As, of late, I have not attended upon your miniftry fo conftantly as heretofore; and as I have fome ground to think that you judge me to be guilty of a fault in abfenting myself, you will permit me to affign a reason in justification of my conduct.

You are very fenfible, fir, that you and I differ very much in our religious opinions; fo much, indeed, that I have heard you declare, that a person who thinks as I do, is, on that account, excluded from falvation. Such a declaration, however, affects me but little; knowing well, that the great and good God hath never fo declared; and therefore efteeming

the fentence of any frail and fallible man as a thing of little moment. Though, by the way, it seems no trifling affair, with refpect to the perfon himself, who places himself in the seat of judgment, and pronounces condemnation on his brother for his opinions. This man had need look well to his authority. And how if, in the end, it should appear that the party fo condemned, is one whom God approves ? But to return:-The wide difference in our fentiments, of neceffity, prevents my gaining that profit from your ministry, which I would heartily wish to gain and thus the principal defign of public worship is defeated. How should I be profited by what I am Shocked and grieved to hear?-by that which the reverence which I owe to the ever bleffed God obliges me to regard without abhorrence?-that at which I am really afhamed to be shocked and grieved no more ; as, indeed, I fhould be, if I had fuch a fenfe of God upon my mind as I ought to have. Yet although I think fo ill of your tenets, confidered in themselves, believing your fincerity unquestionable, I do, at the fame time, account you a good and a worthy man. Such is every man, who, according to his best judgment, pratifes what is right and good. Sincerity, fir, is the chief thing in religion. You would think it fo in a matter between you and your friend. And why not in religion? Because, fay you, the great God doth not judge as man judges. Now, as I apprehend this to be a capital miflake, I will examine it a little;

and

and what I shall say of it will be no improper introduction to what follows.

And furely, if the great God did not judge of good and evil as we judge, he would never have made this appeal to the wicked Ifraelites. "O houfe "of Ifrael! are not my ways equal? Are not your

ways unequal?"-It will be readily granted, that the thoughts and ways of the deity are, in one respect, far above our thoughts, and our ways. It would be very ftrange if it were not fo. The divine mind, seeing the whole compass of truth, and acting even to the extremeft bounds of the univerfe, confequently fees and acts upon reasons unknown to us. But, as all truth is confiftent, that which is unknown to us cannot be oppofite and contradictory to that which is known. Shall we, then, fay we know nothing? In this cafe would not our own hearts testify the falfity of our affertion? Shall we fay that human reason was fo totally perverted by the fall, that it only deceives us? And fhall we prove this too? But how? Shall we prove by reason that reason is deceitful? The attempt has often been made: but certainly no abfurdity can be more grofs. Shall we prove it by fcripture? But fuppofe we are afked, "have you any "good reason to think the genuine sense of the fcrip"ture is fuch?" What shall we answer? If we say no; in this cafe will not our confciences condemn us, for receiving fuch doctrine as the genuine fenfe of fcripture. If we fay yes; is it not, then, manifeft

that, in judging of the sense of scripture, we are determined by reafon? And thus is it not manifeft, that the fcriptural proof of reafon's deceitfulness, is ultimately derived from deceitful reafon itself? It is undeniably and confequently fuch proof is deceitful proof, and cannot be depended upon. If we do depend upon it, in fo doing we declare that reason is not deceitful, in direct oppofition to the very tenet which we were intending to establish. Pray attend to this. Indeed, fir, it is very melancholy, to confider how men have confounded and perverted a reasonable nature. However, notwithstanding all that has been urged to the contrary, it is abundantly evident, that we are endowed with capacities to judge aright, (within certain limits) even as the great God himself judges, concerning good and evil *. It is true we may incapacitate ourfelves, and then put the one for the other; and it feems too true, that this has been done by all who have perfuaded themselves that human reason, as fuch, is totally perverted; fo as to be quite unable to judge concerning good and evil, or things of a religious

nature.

Thus much, fir, being premifed, I now beg leave to mention those doctrines of your's, to which I principally object, and the ground of my objections.

The

Your contrary belief feems to have no other fupport than the notion of the deceitfulness of human reafon, refulting from the fall, which notion has nothing to fupport it.

The doctrines are, that of the trinity according to Athanafius; the doctrine of original fin; the doctrine of election and reprobation; the doctrine of the fatisfaction, and that of imputed righteoufnefs.

The doctrine of the trinity, as Athanafius and you represent it, appears to me utterly abfurd and contradictory: because you represent the father, the fon, and the spirit, as three feparate agents, each of them God,. each of them infinite: and yet you fay there is but one infinite God. You will not, furely, fay the father, fon, and fpirit, are not three feparate agents; when, at the fame time, you affert, that the father fent the fon into the world, who, in confequence of being fo fent, came into the world, and did and fuffered what is recorded of him: when, at the fame time, you affert alfo, that the father fent the fpirit in the name of the fon, and that the fpirit, in confequence of being fo fent, came into the world, and convinced mankind of fin, &c. Surely, fir, you will not say that the fender and the fent, he who commands, and he who obeys, are not feparate agents, but the fame*. Here then are three agents, each of whom you affirm to be infinite,

* Whenever you declare the fon and fpirit to be equal with the father, you do, in the very terms, acknowledge that their exiflence is Separate from the father's existence. You always conceive of things as exifting feparately, when you think of their equality: you cannot help it if you would. But you may impose upon yourself.