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first of August a commission was issued against Symes, who was declared a bankrupt on the 19th.

In a

In September, the plaintiffs demanded the cloths in question of the defendant, who refused to deliver them up, saying, "He might as well give up every transaction of his life," but making no demand. conversation in the March ensuing he said, "The thing might have been settled long ago if the assignees would have allowed him his demand for milling and rowing the eight pieces of cloth." The value of the cloths in dispute was £98 38., and the defendant's general balance against Symes for milling, dyeing, and rowing cloth, £188 11s. It was contended at the trial that the defendant's lier, as far as he had any, was merged in the purchase of the cloth; and that at all events he had waived it by not making any claim in respect of it when the cloth was demanded. The learned judge directed the jury that the plaintiffs, previously to their demand, ought to have tendered at least the amount of the lien for workmanship on the cloths in dispute; but he reserved the point as to the merger of the lien for the consideration of this court. A verdict having been found for the defendant, on the issue as to these eight pieces of cloth,

Taddy, Serjeant, now moved for a rule nisi to set aside this verdict

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e the defendant of the right to which he is entitled, the right of It might have been otherwise if the defendant, when called on to ender the goods, had relied on the purchase; but this was not the se, and the verdict must stand.

PARK, J. If the defendant, on the first conversation, had said any

thing inconsistent with the claim of lien there might have been some ground for this application; but the transactions of his life were milling and rowing cloth, and those were the transactions which he said he might as well give up, if he gave up this. The subsequent conversation puts the matter out of doubt, when he declared the thing might have been settled, if his demand for milling and rowing the cloth had been allowed; and this clearly shows he never intended to relinquish his lien.

BURROUGH, J. If he had said he purchased the cloth, and that the lien formed part of the price, there might be some ground for the motion. But it is clear the fact was not so. Rule refused.

JACOBS v. LATOUR.

COMMON PLEAS. 1828.

[Reported 5 Bing. 130.]

TROVER for the conversion of certain race-horses. At the trial before Burrough, J., last Hertford assizes, it appeared that these horses had been placed by Lawton with the defendant Messer, a trainer, and were by him kept and trained for running. Lawton being indebted to Messer for his services in this respect, and for the keep of the horses, and being insolvent, Messer obtained a judgment against him on the 5th of May, 1827, for £227, upon which he issued a fi. fa. on the 16th of the same month, returnable on the 23d. The levy was made on the 16th, and under it the horses in question, which had never been out of his possession, were sold to Messer for £156.

On the 22d of May, 1827, a commission of bankrupt having issued against Lawton, upon an act of bankruptcy committed in February, 1825, the plaintiff, as his assignee, brought this action to recover the value of the before-mentioned horses.

It was contended, on the part of the defendants, that if the execution would not avail against the commission of bankrupt, at all events the defendant Messer had a lien for his services in training the horses, which entitled him to keep them till his account was settled; a verdict, however, was found for the plaintiff, with leave for the defendants to move to set it aside on this ground, and enter a nonsuit instead. Accordingly Wilde, Serjt. obtained a rule nisi to this effect, citing Chase v. Westmore, 5 M. & S. 180.

Andrews, Serjt., for the plaintiff.

Wilde, for the defendant.

BEST, C. J. This was an action of trover against a stable keeper and trainer, to recover the value of certain horses placed with him for the purpose of being trained. The first question in the cause is, Whether the defendant had any lien on the horses; and the second,

Whether, if he had a lien, it was destroyed by his taking the horses in execution.

It is not necessary for us to enter on the first question, because we are of opinion that if he had any lien, it was destroyed by the exechtion at his suit.

A lien is destroyed if the party entitled to it gives up his right to the possession of the goods. If another person had sued out execution, the defendant might have insisted on his lien. But Messer himself called on the sheriff to sell; he set up no lien against the sale; on the contrary, he thought his best title was by virtue of that sale. Now, in order to sell, the sheriff must have had possession; but after he had possession from Messer, and with his assent, Messer's subsequent possession must have been acquired under the sale, and not by virtue of his lien.

As between debtor and creditor the doctrine of lien is so equitable that it cannot be favored too much; but as between one class of creditors and another there is not the same reason for favor.

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TROVER for a mare. Pleas, first, not guilty; secondly, that the mare was not the property of the plaintiff. At the trial before Parke, B., at the last Assizes for the county of Suffolk, it appeared that the mare in question had been sent on more than one occasion to the premises of the defendant, who was a farmer, to be covered by a stallion belonging to him, and the charge of 11s. for the last occasion not having been paid, the defendant refused on demand to deliver up the mare, claiming a lien not only for the 118., but for a further sum amounting altogether to £9 78. 4d., for covering other mares belonging to the plaintiff, and including also a small sum for poor-rates; on which demand and refusal, the plaintiff, without making any tender of the 118., brought the present action. It also appeared in evidence that the contract in question was made and executed on a Sunday. The learned judge, on these facts being proved, directed the jury to find a verdict for the plaintiff for £25, the value of the mare, giving liberty to the defendant to move to enter a nonsuit on the three following points, which were raised at the trial: - First, whether this was a case in which any lien would exist at all; secondly, if it could, whether the defendant had waived his lien for this particular charge by insisting on payment of his whole demand; and thirdly, whether this contract, being made and executed on a Sunday, was void by the statute 29 Car. 2, c. 7. Byles having, in Easter Term, obtained a rule nisi accordingly,

286

Kelly and Gunning showed cause.

Byles and O'Malley, contra.

PARKE, B. With respect to the principal point in this case (which has been very well argued on both sides) as to the right of lien on 0

Searfe & Morgan

Drover for a mare which def refused to debrer of claiming a liew on the bare for acrvices amounting to 116 and for other services amounting to £97. Pe brought action without offering 115. ct. def had not rained lien of this particular charge by moiting жой on payment of his whole nemand, and contrast not roid bicauce madit executed in Furiday:

Since Pl did not tender any

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i mare a guncial account win you, on when a patanice is due to

me of so much," and part of it was, particularly, a charge of 11s. for
covering this mare. The cases referred to by Mr. Kelly seem to be
distinguishable from the present. In the case of Boardman v. Sill,
the defendant did not mention his lien at all, but claimed to hold, the
goods on the ground of a right of property in them, and did not set up
any claim of lien at all. In Knight v. Harrison, the ground of refusal
was, that the right of property was in another person as to the goods in
question, and that he had a general lien for expenses on those goods.
Neither of those two cases appears to me to apply to the present. In
this case it would be strange to say that the defendant meant to
waive his lien of the 11s. when that was one of the things he said he
would hold the mare for, and it would be equally strange to say that he
meant to excuse the tender of that sum, when no tender was made of

any sum at all. I do not mean to say that such circumstances may

not occur as would amount to the waiver of a lien, and of the tender,
but that a great deal more must have passed than was proved to have
passed on the present occasion. If he had said, "You need not trouble
yourself to make a tender of the sum for which I have a lien, and I
shall claim to hold the mare for it," the plaintiff would then be in the
same situation as if a tender had been made; but we think the defend-
ant cannot be deprived of his right of holding the property on which he
had a lien, by anything that has passed on the present occasion. Then,
as to the other objection, that this was an illegal contract, on the
ground of its having been made on a Sunday; we are of opinion that
this is not a case within the statute 20 Car. 2, c. 7, which only had in
its contemplation the case of persons exercising trades, &c. on that
day, and not one like the present, where the defendant, in the ordinary

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