biddest time to flow throughout ages, and continuing unmoved thyself, givest motion to every thing else, &c. *" It is also a great comfort, to have the faith of this Providence constantly impressed upon the mind, so as to have recourse to it in the midst of all confusions, whether public or private, and all calamities from without or from within; to be able to say-The great King, who is also my Father, is the supreme ruler of all these things, and with Him all my interests are secure; to stand firm, with Moses, when no relief appears, and to look for the salvation of God from on high; and, finally, in every distress, when all hope of human assistance is swallowed up in despair, to have the remarkable saying of the father of the faithful stamped upon the mind, and to silence all fears with these comfortable words, God will provide. In a word, there is nothing that can so effectually conform the heart of man, and his inmost thoughts, and consequently the whole tenour of his life, to the most perfect rule of religion and piety, as a firm belief and frequent meditation on this Divinė Providence, which superintends and governs the world. He who is firmly persuaded, that an exalted God of infinite wisdom and purity is constantly present with him, and sees all that he thinks or acts, will, to be sure, have no occasion to overawe his mind with the imaginary presence of a Lælius or a Cato. Josephus assigns this as the source or root of Abel's purity: "In all his actions," says he, "he considered that God was present with him, and therefore made virtue his constant study +. Moreover, the heathen nations acknowledge this superintendence of Divine Providence over human affairs in this very respect, and that it is exercised in observing the morals of man *O! qui perpetua mundum ratione gubernas Terrarum cœliq.; sator, qui tempus ab ævo, Ire jubes; stabilisq.; manens das cuncta moveri, &c. BOETH. de Con. Philosoph. lib. iii, metr. 9. † Πάσιν τοῖς ὑπό αυτοῦ πραττομένοις παρεῖναιτον Θεον νομίζων, αρετῆς προνοεῖτο. Antig. lib. i. cap. 3. kind, and in distributing rewards and punishments. But this supposes some law or rule, either revealed from Heaven, or stamped upon the hearts of men, to be the measure and test of moral good and evil, that is, virtue and vice. Man, therefore, is not Zaov dvoμov, a lawless creature, but capable of a law, and actually born under one, which he himself is also ready to own. "We are born in a kingdom," says the Rabbinical philosopher, "and to obey God is liberty*." But this doctrine, however perspicuous and clear in itself, seems to be a little obscured by one cloud, that is, the extraordinary success which bad men often meet with, and the misfortunes and calamities to which virtue is frequently exposed. The saying of Brutus, "O! wretched virtue, thou art regarded as nothing, &c. † is well known; as are also those elegant verses of the poet, containing a lively picture of the perplexity of a mind wavering and at a loss upon this subject; "My mind," says he, "has often been perplexed with difficulties and doubts, whether the gods regard the affairs of this earth, or whether there was no Providence at all. . . . . For, when I considered the order and disposition of the world, and the boundaries set to the sea-I thence concluded, that all things were secured by the providence of God. . But when I saw the affairs of men involved in so much darkness and confusion, &c.‡" " But not to insist upon a great many other considerations, which even the philosophy of the heathens suggested, in vindication of the doctrine of Providence; there is one consideration of great weight to be set in opposition to the whole of this pre * In regno nati sumus, Deo parere, libertas. * Ο τλήμων ἀρετὴ ὡς οὐδὲν, &c. Sepe mihi dubiam traxit sententia mentem Nam cum dispositi quæsissem fœdera mundi hinc omnia rebar Consilia firmata Dei, &c. Sed cum res hominum tanta caligine volvi CLAUDIAN in Rufinum, lib. i, judice, viz., that it is an evidence of a rash and forward mind, to pass sentence upon things that are not yet perfect and brought to a final conclusion; which even the Roman stoic, and the philosopher of Cheronea insist upon, at large, on this subject. If we will judge from events, let us put off the cause, and delay sentence, till the whole series of these events come before us; and let us not pass sentence upon a successful tyrant, while he is triumphant before our eyes, and while we are quite ignorant of the fate that may be awaiting himself or his son, or, at least, his more remote posterity. The ways of Divine justice are wonderful. "Punishment stalks silently, and with a slow pace; it will, however, at last overtake the wicked*." But, after all, if we expect another scene of things to be exhibited, not here, but in the world to come, the