FELLOW SERVANTS. See Negligence, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.

FORECLOSURE. See Equity, 7. Receiver, 1. Bill of Review, 7. Me-

chanic's Lien, 3.

1. SHERIFF'S CERTIFICATE

- REDEMPTION FROM MORTGAGE FORE-
CLOSURE-WHEN NOT CONCLUSIVE-STATUTES OF MINNESOTA.-
A sheriff's certificate of redemption from a mortgage foreclosure sale
is not so far conclusive under the statutes of Minnesota as to prevent
the redemptioner from showing that he paid the full amount of the
redemption money within the time fixed by the statute for the making
of a valid redemption. Paige v. Smith,

FORFEITURE. See Receiver, 6.

FRAUD. See Practice, 2. Receiver, 6.

457

Grantor, 1. Accounting, 1, 2.

Bill of Review, 2, 3, 4, 5. Tax

Conveyance, 1. Insurance, 3, 4, 5.
Sale, 3. Decree, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Conditional Sales, 2. Attachment, 3.
Injunction, 9. Homestead Entries, 9. Mortgage, 1, 2, 3.

-

1. VENDOR'S FRAUD - PRIVITY - NOTICE - REMEDY.-It is a sound
rule of equity, that where the vendee of personal property buys in good
faith and without notice of fraud on the part of the vendor, and
pays only a part of the consideration, agreeing to pay the remainder
at a future day, if before final payment he receives notice of the
vendor's fraud, he will be protected only to the amount actually paid
before notice; but it is doubtful whether this rule can be applied and
enforced in a court of law. Sousteby v. Keeley et al.
103
2. SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY - PROMISE BY VENDEE TO PAY
VENDOR'S DEBT.-There is a conflict of authority in this country
upon the question whether a promise made by the vendee of personal
property, in consideration of the purchase, to pay a debt due from the
vendor to a third party, is a contract upon which the latter may sue
the former. Authorities cited. The affirmative has been held by the
supreme court of Minnesota, and the negative by the supreme court
of the United States.

Id.
3. STATE AND FEDERAL DECISIONS - RULE OF DECISION IN FEDERAL
COURTS. Even upon questions of purely commercial law, the fed-
eral courts should follow those of the state, if it appears that by rea-
son of the situation of the parties and of the subject-matter, to hold
otherwise would subject a party to double payment of the same debt,
without the possibility of relief from the federal courts. Such a case
presents reasons for following the supreme court of the state, so cogent
as to justify a circuit court in making it an exception to the rule re-
quiring it to follow the rulings of the supreme court of the United
States.
Id.

4. FRAUD-HOW ALLEGED-INTENT.- An allegation that the de-
fendant wrongfully, falsely and fraudulently certified and represented
certain material facts to be true, whereas none of them were true, is

FRAUD-continued.

a sufficient allegation of fraud, as they clearly mean that such representations were made with fraudulent intent. Bank of Montreal v. Thayer,

1

5. RECEIVER'S CERTIFICATE OF INDEBTEDNESS PAYABLE TO BEARER RIGHTS OF INNOCENT PURCHASER - FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATIONS.- Where a receiver of a railroad issued a certificate falsely and fraudulently stating that there was due the Joliet Iron and Steel Company, or bearer, $5,000 for indebtedness incurred by him, and falsely representing that the same was issued by order of court, and constituted a first lien on the railroad, etc., being for iron rails for constructing said road: Held, that such representations are to be considered as addressed to, and to be acted upon by any purchaser of the certificate in the market before maturity, and that it was not necessary to allege an intent to defraud the plaintiff, who was such a purchaser; nor was it necessary to allege or prove that there was a fraud practiced upon the Joliet Iron and Steel Company, the payee. In such a case the law presumes the intent to defraud whoever might purchase the certificates in the market, and upon the faith of the representations expressed upon their face. Id.

6. SAME.- Plaintiff must show that he acted upon said representations, and had a right to act upon them.

Id.

7. SAME-WARRANTY.- When such an instrument is sued upon as a warranty, the action must be in the name of the person to whom such warranty is addressed, and cannot be maintained by a purchaser of the certificate who has no assignment of the cause of action upon the warranty. The action in such a case is ex contractu.

