is like that of God and His holy Son. There is a second form (eldos) of royalty, after the purely rational and Divine administration, (namely), that which avails itself only of the high-spirited temper of the soul in (the task of) royalty; after which form Heracles reigned over Argos and Alexander over the Macedonians. And the third is that which aims at one thing only, (namely), to conquer and overturn-but to use the victory for evil or for good does not belong to such (rule)-the Persians employed it in campaigning against Hellas. . . . Fourth is the worst royalty of all, that which is carried on according to the lusts, like that of Sardanapalus and of those who make it their object to indulge their lusts as much as possible. Tactics is the instrument of the royal office, both of that which conquers by excellence (åperǹv) and of that (which conquers) by force it varies according to nature and material." In the conflicts of men and of animals, the governing power is the soul and mind; in the conquest of the passions it is reason and prudence. "Divine affairs (are controlled by) wisdom, human affairs by statesmanship, everything by the kingly (faculty). A king then is he who rules according to laws, who knows how to rule over willing subjects such is the Lord, who admits (to His presence) those who believe on Him and through Him." 2 This is no doubt an important passage, and looks as if it ought to yield valuable in-formation in regard to the Christian conception of the State and the Christian attitude towards it. Its usefulness in this respect is, however, largely impaired, if not entirely cancelled, by the remarkable looseness of thought which the whole context displays (the four types of royalty, for instance, leave no room for an ordinary human and fairly peaceable ruler), and by the strange confusion of the political institution itself with its psychological and theological parallels. Perhaps the most we can say with any confidence is that the words presuppose in Clemens' own mind a certain tacit assumption of the possibility and value of good monarchical government.4

1 Cl. Strom. I. xxiv. 158.

2 Cl. Strom. I. xxiv. 159.

So, e.g., Dr. Carlyle (162) apparently regards it: if we turn to the Alexandrian Fathers, we find Clement defining a king as one who rules according to law, and who is willingly obeyed by his subjects,—that is, if we may so interpret Clement's meaning, a king is one who follows not merely his own caprice or desire, but governs according to those rules of public action which are designed for the attainment and preservation of justice, and whom his subjects willingly obey as representing their own just desires.”

Other references of Clemens to politics occur in Strom. 1. xxv. 165f (Plato's views on politics, mostly suggested by Moses: dvaykaĴOV YOÛν TÒ TOλITEVεσθαι ὀρθῶς, ἄριστον δὲ φιλοσοφείν), xxvi. 168, 170 (further on Mosaic and Hellenic laws and polities: royalty of the wise man), 11. iv. 19 (royalty of the wise

THE DIVINE APPOINTMENT OF RULERS.-We are fortunately not left to such unsatisfactory material in our efforts to discover the Christian view of the State. Practically all the authors of our period reproduce the Pauline doctrine that earthly rulers in general and the Roman Emperors in particular have been appointed by God,1 and some of them add the complimentary man), VII. i. 3 (service rendered by subjects to rulers an example of ministerial service, as distinct from the service which aims at improvement), vii. 36 (royalty of the Gnostic).

