Several pipe-rolls, commissions and returns, and other documents (most of which are referred to in The Hull Dock Company v. Browne (a)) were given in evidence at the trial, and to these, as well as the act 39 & 40 G. 3. c. 10., (public local, &c.) for the regulation of the Hull pilots (b), and to all documents above cited, either party was at liberty to refer, as part of the case. This case was argued on a former day in the term by Alexander for the plaintiff, and Wightman for the defendant. The principal point relied upon for the latter was; that the port of Goole was not within the (a) 2 B. & Ad. 43. (b) The parts of this act referred to in argument were, for the defendant, sect. 1., which recites that the corporation of the Hull Trinity House have by usage and charters exercised the power of appointing pilots to conduct ships and vessels from the river Humber to cross the seas, or to pass from the said river Humber beyond Flamborough Head northward, and Wintertonness southward; but they are not invested with sufficient powers to prevent other persons from acting as pilots within the said limits; and that it would greatly tend to the safety of ships and vessels sailing or trading from and to the port of Kingston-upon-Hull, if effectual powers were given for appointing and regulating of pilots for conducting of such ships and vessels between the said port and the sea, and for a small distance out at sea, and for preventing persons not so appointed from acting as pilots of such ships, or any ships destined from the said port to cross the seas, or to pass beyond Flamborough Head, &c.: power is then given to the Trinity House to license river pilots for conducting vessels into, out of, and below the said port, and to a certain distance out at sea; and a penalty is imposed for acting without licence. For the plaintiff were cited, sect. 46., which provides that nothing in the act shall extend to take away, impeach, &c. the rights, powers, privileges, jurisdictions, or authorities of the guild of the Hull Trinity House, about or concerning the haven, dock, roadsteads, or other premises vested in them, or which they might have used and enjoyed by virtue of any charter, patent, act of parliament, or title whatsoever, if this act had not passed, otherwise than as they are by this act expressly altered. And sect. 2., which provides that nothing in this act contained shall extend to prevent any owner, &c. of any ship inward-bound from conducting or piloting such ship into and up the river Humber in case none of the river pilots should be ready and offer to conduct and pilot the same. 1832. BEILBY against RAPER 1832. BEILBY against RAPER. port of Kingston-upon-Hull, and that the Hull Trinity (a) Lord Tenterden C. J., Littledale, Taunton, and Patteson Js. vious section, which enacts, that it shall be lawful for the corporation of Trinity House of Deptford Strond, and they are thereby required to appoint sub-commissioners at the places there mentioned, to examine into the qualification of persons to act as pilots: and Rex v. The Bailiffs and Corporation of Eye (a), and Rex v. The Mayor and Burgesses of West Looe (b), were cited. The Court intimated an opinion in the course of the argument that the clause was permissive only, and the point was not further insisted upon on behalf of the defendant. The judgment afterwards delivered upon the rest of the case is sufficiently full to render a more particular detail of the argument unnecessary. Cur. adv. vult. Lord TENTERDEN C. J. now delivered the judgment of the Court. Upon the argument in this case, two objections to the plaintiff's recovery were taken on behalf of the defendants. First, which is the principal and only important question in this matter, that the corporation of the Trinity House of Kingston-upon-Hull had no authority to license persons to pilot vessels from Goole, to the exclusion of all other persons. Secondly, That if the Trinity House had such authority, the licence must be for the entire extent of their authority, and not confined, as this is, to the space between the port of Goole and the waters thereof, and Hull Roads. This second objection is answered by a reference to 1832. BEILBY against RAPER. (a) 1 B. & C. 85. (b) 5 D. & R. 414. Ú 4 the 1832. BEILBY against RAPER. the charter of Queen Elizabeth, which requires the Trinity House to signify by their licence the countries, coasts, and places for which a mariner is found sufficient to take the charge of vessels. Indeed, without such a particular provision, it should seem that those who have authority to license for the whole distance, may, if not restrained by some particular provision, reasonably and conveniently license a person for a part only, for which he might be deemed competent, provided no greater charge was thereby imposed on the vessel; and nothing of that sort appears in the present case. In support of the first objection it was urged, first, that the charters must be confined in construction to places at which the customer for the time being had authority. Secondly, that there had not only been no usage to license pilots for the waters above Hull Roads, but that unlicensed persons had been in the habit of taking the charge of vessels from Hull Roads up the rivers Trent and Ouse, and that upon one occasion, when one of those persons applied to the Trinity House for a licence, and on another, when he applied for assistance to recover his wages, he had been told by some of the brethren that they had nothing to do with the river navigation. It was also observed, that no pilots had ever been appointed for Grimsby, which is clearly within the large limits mentioned in the charter of Elizabeth; and it was also insisted, that the Hull pilot act of the 39 & 40 G. 3. was conformable to the then existing practice, and shewed that the Trinity House had no authority above Hull Roads. The authority of the crown to grant the charters mentioned in the case was not nor could be disputed. The language of the charter of Queen Elizabeth is free from all all ambiguity: "In all havens, creeks, and other places where our customer of Hull, by virtue of his office, hath any authority to take any custom by the name of primage." And it is very plainly shewn in the case as stated, that the customer of Hull, long before the charter of Queen Elizabeth, and, indeed, from very remote times, had exercised his authority at Selby on the Ouse, which is several miles above the place where the port of Goole has been recently established. And we find nothing either in the words of the charter or in reason, to put that narrow construction on the charter for which the defendant contends, or to limit the generality of the expression to the authority of the customer as it might happen to be varied, narrowed, or extended in after times. It is true, that until the establishment of the port of Goole, the Trinity House did not exercise the right of appointing pilots for the waters above Hull Roads; but for coasting vessels they had no authority to do so, and the trade from the waters above Hull Roads, was almost exclusively of that description; the instances of vessels foreign bound passing from above those roads being very few, and those within a very short period, and on very particular occasions. And it appears that the Trinity House was in the habit of exercising another of the powers given by the charter, viz. that which relates to the wages, &c. of mariners, with regard to mariners belonging to Selby. It appears also, that this corporation appointed persons at Selby and at Grimsby to collect the head penny duty from mariners under the authority of the statute 20 G. 2. c. 38. by which they are empowered to collect that duty at the town and port of Kingstonupon-Hull. Whatever, therefore, the usage as to pilots may 1832. BEILBY against RAPER |