Cross-Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of ComplexityErik Gartzke, Jon R. Lindsay The complexity of the twenty-first century threat landscape contrasts markedly with the bilateral nuclear bargaining context envisioned by classical deterrence theory. Nuclear and conventional arsenals continue to develop alongside anti-satellite programs, autonomous robotics or drones, cyber operations, biotechnology, and other innovations barely imagined in the early nuclear age. The concept of cross-domain deterrence (CDD) emerged near the end of the George W. Bush administration as policymakers and commanders confronted emerging threats to vital military systems in space and cyberspace. The Pentagon now recognizes five operational environments or so-called domains (land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace), and CDD poses serious problems in practice. In Cross-Domain Deterrence, Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay assess the theoretical relevance of CDD for the field of International Relations. As a general concept, CDD posits that how actors choose to deter affects the quality of the deterrence they achieve. Contributors to this volume include senior and junior scholars and national security practitioners. Their chapters probe the analytical utility of CDD by examining how differences across, and combinations of, different military and non-military instruments can affect choices and outcomes in coercive policy in historical and contemporary cases. |
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Cross-Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity Erik Gartzke,Jon R. Lindsay Limited preview - 2019 |
Cross-Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an ERA of Complexity Jon R. Lindsay,Erik Gartzke No preview available - 2019 |
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31 January accessed 25 accessed 31 January action actors advantage adversaries Air Force air power alliance allies army ASAT asymmetric Athenian Athens attacks capabilities challenges chapter China Chinese coercers coercion coercive Cold Cold War command commitments Compellence complexity conflict conventional countervalue credibility crisis cross cyber deterrence cyber operations cyberattacks cyberspace defense deterrence policies deterrence theory diplomatic domain deterrence East Asia East Germany Easter Offensive economic effective emerging escalation Europe extended deterrence George H. W. Bush global Greenhill ground forces increasing intelligence interests International Security Korea launch limited means military power missiles National Security NATO naval North Korea nuclear deterrence nuclear triad nuclear weapons offensive options parties Peloponnesian War political potential problem region response retaliation risk Russian satellites signal Soviet Union space systems Sparta stability strategy success targets threats Thucydides treaty U.S. air U.S. military U.S. policymakers United University Press violations vulnerabilities warfare warfighting