1 Theoph. i. II (. . . εἰδὼς ὅτι ὁ βασιλεὺς ὑπ ̓ αὐτοῦ [sc. Θεοῦ] γέγονεν . . . ἄνθρωπος ὑπὸ Θεοῦ τεταγμένος); Act. Αpoll. 6 (αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπον ἀνθρώπων ἔταξεν βασιλεύειν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς), 8, 9 (εἰδότες ἀκριβῶς ὅτι οὐχ ὑπὸ ἄλλου τινός, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ μονῆς τῆς τοῦ ἀκινήτου Θεοῦ βουλῆς, τοῦ τὰ πάντα ἐνπεριέχοντος, ὡς προεῖπον, βασιλεύει [Commodus] ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς); Tert. Nat. ii. 17 fin. (i. 396) (Quaerite quis temporum vices ordinavit. Idem regna dispensat, et nunc penes Romanos eam summam tanquam pecuniam de multis nominibus exactam in unam arcam congregavit), Apol. 26 init. (i. 225) (Videte igitur ne ille regna dispenset, cujus est et orbis qui regnatur, et homo ipse qui regnat, ne ille vices dominationum ipsis temporibus in saeculo ordinarit, qui ante omne tempus fuit et saeculum corpus temporum fecit, ne ille civitates extollat aut deprimat. Sub quo fuit aliquando sine civitatibus genus hominum), 30 (i. 231) (Sciunt [sc. imperatores] quis illis dederit imperium; . . sentiunt, eum Deum esse solum, in cujus solius potestate sunt, a quo sunt secundi, post quem primi, ante omnes et super omnes deos), 32 (i. 238) (Nos judicium Dei suspicimus in imperatoribus, qui gentibus illos praefecit. Id in eis scimus esse, quod Deus voluit), 33 (i. 238) (. . . imperatorem, quem necesse est suspiciamus ut eum, quem Dominus noster elegerit. Et merito dixerim, noster est magis Caesar, ut a nostro Deo constitutus), 36 fin. (i. 249) (ipsum [i.e. Caesarem] qui per Deum tantus est), Orat. 5 (i. 560) (Deus. . . in cujus manu cor omnium regum est), Pall. 1 (i. 916) (‘At cum saecularium sortium variavit urna, et Romanis Deus maluit-spoken of Rome's supremacy over Carthago on the element of chance,' see below, PP. 514f), 2 (i. 925) (Deo tot Augustis in unum favente), Fug. 12 (i. 486) (Aspice regnorum et imperiorum utique a Deo dispositum statum, in cujus manu cor regis), Scap. 2 (i. 541f) (... imperatoris, quem sciens a Deo suo constitui, necesse est ut et ipsum [sc. Christianus] diligat. . . . Colimus ergo et imperatorem sic quomodo et nobis licet et ipsi expedit, ut hominem a Deo secundum, et quicquid est a Deo consecutum, et solo Deo minorem. . . . Sic enim omnibus major est, dum solo vero Deo minor est : sic et ipsis deis major est, dum et ipsi in potestate sunt ejus), Scorp. 14 (i. 532f) (quotation of R xiii. Iff); Hipp. Dan. 11. vii. (σù ßaoiλeû, . ᾧ ὁ Θεὸς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ βασιλείαν ἰσχυρὰν καὶ κραταιὰν καὶ ἔντιμον ἔδωκεν ἐν παντὶ τόπῳ, ὅπου κατοικοῦσιν υἱοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων KAI KATÉOTNOÉV σe kúριov máνTwv similarly III. iv. 2, xvii. 4), II. xxxiii. 3 (καρδία βασιλέως ἐν χειρὶ Θεοῦ, therefore Nebuchadnezzar was enabled, unlike his satraps, to see the Son of Man in the furnace; cf. III. xvii. 6 (Оeóv, où ǹ πvoń σov ἐν χειρὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ πᾶσαι αἱ ὁδοί σου)), III. iv. 7 (ὅσοι βασιλεῖς εὐλαβῶς καὶ θεοφιλῶς ἀνεστράφησαν, οὗτοι καὶ παρὰ Θεοῦ ἐτιμήθησαν, ὅσοι δὲ κατὰ φυσίωσιν ὑπὲρ τὸ δέον ἐπήρθησαν, οὗτοι ἀξίαν καὶ δικαίαν τὴν παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ τιμωρίαν ἀπέλαβον), III. xvii. (Nebuchadnezzar was punished ἕως οὗ ἔγνω ὅτι κυριεύει ὁ Ὕψιστος τῆς βασιλείας τῶν ávoрúñшv kai į dv dóéŋ dŵσei aúтýv), xvii. 6 (Dan v. 26-28 quoted), xviii. 3 (xα0ɩσтậ [ó Oeds] Baσiλeîs Kai μebloтa); Minuc. xii. 5 (Caecilius: Nonne Romani sine uestro Deo imperant, regnant, fruuntur orbe toto uestrique dominantur ?), xxv. 12 (Octavius: et tamen ante eos [i.e. Romanos] Deo dispensante diu regna tenuerunt Assyrii, Medi, Persae, Graeci etiam, et Aegyptii, etc.), xxxiii. 3 (quamdiu enim eum [i.e. Deum Judaei] caste innoxie religioseque coluerunt, .. de paucis innumeri facti, de egentibus diuites, de seruientibus reges); Orig. Cels. viii. 65 (quotes R xiii. 1, 2a, to meet the saying of Celsus oude TouTous aveu δαιμονίας ισχύος τῶν τῇδε εἶναι ἠξιωμένους, but waives further discussion: διὰ

.

Pauline thought that the purpose of this Divine appointment is the maintenance of justice.1 The acceptance of this simple thesis was sufficiently ensured by the authority of the great Apostle ; but it was not clear on the surface how it was to be reconciled with the guilt of rulers in the matter of idolatry, persecution, and other crimes, not to mention the standing contrast of its coercive measures with those of Christianity. It was therefore inevitable that the theory should be elaborated and qualified in various ways, as soon as Christian thought was bold enough to face its difficulties. Both Irenæus and Origenes speculate on the subject in a very interesting manner.

