was not separated or distinguishable from the rest of the corn in the cribs. That about two weeks after the 100 bushels were delivered, and paid for, plaintiff called on defendant, at his residence, and told him that he had come for the 200 bushels of corn, and offered to pay, and at the same time tendered the sum of $200 for it; and that defendant said he had no more corn, but in a few minutes afterwards, offered to let plaintiff have 200 bushels, provided, he, plaintiff, would take it by his, defendant's measure, which was short. That plaintiff declined to take the corn by defendant's measure, and went off without getting the corn. That corn was worth $1 per bushel at the time plaintiff got and paid for the 100 bushels, and soon after it advanced to $1 25." The defendant in error is not represented by counsel here, and we are at a loss to know upon what ground the Court below sustained the demurrer to the evidence. The contract for the sale and delivery of the 300 bushels of corn was manifestly an entire and not a separate contract. 2 Parsons on Contracts, scc. iv, p. 29, and notes. The delivery of part of the corn, and payment therefor, took the contract out the statute of frauds. Dig., ch. 73, sec. 2, p. 540; 2 Parsons on Contracts, p. 320, 321, 324, and notes. The plaintiff was entitled to recover damages for the non-delivery of the residue of the corn. It would hardly be insisted that the plaintiff was bound to accept the corn by the defendant's short measure. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded, etc. The verdict of a jury, in a criminal prosecution, is of no validity until delivered by the jury, in court: and if the clerk receive the verdict, in the recess of the court, without the direction of court or consent of parties, and the jury disperse, a venire de novo should be awarded. Appeal from Van Buren Circuit Court. Hon. WILLIAM C. BEVENS, Circuit Judge. JOHNSON, Attorney General, for the State. Mr. Chief Justice ENGLISH delivered the opinion of the Court. Mills was indicted in the Van Buren Circuit Court for an assault and battery. He pleaded not guilty, and was put upon his trial. After the evidence was introduced, and the case submitted to the jury, the Court took a recess for dinner. Before the Court met again, the jury returned to the clerk a verdict of not guilty, which he received, and the jury were "dismissed by the sheriff," says the bill of exceptions, and permitted to disperse. After the Court met, the prosecuting attorney filed a motion to set aside the verdict, because it was delivered to the clerk in the recess of the Court, without the direction of the Court, or consent of parties: the Court overruled the motion, and rendered judgment upon the verdict, discharging the defendant. The prosecuting attorney excepted and appealed. The verdict was of no validity until delivered, by the jury, in Court. The clerk had no authority to receive it. 1 Bacon Abr., Title, Verdict, letter B; 3 Johnson Rep. 255; 1 Johns. Cases 308; 7 John. R. 32; 6 lb. 68. The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded with instructions to the Court to set aside the verdict, and award a venire de novo. HENDERSON & JONES VS. MARTIN ET AL. Covenant by the defendants, describing themselves as a committee on the part of a company-naming it-reciting that they had sold to the plaintiffs certain property, and binding themselves to deliver such property to the plaintiffs at a certain place, and on a certain day: Held, on demurrer, that it was a personal covenant, upon which an action would lie against the covenantors. Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court. The Hon. JOHN J. CLENDENIN, Circuit Judge. WILLIAMS & WILLIAMS, for the appellants. A corporation can by no possibility bind itself by deed only under its corporate seal: nor can any one bind a corporation only by the corporate seal; notwithstanding the corporation would be liable to an action on an implied contract upon an agreement sealed with the private seals of the agents, either before or after benefits were derived under the contract: But because the corporation might be liable on an implied assumpsit upon the instrument thus sealed with the private seal of her Henderson & Jones vs. Martin et al. [JANUARY agents, still this would not prevent the plaintiffs below from holding the defendants personally liable, as decided in Randall vs. Van Vechten, 19 John. Rep. 60. The agent of a corporation cannot bind the corporation by his private seal; and if he contracts in such a manner as not to bind his principal, he himself is liable. The affixing of a private seal to an instrument of writing or contract purporting to be executed on behalf of a corporation renders the agents so affixing personally responsible. Dunlap's Paley's Agency, 3 Amer. Ed. 377 and notes and cases cited; Tippetts vs. Walker, 4 Mass. 595; White vs. Skinner, 13 John. 307; 7 Tenn. Rep. 207; 3 John. Cas. 180; Caines 254; 5 East 148; Bank of Columbia vs. Patterson's adr., 7 Cranch 304; Lessee of Hatch vs. Barr, 1 Ohio 390; Savings Bank vs. Davis et al., 8 Conn. 191; Kinzie vs. Chicago, 2 Scam. 187; Bank of Metropolis vs. Guttschlick, 14 Peters Rep. 19; 16 Mass. 42; 1 Greenlf. Rep. 231; Dicker vs. Freeman, 3 lb. 338; Bank vs. Rose et al., 2 Strob. Rep. 257; Angell & Ames, sec. 217, and cases cited; sec's 295, 296. The fact that the words " Committee of the Little Rock Lumber and Manufacturing Co.," were used, does not cut any figure in the case, being merely words of description as held in Toft vs. Brewster et al.. 9 John. 334, and cases cited; 15 Ib. 44; 7 Cowen 453. S. H. HEMPSTEAD, for the appellees. In this case the agreement states "we the undersigned committee on part of the Little Rock Lumber and manufacturing company," etc., and signed and sealed by defendants and one other person as "committee." This is the contract of the company, and on which the agent is not liable. To prove which, see, Story's Agency 154; 19 John. 60; 4 Wend 28; 1 Cowen 537; 6 Cushing 55; 9 Mass. 336; 9 Paige 193; 22 Wend. 325; 2 Taunt. 374; 16 Pickering 351; 4 Cush. 371; 6 B. Mon. 612; 9 S. & M. 29; 21 Conn. 627; 11 S. & R., 126; 2 Greenl. 358; 23 Wend. 435; 4 Hill 351; 2 Gilman 371; 11 Mass. 97; 16 Mass. 461; 1 Salk. 95. TERM, 1858.] Henderson & Jones vs. Martin et al. Mr. Justice Scorт delivered the opinion of the Court. This was an action of covenant by the appellants against the appellees, assigning, for breach, the non-delivery of the property specified in the covenant, although specially demanded. The following is a copy of the covenant, oyer having been granted, to wit: "Know all men by these presents, that we, the undersigned committee on the part of the Little Rock Lumber and Manufacturing company, have this day sold to J. R. Henderson and Jahiel Jones, of the firm, name and style of Henderson & Jones, the following propery, to wit: one Steam Boiler, one Steam Doctor, one Steam Engine, one Saw Sash and Carriage, with all fixtures complete for sawing, and one bull-wheel with carriage. The above property we bind ourselves to deliver to the said Henderson and Jones at the Mill of said company in Pulaski county, near Little Rock, on the first day of August next, or sooner if required by them. this 16th day of June, 1855. Given under our hand and seal T. H. MCCRAY, [SEAL.] There was a demurrer to the declaration assigning for cause that it appears by the covenant, that the contract declared upon was that of the Little Rock Lumber and Manufacturing company, and not the individual contract of the appellees. The demurrer was held good, and the appellants electing to stand upon their declaration, final judgment was rendered accordingly, and the cause brought here by appeal. The question presented is one of legal construction of the instrument declared upon. Whether the supposed principal be a corporation, or some other association of individuals does not now appear upon the record; and whether the supposed agency existed, and the supposed agent was duly authorized in the premises is in no otherwise affirmed than by the face of the |