unless such house, &c. shall be actually occupied under such yearly hiring by the person hiring the same for the term of one whole year at the least, and unless the rent for the same, to the amount of 10l. at the least, shall be paid by the person hiring the same." That clause is clearly prospective only. Sect. 2. proceeds: "Provided always, that where the yearly rent shall exceed 107., payment to the amount of 107. shall be deemed sufficient for the purpose of gaining a settlement under the said recited act." Now, if that clause had been incorporated in the first section, it would clearly have been prospective only; and though it be in a separate section, it operates as a proviso to the first, and cannot, therefore, be construed as extending its operation. The words "from and after the passing of this act" in the first clause override the whole. The expression "gaining a settlement under the said recited act" may be relied upon on the other side; but that can refer only to cases occurring after this act, which is professedly "to explain and amend" the former. The doubts recited are no proof that this act is retrospective, for they relate not only to the amount of rent, but other matters, the regulation of which is clearly prospective. Campbell and Prendergast contrà. Section 2. is retrospective; it need not be contended that sect. 1. is so. The act 6 G. 4. c. 57. required the house, &c. to be occupied under a yearly hiring, and the rent, to the amount of 107., paid, for one whole year at the least; and it was decided by Rex v. Ramsgate (a), that this required the whole year's rent to be paid, though amounting to 1000l. The 1 W. 4. c. 18. s. 2. was intended to remedy the in 1832. The KING against The Inhabitants of DURSLEY. 1832. The KING against The Inhabitants of DURELEY. convenience resulting from that decision. The first section provides, that after the passing of the act, no settlement shall be gained by the yearly hiring of a dwelling-house, unless the same shall be occupied by the party hiring, and the rent, to the amount of 10l. at the least, shall be paid by such party. That is prospective, and will prevent the gaining of any settlement after the act by renting a tenement, unless upon the terms prescribed by this act. The second section, therefore, which provides for the gaining of settlements by renting, &c. under the recited act, must be retrospective, or it will have no operation whatever. Lord TENTERDEN C. J. I think we must understand the second section to be retrospective, because it would be useless unless it were so. The words that "payment to the amount of 10l. shall be deemed sufficient for the purpose of gaining a settlement under the said recited act" import that, as to the payment of rent, the statute is declaratory. If the words had been "it is hereby declared that payment, &c. shall be deemed sufficient," there could have been no doubt that the clause would be retrospective. Here the words are the same in effect. LITTLEDALE J. The act is not very clearly expressed; but taking the words in the first section, "the rent for the same to the amount of 107. at the least," to be descriptive of the amount of rent to be actually paid, which I suppose is meant, then the effect of the first section is, that “after the passing of the act no settlement shall be gained unless rent to the amount of 107. be paid;" and if that be so, then, unless the second section be retrospective, it adds nothing to the former. PARKE PARKE J. This act is to "explain" the former. Sect. 1. provides for settlements by renting for the future. Sect. 2., therefore, unless it be retrospective, is without object. PATTESON J. concurred. Order of sessions quashed. 1832. The KING against The Inhabit ants of DURSLEY. DOE dem. SEWELL against PARratt. Tuesday, vised all his EJECTMENT for chambers in Albany. At the trial Testator de-C, 158 before Lord Tenterden C. J., at the sittings for Middlesex after last Trinity term, a verdict was taken for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of this Court on the following case : real estates in &2d 475 Jamaica, and all the residue of his real of ultimately, of his heirs at law. he By a codicil he Matthew Gregory Lewis, Esq., being seised in fee the chambers in question, the fee-simple of which had bought for 600 guineas, made his will, dated the 5th June 1812, and thereby devised all his real estates in Jamaica (therein particularly described), and all the residue of his estate, real, personal, or mixed, to the lessor of the plaintiff, and to Robert Sewell and Cyril another party amount of a further devised "I also be queath to him my chambers in Albany, for which I paid 600 guineas, with all my furniture, ex cept such arti Jackson D.D., their heirs, executors, &c. upon trust to to donation." fee simple of (of which he died seised) for 600 guineas; and he had no other chambers in Albany: Held, that the devisee under the codicil took only a life estate. ject 5 Bac 17-20. 1832. DoE dem. ject to the said annuity), to the use of all and every the child or children of such deceased sister, and of their respective heirs, such children to take as tenants in common. In January 1813, he added this codicil: "I bequeath to the Honourable Thomas Stapleton, 12007., being the amount of Lord Le Despencer's bond, to be paid by my executors into his own hands, for his sole and separate use, and also bequeath to him my chambers in Albany, for which I paid 600 guineas, with all my furniture, except such articles as I may particularly except from this donation." The testator died in 1818, seised in fee of the said chambers in Albany, and of no others there. The Hon. Thomas Stapleton, under whom the defendant claimed, and who was a stranger in blood to the testator, entered into possession of the chambers, and died in 1829. The lessor of the plaintiff was the only surviving trustee under the will. This case was now argued by Tyrwhitt for the lessor of the plaintiff. The question is, whether Mr. Stapleton took an estate in fee simple, or only a life estate, in the chambers, under this codicil. Where no words of limitation are added to a devise, and there are no other words from which an intention to give an estate of inheritance can be collected, the devisee takes only a life estate. The present codicil has no words of limitation. The lessor of the plaintiff is trustee for the heiresses at law, and by the former part of the will, the testator devises his estates in Jamaica, and all the residue of his real and other estates, to him and his heirs, and upon trusts which of themselves imply a devise of the fee. It rests with the defendant to shew (in the absence of such express words as are used in the body of the will as to other property), that the testator intended intended to except the chambers out of this devise, and give them in fee-simple to him. Jardine, contrà, was here called upon by the Court. It can scarcely be questioned, upon reading this codicil, that the testator in fact meant to give the chambers to Mr. Stapleton absolutely, and not for life only. Where there are not express words of restriction, it is generally supposed that the testator meant to pass his whole interest; and courts will go far to support a testator's intention. Sir J. Mansfield C. J. says, in Doe d. Wright v. Child (a), " In almost all the cases where questions of this sort have arisen, it has been next to impossible, out of a court of justice, to doubt of the testator's intention to give the thing absolutely to the devisee. When a man gives a house, he supposes that he gives it in the same manner as he gives a personal chattel." Here the testator probably thought that he gave the devisee his chambers as effectually as the furniture in them. Then, are the words used sufficiently certain to accomplish that intention? The devise is of " my chambers in Albany, for which I gave 600 guineas;" the testator had no other chambers in Albany; the latter words therefore were not necessary to distinguish the subject-matter of the devise; they cannot be rejected as nugatory; and if they have any object, it must be to denote the quantity of interest possessed by the testator, and which he intended to devise. He means, "all that for which I gave 600 guineas," namely, the fee-simple in the chambers. The devise in question comes between two bequests of other property, which are clearly absolute: it may therefore be inferred, that this was intended to be so too. A like argument from collocation was relied upon by Lord El (a) 1 New Rep. 345.; and see Bailis v. Gale, 2 Vcs. 48, 49. lenborough, 1832. Doɛ dem. against PARRATT. |