Irenæus twice takes the matter up. Firstly, in proving from Jesus' parable of the king's marriage-feast, that there can be only one God, he says that the armies sent to kill the murderers of the king's servants are called God's armies, because all men belong to God. He then quotes Rom. xiii. 1b-6 in full, and presently repeats his argument that the punitive armies are God's, "since every man, inasmuch as he is a man, is His formation (plasma), although he may not know his own God." Secondly, and at greater length, he points out that Satan according to Scripture is a liar, and that, when he promised to give all the kingdoms of the earth to Christ on condition that he should fall down and worship him, he was making a promise which he could not fulfil, for he was promising to give what was not his own, and his declaration that all things had been delivered to him was a falsehood. "For the creation is not under his power, inasmuch as he himself is one of the creatures. Nor shall he assign to men the rule over men; but all other things and all human affairs are arranged according to the ordinance of

66

"

66

τούτο ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος τὸ πρόβλημα ἐξετάσαι ὑπερεθέμεθα), 68 (. . . “ εἰς ” μὲν οὖν κοίρανος ἔστω, εἰς βασιλεύς, οὐχ ᾧ ἔδωκε Κρόνου παῖς ἀγκυλομήτεω,” ἀλλ ̓ ᾧ ἔδωκεν ὁ καθιστῶν βασιλεῖς καὶ μεθιστῶν “ καὶ τὸν χρήσιμον ” [Sirach x. 4] κατὰ καιρὸν ἐγείρων ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς· καὶ οὐχ ὁ τοῦ καταταρταρωθέντος, ὡς οἱ μῦθοι Ελλήνων λέγουσι, Κρόνου υἱὸς ἀπελάσας τοῦτον τῆς ἀρχῆς καθίστησι βασιλεῖς, οὐδ ̓ ἂν ἀλληγορῇ τις τὰ κατὰ τοὺς τόπους, ἀλλ' ὁ διοικῶν τὰ σύμπαντα Θεὸς οἶδεν ὅ τι ποτὲ ποιεῖ κατὰ τὸν τόπον τῆς τῶν βασιλέων κατάστασεως λύομεν οὖν τὸ δόγμα σε ᾧ ἔδωκε Κρόνου παῖς ἀγκυλομήτεω

ἀλλ ̓ οὐδ ̓ εἰκότως ἡμᾶς ἀμύνεται βασιλεύς, φάσκοντας μὲν ὅτι οὐ “Κρόνου παῖς ἀγκυλομήτεω” ἔδωκεν αὐτῷ τὸ βασιλεύειν, ὁ δὲ μεθιστῶν βασιλεῖς καὶ καθιστῶν. καὶ τὸ αὐτό γε ποιείτωσάν μοι ἅπαντες, τὸ μὲν ̔Ομηρικὸν καταλύοντες δόγμα, τὸ δὲ θεῖον περὶ βασιλέως τηροῦντες καὶ τὸ “τὸν βασιλέα τιμᾶτε " φυλάττοντες), viii. 74 (τὸν πολιέα Oebv, "the God of the State," if we may trust the reading).

1 Theoph. i. i (ἄνθρωπος ὑπὸ Θεοῦ τεταγμένος . . . εἰς τὸ δικαίως κρίνειν· τρόπῳ уáp Tiv Tарà Оeоû olкovoμlav TETOTEUTα); Tert. Anim. 33 (ii. 611) (Quis non praeferat saeculi justitiam, quam et Apostolus non frustra gladio armatam contestatur [R xiii. 4], quae pro homine saeviendo religiosa est ?); Orig. Comm. in Rom. t. ix. 26 (vii. 328) (see below, pp. 376f n 4): cf. Act. Apoll. 8f (Armenian in Conybeare 39).

2 Iren. Iv. xxxvi. 6 (ii. 282f).

God the Father." And later: "He did not settle the kingdoms of this age, but God (did); for the king's heart is in God's hand.' And through Solomon the Word says: By me kings reign, and the powerful maintain justice. By me princes shall be exalted, and by me tyrants rule the earth'": then follow some pertinent phrases from Rom. xiii. He next ventures upon an original and interesting explanation of the Divine appointment of kings, and says: "For since man, by departing from God, grew so savage as to reckon even a kinsman his enemy, and to engage without fear in every (sort of) disturbance and murder and avarice, God imposed upon him the fear of man-for they did not know the fear of God-so that, being subjected to the power of men and restrained by their law, they might attain to some (measure) of justice and exercise mutual forbearance, in dread of the sword openly held forth, as the apostle says: For not without cause does he bear the sword: for he is God's servant, an avenger for wrath to him who does evil.' And for this reason, too, the magistrates themselves, wearing the laws as a garment of justice, shall not be questioned or punished for what they do justly and lawfully. But whatever they do for the overthrow of justice, unfairly and impiously and illegally and in a tyrannical fashion, in these things they shall perish, the just judgment of God coming upon all equally and failing in nothing. For the benefit of the gentiles, therefore, was earthly rule established by God-but not by the devil, who is never quiet, nay, who does not wish even the (heathen) nations to live in tranquillity—in order that, fearing the rule of men, men might not consume one another like fishes, but that by the establishment of laws they might smite down the manifold wrong-doing of the gentiles. And accordingly those who exact tribute from us are God's servants, serving for this very (purpose).' For by the order of Him, by whose order men are born, are kings also appointed, fitted for those who are ruled over by them at that time. For some of them are given for the correction and benefit of (their) subjects and the preservation of justice, but some for fear