FREIGHT. See Negligence, 14.

GARNISHEE. See Garnishment, 1.

GARNISHMENT.

1. GARNISHMENT

ld.

- INTERROGATION OF GARNISHEE.- A garnishee may be required to answer questions tending to show that he was party to a fraudulent assignment by the defendant in the suit. Oberteuffer and others v. Harwood, and Petit, Garnishee, 415

GRANTEES. See Mining Claim, 11. Grantor, 1.

GRANTOR.

1. GRANTOR AND GRANTEE-PRIOR FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE PURCHASER AT SHERIFF'S SALE - SUBSEQUENT CONVEYANCE TO GRANTOR.- Hymer fraudulently conveyed the land in controversy to his minor children, by deed of warranty, in September, 1861. The same land was subsequently attached by the creditors of Hymer, and sold at sheriff's sale to Rogers for the sum of $451. Hymer subsequently conveyed the same land to Arnold by deed of warranty, dated

GRANTOR-continued.

November 30, 1863, in consideration of $1,000. Afterwards, May 7,
1864, Hymer procured a deed from Rogers for the sum of $451, the
purchase money having been advanced by Arnold. Held, there being
presumptive evidence that part of the $1,000 received from Arnold
had been invested for the benefit of the wife and children of Hymer,
that the deed from Rogers to Hymer inured to the benefit of Arnold.
Arnold v. Hymer and others,
631

GRANTS OF LAND. See Statute of Limitation, 6.

1. GRANT OF LAND TO THE TERRITORY OF MINNESOTA TO AID IN
THE CONSTRUCTION OF RAILROADS INDEMNITY CLAUSE-ACT
OF MARCH 3, 1857-SELECTION OF INDEMNITY LANDS-ACT OF
MARCH 3, 1865-ACT OF JULY 13, 1866. Barney and others v.
Winona & St. Peter Railway Company,

GUARANTY. See Note, 2.

HABEAS CORPUS. See Jurisdiction, 2.

HOMESTEAD ENTRIES. See Land Grant, 3, 4, 5.

421

1. HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPTION LAWS-To WHAT LANDS THEY
APPLY.-The fact that the title to land may be in the United States
does not necessarily make it that part of the public domain which is
subject to settlement by citizens of the United States under the home-
stead and pre-emption laws. The United States v. Payne, 289
2. TREATY-FORCE AND EFFECT OF AS A CONVEYANCE OF LANDS.-
The treaty-making power has a right to convey title to the lands of
the United States without an act of congress, and if a treaty acts di-
rectly on the subject of the grant, it is equivalent to an act of congress,
and the grantee has a good title.

Id.
3. TREATY-MAKING POWER MAY RESERVE PART OF PUBLIC DO-
MAIN.-The treaty-making power can reserve a part of the public
domain for a specific lawful purpose, because this is but the exercise
of a less higher power than that which conveys title.
Id.
4. PRESIDENT'S PROCLAMATION RESERVING PART OF PUBLIC DO-
MAIN.- The president of the United States can by proclamation or
executive order reserve a part of the public domain for a specific law-
ful purpose.

-

Id.
5. POWER OF CONGRESS TO RESERVE, etc.— Congress can by law re-
serve a part of the public domain for such purpose.
Id.
6. RESERVATION - WHAT CONSTITUTES.- No set form of words or
phrases need be used to set aside a reservation. It is enough if there
are sufficient words to indicate the purpose of the power that acts, to
show that it intended to act in a given case.
Id.

7. COLORED PERSONS-THEIR RIGHTS IN INDIAN COUNTRY.-Col-
ored persons who were never held as slaves in the Indian country, but

HOMESTEAD ENTRIES- continued.

who may have been slaves elsewhere, are like other citizens of the United States, and have no more rights in the Indian country than other citizens of the United States.

-

Id.