whole dispute concerning the events of this short and precarious life, immediately disappears and comes to nothing. And to conclude, the consent of wise men, states, and nations on this subject, though it is not quite unanimous and universal, is very great, and ought to have the greatest weight. But all these maxims we have mentioned, are more clearly taught, and more firmly established, in the Christian religion, which is of undoubted truth: it has also some doctrines ресиliar to itself, [Kupías dóžas,] annexed to the former, and most closely connected with them, in which the whole Christian world, though by far too much divided with regard to other disputed articles, are unanimously agreed and firmly united together. But of this hereafter. * Σιγὰ καὶ βραδεῖ ποδι στείχουσα μάρψει τους κακοὺς ὅταν τύχη. LECTURE IX. Of the Pleasure and Utility of RELIGION. THOUGH the author of the following passage, was a great proficient in the mad philosophy of Epicurus, yet he had truth strongly on his side, when he said, "That nothing was more pleasant than to be stationed on the lofty temples, well defended and secured by the pure and peaceable doctrines of the wise philosophers *." Now, can any doctrine be imagined more, wise, more pure and peaceable, and more sacred, than that which flowed from the most perfect Fountain of wisdom and purity, which was sent down from heaven to earth, that it might guide all its followers to that happy place whence it took its rise? It is, to be sure, the wisdom of mankind to know God, and their indispensable duty, to worship Him. Without this, men of the brightest parts and greatest learning, seem to be born with excellent talents only to make themselves miserable; and, according to the expression of the wisest of kings, He that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow, Eccl. i. 18. We must, therefore, first of all, consider this as a sure and settled point, that religion is the sole foundation of human peace and felicity. This, even the profane scoffers at religion are, in some sort, obliged to own, though much against their will, even while they are pointing their wit against it; for nothing is more commonly to be heard from them, than that the whole doctrine of religion was invented by some wise men, to encourage the practice of justice and virtue through the world. Surely then, religion, whatever else may be said of it, must be a matter of the highest value, since it is found necessary to secure advantages of so very great importance. But, in the mean time, how unhappy is the case of integrity and virtue, if what they want to support them is merely fictitious, and they * Bene quam munita tenere Edita doctrinâ sapientum templa serena. LUCRETIUS. cannot keep their ground but by means of a monstrous forgery! But far be it from us to entertain such an absurdity! For the first rule of righteousness cannot be otherwise than right, nor is there any thing more nearly allied or more friendly to virtue, than truth. But religion is not only highly conducive to all the great advantages of human life, but is also, at the same time, most pleasant and delightful. Nay, if it is so useful, and absolutely necessary to the interests of virtue, it must, for this very reason, be also pleasant; unless one will call in question a maxim universally approved by all wise men, that "life cannot be agreeable without virtue *:" a maxim of such irrefragable and undoubted truth, that it was adopted even by Epicurus himself. How great, therefore, must have been the madness of that noted Grecian philosopher, who, while he openly maintained the dignity and pleasantness of virtue, at the same time employed the whole force of his understanding to ruin and sap its foundations! For, that this was his fixed purpose, Lucretius not only owns, but also boasts of it, and loads him with ill-advised praises for endeavouring, through the whole course of his philosophy, to free the minds of men from all the bonds and ties of religion. As if there was no possible way to make them happy and free, without involving them in the guilt of sacrilege and atheism! As if to eradicate all sense of a Deity out of the mind, were the only way to free it from the heaviest chains and fetters! Though, in reality, this would be effectually robbing man of all his valuable jewels, of his golden crown and chain, all the riches, ornaments, and pleasures of his life which is inculcated at large, and with great eloquence, by a greater and more divine master of wisdom, the royal author of the Proverbs, who, speaking of the precepts of religion, says, They shall be an ornament of grace unto thine head, and chains about thy neck: and, of religion, under the name of wisdom, If thou seekest her as silver, and searchest * Ουκ είναι ἥδεως ζῆν ἀνευ τῆς ἀρετῆς. |