-the motive would appear practically to differ little from that set forth by Grotius in his law of nature (above, p. 121). It is perhaps rather wider in scope, as extending to other objects of general utility besides "society;" and in area, unless Grotius' "society" be taken, as perhaps it should, to include the whole

human race.

I do not here consider modern Utilitarianism as an index to the law of God. This is the well-known view taken of the Utilitarian theory by Austin 25. But Utilitarian philosophers themselves, I think, now consider the sanctions and motives of this rule of conduct as independent of a divine lawgiver". Austin's own identification of the law of nature with the law of God (above, p. 117) will be again considered in the next chapter.

Summary. I must now briefly re-state the different kinds of regular human conduct to which I have adverted; with the corresponding motives, as determining whether the rules in question would usually be considered law or not. For instinct there is no ulterior motive, and little in Bentham's physical sanctions. If there be any in this latter case, it is that of Hobbes' law of nature, i.e. the simple desire of self-preservation. Under the law of nature according to

24 Sidgwick "Methods of Ethics," 1. 1. p. 9.

25 Austin, 2, p. 109, &c., &c.

26 Sidgwick, ib. 4. 6, ad finem.

those philosophers who are practically Emotional Intuitionists -a case somewhat approaching that of instinct—the ultimate motive appears to be the approval or disapproval of the agent himself. Under Grotius' law of nature, which, though not very different in character from that just mentioned, comes still nearer to true Utilitarianism, obedience is due, in the last resort, to the general human desire for "society." The Utilitarian, in this, the wider sense of the word, is governed by a consideration of all consequences bearing upon the general good, and, as his ultimate motive, by a desire for the general good. The Utilitarian in the narrower sense, or Egoistic Hedonist, although his ultimate object is not absolutely identical with that of the Hobbists, may for our present purpose, be ranked with them.

In all these cases but instinct, there is some consideration of consequences, there is some ulterior motive. And yet I do not think that any of the "laws of nature," or any of the rules of conduct in general, here mentioned, would square with the ordinary understanding, by any age, of law and similar terms. This is not, I believe, merely because the rules in question are mostly confined to philosophers, and their influence is therefore recognised, at least consciously, by but few: it is rather because of the character of the motive to obedience. That motive appears to regard consequences which, if not virtually parts of the action and therefore scarcely to be considered consequences at all, are so necessarily resultant from it that they may be fairly called intrinsic or natural.

The motive to obedience, on the other hand, under what men have understood by law, has been, I believe, always in some manner connected with the extraneous approval or disapproval of other beings, either human or, if superhuman, capable of understanding human conduct and motives 27.

27 All law is laid down, according to Austin (1, p. 88), by "an intelligent being." He does not proceed to define, but the intelligence required is clearly that mentioned in the text.

This is almost certainly true at the present day, and I think that, even among the old names of law, those which are the most clearly free from any notion of imposition or command, as clearly postulate a long-standing general approval. The enquiry is merely into historical fact, past or present; involving no judgment as to which is the higher and which the lower motive, but the simple question what is the motive, put in the most general terms, which has induced men to obey what they commonly call law.

This peculiarity, then, of the motive to obedience is, as it appears to me, the practical and logical differentia, by which we can strike off from law properly so called not only the "laws" of instinct, but every "law of nature" which is not conceived as identical with the law of God. In all such cases the use of the word law, if not so lax as in the case of inanimate matter or abstractions, is yet, and would be generally considered, distinctly metaphorical.

CHAPTER XI.

DEFINITION: LAW, AS TO ITS SANCTION.

Grotius' voluntary law. In our analysis of Blackstone's definition, as compared with the ordinary acceptation of the word law and the like, we have successively eliminated the "laws" of inanimate matter, of instinct, and of nature (not considered as the law of God); taking as an essential characteristic of law properly, and ordinarily, so called, that the motive for obedience to it depends upon extraneous approval or disapproval (all consequences of such approval or disapproval being of course included). We have arrived in fact, by our investigation of law generally, at what Grotius calls Voluntary law, as owing its origin to will human or divine'. On the latter case I shall speak presently; in the former, according to Grotius, the will may be that of a national sovereign, or of some one in a position subordinate to such a sovereign; finally, it may be that of all or many nations 2.

Grotius compared with Hobbes and Blackstone. Grotius looks here rather at those who influence than, as I have done, at those who are influenced, to obedience; and his definition of national law is in this passage identical with that of Hobbes: but that he does not consider the im

1 De Jure, &c. 1. 1. 13. Quod ex voluntate originem ducit: estque vel humanum vel divinum.

2 Ib. 1. 1. 14. 1.

position by a sovereign essential to law is perfectly clear from the last cases.

Hobbes, on the other hand, at once defines law as a command addressed to one formerly obliged to obey. In accordance with this view, he thus expresses the step from the laws of nature, improperly so called, to the law of nature properly so called, as being the law of God. "These dictates. of reason...are but conclusions or theorems...but yet if we consider the same theorems as delivered in the word of God, that by right commandeth all things, then are they properly called laws."

In entire agreement with Hobbes is Blackstone's general definition of law, of which I now come to the main pointsthat it is a rule of action prescribed by some superior and which the inferior is bound to obey'. Had Blackstone adhered to this definition he would, of course, never have incurred the censures of Austin. As a matter of fact he deserts his doctrine of prescription, both in the case of the law of nature and of municipal or national law. The former "exists in the nature of things anterior to any positive precept," and "the Creator himself always conforms to these eternal and immutable laws of good and evils". So, too, when he comes to consider the municipal law of England, Blackstone recognises, at the very outset, laws which receive their

Indeed he admits (1. 1. 14. 2) a jus civile (national law) non scriptum, which is proved usu continuo et testimonio peritorum. This is scarcely reconcileable with the statement above, that all jus civile "a potestate civili proficiscitur," unless on the assumption of obsolete statutes for every rule (see Hale, Hist. Common Law, cap. iv. p, 66).

4 Above, p. 104.

5 Above, p. 121.

6 66 Leviathan," Part 1. chap. 15 ad finem, p. 80.

7 Blackstone, Int. 2. ad init. p. 38.

8 Ib. p. 40. See too above, p. 122.