8. TREATY How CONSTRUED.-A treaty, like an ordinary contract or a statute, must be construed to give it effect, if possible, and courts always adhere to this rule. In construing a treaty we have a right to take into consideration the situation of the parties to it at the time it was made. The property which is the subject-matter of the treaty, and the intention and purposes of the parties in making the treaty. To get at the purposes and intention of the parties, we have a right to consider the construction the parties to the treaty, and who were to be affected by it, have given it, and what has been their action under it. Id. 9. SAME.-The construction of a treaty to be taken as the true one, is the one which has been adopted and acted upon by all the parties to it, unless the parties to it were mutually led into this construction by fraud or mistake. In a case where the mutual construction was in the face of the language used, and the rights of third parties had intervened, the language would be taken as governing. Id. 10. SEVERANCE OF A TRACT OF LAND FROM PUBLIC DOMAIN.- A tract of land lawfully appropriated to any purpose becomes thereafter severed from the mass of public lands, and no subsequent law or proclamation will be construed to embrace it or operate upon it. Although no exception is made, congress cannot be supposed to include it by a law general in its terms. This doctrine applies with more force to Indian than to military reservations. Id. 11. INDIAN TITLE EFFECT OF ITS EXTINCTION.- As soon as Indians part with their title the land ceases to be Indian country, without any further act of congress, unless by the treaty by which the Indians parted with their title, or by some act of congress, or some executive order of the president, a different rule was made applicable.

Id.

12. HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION CONTRACT ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.- Under section 2695 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, the homestead of a debtor who is the head of a family is exempt from sale for debts contracted before its acquisition by such debtor. Where a single note was given by the debtor before the acquisition of the homestead, and after such acquisition it was agreed between the parties that said note should be given up and cancelled, and five new notes for sums ranging from $100 to $150 should be given in its stead, in order to enable the creditor to sue in a justice's court, held, that such new notes created new indebtedness in place of the old, and were an accord and satisfaction of the latter. In re Dixon, Bankrupt, 556 · CONSIDERATION.— An agreement by the debtor at the creditor's request and for his accommodation, to give new notes

13. SAME-SAME

--

HOMESTEAD ENTRIES-continued.

for small sums so as to enable the creditor to sue before a justice of

the peace, is a sufficient consideration for an agreement to cancel a previous contract.

HOT SPRINGS RESERVATION. See Commissioners, 1, 2, 3.

HUSBAND. See Negligence, 12.

IMPLICATION. See Commissioners, 10.

IMPROVEMENTS. See Commissioners, 3.

Id.

INDIAN COUNTRY.

See Reservation.

sioners, 8, 9.

Homestead Entries, 7. Commis

INDIAN TITLE. See Homestead Entries, 11.

INDIAN TREATIES. See Commissioners, 7.

INDEMNITY BOND. See Equity, 1. County, 2.

INDEMNITY OF LANDS-CLAUSE. See Grants of Land, 1.
INDICTMENT.

1. INDICTMENT FOR SEVERAL OFFENSES IN ONE INDICTMENT.- Sec. 1024 of the Revised Statutes of the United States permits separate offenses of the same class, and growing out of the same transactions, to be joined in one indictment in separate counts, provided they be such as may be properly joined. Ex parte Peters, 403

2. SAME BURGLARY-LARCENY.- Burglary and larceny growing out of the same transaction are such distinct offenses as to be properly joined in the same indictment in separate counts and separately punished. Id. 3. SAME-SAME-SAME.- Held, accordingly, that a person who breaks and enters a house with intent to steal therefrom, and actually steals, may be punished under separate indictments, or under separate counts in the same indictment, for two offenses, or one, at the election of the power prosecuting him; and a person charged and convicted of both offenses growing out of the same transaction is not entitled to be released from imprisonment on habeas corpus, upon the ground that his sentence was illegal and void, either in whole or in part.

INDORSEMENT. See Negligence, 17.

Id.

INFRINGEMENT. See Bill of Review, 8. Estoppel, 3. Patent, 1. 1. INFRINGEMENT SUSPENSION OF INTERLOCUTORY DECREE POWER OF COURT.- The suspension of an interlocutory decree, perpetually enjoining the infringement of a patent, until an accounting can be had and a decree entered from which an appeal can be taken, rests in the discretion of the court which granted the decree. Brown v. Deere, Mansur & Co. 425