fort of fuperiority over the reft, they are, to all intents and purposes, three diftinct Gods. For if each of them, feparately confidered, be poffeffed of all divine perfections, fo that nothing is wanting to complete divinity, each of them must be as properly a God as any being poffeffed of all the properties of man must be a man, and therefore three persons pofsessed of all the attributes of divinity must be as properly three Gods as three perfons poffeffed of all human artributes must be three men. Thefe three perfons, therefore, muft be incapable of any ftrict or numerical unity. It must be univerfally true, that three things to which the fame definition applies can never make only one thing to which the fame definition applies. And when by the words thing, being, or person we mean nothing more than, logically speaking, the subject, or substratum of properties or attributes, it is a matter of indifference which of them we make use of.

Each of these three perfons may have other properties, but they must be numerically three in that respect in which the fame definition applies to them. If, therefore, the three perfons agree in this circumstance, that they are each of them perfect God, though they may differ in other refpects, and have peculiar relations to each other, and to us, they muft ftill be three Gods; and to fay that they are only one God is as much a contradiction, as to fay that three men, though they differ from one ano

ther

ther as much as three men can do, are not three men, but only one man.

If it be faid, with the Antenicene fathers, and with bishops Pearfon and Bull, among the modern English writers, that the Father is the fountain of deity, and that the fon is derived from him, whether neceffarily or voluntarily, whether in time or from eternity, they cannot be of the fame rank: but the Father will be poffeffed of an original, a real, and proper fuperiority to the Son; who will be no more than an effect upon the Father's exertion of his powers, which is, to all intents and purposes, making the Son to be a production or creature of the Father; even though it should be fuppofed with the antients that he was created out of the substance of the Father, and without taking any thing from him. Moreover, as upon this scheme the Son was never capable of giving birth to another perfon like himself, he must have been originally inferior in power to the Father, the fource from which he himself sprang. On this scheme, therefore, there is no proper equality between these divine perfons; and the Antenicene Fathers did not pretend that there was, but diftinguished the Father by the epithet of avrode, God of himself, and the Son by the inferior title of 9 x J, God of God, or a derived God.

EX

If it be faid that there is only one intelligent fupreme mind, but that it exerts itself three different ways, and has three different modes of action, or operation

operation (which was the opinion of Dr. Wallis, and that which was generally afcribed to the ancient Sabellians), with respect to one of which the fame divine Being was called the Father, to another the Son, and another the Holy Spirit; there is no proper trinity at all. For on the fame principle one man, bearing three different offices, or having three different relations or capacities, as those of magiftrate, father, fon, &c. would be three different

men.

Some represent themselves as believing the doctrine of the trinity by aflerting with Dr. Dod dridge, that God is fo united to the derived "nature of Chrift, and does fo dwell in it, that, "by virtue of that union, Christ may be properly

called God, and fuch regards become due to him, 56 as are not due to any created nature, or mere "creature, be it in itself ever fo excellent."

What this union is, in confequence of which any creature can be entitled to the attributes and honours of his creator, is not pretended to be explained; but as we cannot poffibly have any idea of an union between God and a creature, befides that of God being prefent with that creature, and acting by him, which is the fame thing that is afferted by the Arians or Socinians, thefe nominal trinitarians must neceffarily belong to one or other of thefe two claffes. This is fo evident, that it is hardly poffi

See his Lectures, propofition 128, p. 392.

ble

ble not to suppose but that they must have been much affifted at leaft in deceiving themselves into a belief that they were trinitarians, by the influence which a dread of the odium and other inconveni⚫ ences attending the Arian or Socinian doctrine had on their minds. The prefence of God the Father with any creature, whether it be called an union with him, or it be expreffed in any other manner whatever, can be nothing more than the unity of the Father in that creature; and whatever it be that God voluntarily imparts, he may withdraw again at pleasure. And what kind of divinity muft that be, which is dependent upon the will of another?

Upon none of the modifications, therefore, which have been mentioned (and all others may be reduced to thefe) can the doctrine of the trinity, or of three divine perfons in one God be fupported. In most of them the doctrine itself is loft, and where it remains it is inconfiftent with reafon and common fense.

II. ARGUMENTS FROM REASON AGAINST THE

ARIAN HYPOTHESIS.

THE Arian doctrine, of the world having been made and governed not by the fupreme God himfelf, but by Chrift, the Son of God, though no contradiction in itself, is, on several accounts, highly improbable.

Our reafoning from effects to causes carries us no farther than to the immediate creator of the vifible univerfe. For if we can fuppofe that being to have had a caufe, or author, we may suppose that his caufe or author had a higher caufe, and fo on ad infinitum. According to the light of nature, therefore, the immediate caufe or author of the vifible univerfe is the felf-exiftent first cause, and not any being acting under him, as his inftrument. However, the scheme itself is not naturally impoffible, fince a being poffeffed of power fufficient to produce the vifible univerfe, which is a limited production, may be finite, and therefore may derive his power, and his being, from one who is fuperior to him. But though the Arian scheme cannot be faid to be in itself impoffible, it is, on feveral accounts, extremely improbable a priori, and therefore ought not to be admitted without very ftrong and clear evidence.

If this great derived being, the supposed makerand governor of the world, was united to a human body, he must either have retained, and have exercifed, his extraordinary powers during this union, or have been divested of them; and either fuppofition has its peculiar difficulties and improbabilities..

If this great being retained his proper powers. during this union, he must have been sustaining the whole universe, and fuperintending all the laws of nature, while he was an infant at the breast of his

mother,