1 Iren. v. xxii. 2 (ii. 385f). The charge of falsehood against the devil is again repeated in xxiv. I init., 3 init. (ii. 388f).

2 Iren. v. xxiv. 1 (ii. 388f): Prov xxi. 1, viii. 15, R xiii. 1, 4b quoted. These words were spoken not of angels, sed de his quae sunt secundum homines potestates.' R xiii. 6. Hoc autem et Dominus confirmavit, non faciens quidem quod a diabolo suadebatur; tributorum autem exactoribus jubens pro se et pro Petro dari tributum : quoniam "ministri Dei sunt, in hoc ipsum deservientes."

3 Iren. v. xxiv. 2 (ii. 389): R xiii. 4b, 6b. Cf. the similar idea of government, as instituted for the purpose of repressing violence, in the Bardesanic Book of the Laws of the Countries in ANCL xxiib. 111,

and punishment and rebuke, and some for deception and disgrace and pride, according as they (the subjects) deserve, the just judgment of God, as we have already said, coming upon all equally." 1

This last remark of Irenæus-to the effect that God sometimes gives men evil rulers as a punishment for their wickednessnaturally suggests implications and raises problems, particularly in connection with persecution, with which Irenæus does not deal.2 It is to Origenes that we have to turn for a somewhat fuller treatment of the question. When quoting Rom. xiii. 1, 2a, against Celsus' contention that kings were appointed by demons, he touches on the problem presented by evil kings, and passes it by, referring the reader to his Commentary on Romans.' 3 In this somewhat earlier work, commenting on the phrase, "there is no power except from God" (Rom. xiii. 1), he faces the question whether this includes a persecuting government. His answer is that political power, like any other faculty, such as sight or hearing, is given to us by God for a good purpose, in this case for the punishment of evil men and the praise of good men. But things given for a good purpose may be perverted to a bad one, and “there will be a just judgment of God for those who wield the power they have received according to their own impiety, and not according to the Divine laws." 4 After some comments on verses 2 and 3,

1 Iren. v. xxiv. 3 (ii. 389f). On Irenæus' theory of the State, cf. Neumann SK 93f; Holtzm. RS 26; Carlyle 129f (“ We have here an explicit statement that the institution of government has been made necessary by sin and is a divinely appointed remedy for sin. The Christian writers of the same period as Irenæus do not indeed draw out the relation of government to the existence of evil, as Irenæus has done, but they agree with him in asserting its divine origin. . . No doubt these emphatic assertions of the divine authority of the ruler, while they may have been partly intended to allay any suspicions of disloyalty, were also intended to counteract those tendencies to anarchy in the Christian societies, to whose existence the New Testament bears witness. The Christian writers of the second century, then, clearly carry on the tradition of the New Testament, that the principle of authority is a divine principle," etc.); Bigelmair 82f; Troeltsch 164f (the idea of the State as a result of, but also as a remedy for, the general sinfulness—a relative Law of Nature ad hoc as distinct from an absolute-was borrowed from the Stoics by the Christians, who added to it the element of punishment: this explained the existing severities; Iren. v. xxiv. quoted). Cf. Horace Bushnell, Nature and the Supernatural (i) 12.

2 Neumann SK 94 (“ dass die Christen im römischen Reiche einen Kaiser hätten, wie sie ihn verdienten, hätte kein Glied der Kirche während einer Verfolgung zugestanden"); Carlyle 148 ("We may doubt whether Irenæus had in his mind the conclusions which might be and ultimately were connected with this view, but it is at least important to observe its appearance thus early in Christian theory ").

3 Orig. Cels. viii. 65.

4

Orig. Comm. in Rom. t. ix. 26 (vii. 327f)

Non est enim,' inquit,' potestas nisi a Deo.' Dicit fortasse aliquis: Quid ergo? Et illa potestas quae servos Dei persequitur, fidem impugnat, religionem subvertit, a Deo