Of the Advantages of THINKING.

M fign'd for a fociable life, has two faculties

AN being the only creature here below de

to diftinguish him from other creatures thinking and speaking. The one, to fit him for the fociety of others; and the other, to qualifie him alfo for his own: As to the latter of these faculties, there's no fear of its gathering ruft for want of ufe. We are rather apt to speak too much; and the most referv'd have reafon to pray with the Pfalmift, Set a watch, O Lord, before my mouth, and keep the door of my lips.

But the former, is that which generally lies fallow and neglected; as may be guefs'd from the intemperate ufe of the other. There are few indeed, that are capable of thinking to any great purpose: But among thofe that are, there are fewer that employ this excellent talent. And for ought I know, however ftrange it may feem, among the ingenious and well educated, there are as few thinkers as among the herd of the vulgar and illiterate. For either they live a popular life; and then what for bufinefs, pleafure, company, vifits, with a world of other impertinencies, there's fcarce room for fo much as a morning reflexion. Or elfe, they live retir'd, and then either they doze away their time in drowfinefs and brown ftudies; or, if brisk and active, they lay themselves out wholly upon devouring books, and making common places; and fcarce entertain their foli tude with a meditation, once in a moon.

But 'tis merely for want of thinking that they can allow themselves in doing fo. For by a little of this they would foon difcover, that of all the methods of improvement that can be used, there is none fo advantageous as thinking; either for our intellectuals or our morals; to make us wifer, or to make us better. And first, for our intellectuals. 'Tis the perfection of our rational part to know;

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that is, to be able to frame clear and diftinct conceptions, to form right judgments, and to draw true confequences from one thing to another. Now befides, that the powers of the mind are made more bright, vigorous, and active by ufe, as all other faculties are; there is this farther advantage, that by habitual thinking the object is made more familiar to the understanding; the habitudes and relations of idea's one towards another, by frequent comparing, become more vifible and apparent; and confequently it will be more eafie to perceive them, and fo to divide what ought to be divided, and to compound what out to be compounded, wherein confifts the fum of what belongs to contemplation and science.

Reading is indeed very excellent and useful to this purpofe; but thinking is neceffary. This may do without the other, as appears in the first inventers of arts and fciences, who were fain to think out their way to the receffes of truth; but the other can never do, without this. Reading without thinking, may indeed make a rich common place, but 'twill never make a clear head; it may indeed bring in a great ftore of Hyle, but 'tis yet without form, and void, till thinking, like the feminal fpirit, agitates the dead shapeless lump, and works it up into figure and fymmetry.

But of what advantage thinking is to the advancement of knowledge, will farther, appear, by confidering fome of the chief impediments of it; and how they are removed by thinking. And the first that I fhall mention, is the prejudice of infancy. We form infinite rafh judgments of things, before we duly understand any thing; and these grow up with us, take root, fpread and multiply;. till after long ufe and cuftom, we mistake them for common notions and dictates of nature; and then we think it a crime to go about to unlearn or eradicate them. And as long as we ftand thus affected, we are condemn'd to errors and perpetual wandrings. So great reafon had the excellent Des-Cartes to lay the foundation of his philofophy

in an equipoife of mind; and to make the removal of these prejudices the very entrance and beginning of wisdom.

But now when a man fets upon a course of thinking, nothing will be fo obvious as to confider, that fince we come fo late to the perfect use of our reafon; among thofe many judgments we have made, 'tis very likely the major part are falfe and erroneous. And this is a fair ftep to the fhaking off thofe infant-prejudices; at least he will be thereby induc'd not to believe any thing, for this reafon, because he had given it fuch early entertainment. From this general reflection he proceeds to examine the things themfelves. And now he is a capable judge, can hear both fides with an indifferent ear, is determin'd only by the moments of truth; and fo retracts his paft errors, and has the best moral fecurity against any for the future.

Another great hindrance to knowledge is the wrong perception of things. When the fimple Idea's of our minds are confus'd, our judgments can never proceed without error. 'Tis like a fault in the firft concoction, which is never corrected in either of the other. For how can I judge whether the attribute agree to the fubject, if my notion of both be confus'd and obfcure? But now, the only caufe of the confusedness of our notions, next to the natural inability of our faculties, is want of attention and clofe application of mind. We don't dwell enough upon the object; but fpeculate it tranfiently, and in hafte; and then, no wonder that we conceive it by halves. Thinking therefore is a proper remedy for this defect alfo.

Another great hindrance to knowledge is ambiguity of terms and phrates. This has bred a world of confufion and misunderstanding; especially in controverfies of religion; a great many of which, if thoroughly fifted and well compared, will be found to be mere verbal contentions; as may appear from what the excellent Monfieur Le Blanc has perform'd in this kind. But now, this is owing meerly to waut of thinking. There is a lati

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tude in the phrafe ; and one writer not fufficiently attending to that determinate fenfe of it which his adverfary intends, very haftily and furiously denies what the other does not affirm; and he again as furiously affirms what this does not deny. So that they are really agreed all along, and yet fight on like fools in the dark. And there is no hopes they will ever be reconciled, till either they will take the pains to think themselves, or fome body elfe will be fo kind, as to think for 'em.

Another great hindrance to knowledge, is an over-fond and fuperftitious deference to authority, especially that of antiquity. There is nothing that cramps the parts, and fetters the underftandings of men like this ftrait lac'd humour. Men are refolv'd never to out-fhoot their forefathers mark; but write one after another, and fo the dance goes round in a circle; out of which, if fome had not the boldness and courage to venture, the world would never be the wifer for being older. The schoolmen are a great inftance of this, men of fingular abilities, and fharp understandings, capable of the higheft improvements, and of penetrating into the deepeft receffes of truth, had they but the power of making a free use of their thoughts. But fo bound up to authorities, and fo devoted to the principles of a philofophy, whofe foundation is laid in the falfe and confufed ideas of fenfe, that their advancements in theory and fcience, were not answerable to the capacity which they were endued with, the leifure which they en-joyed, and the indefatigable diligence which they ufed. And all because of the great difadvantage they laboured under, it being confined within the circle of authority, to which, even in this freer age, fome have ftill fo fervile a regard, that they would rather lofe truth, than go out of the road to find it. This alfo makes men otherwise senseful and ingenious, quote fuch things many times out of an old dull author, and with a peculiar emphafis of commendation too, as would never pass even in ordinary converfation; and which they

them

themselves would never have took notice of, had not fuch an author faid it. But now, no fooner does a man give himself leave to think, but he perceives how abfurd and unreasonable 'tis, that one man fhould prefcribe to ail pofterity: That men, like beafts, fhould follow the foremost of the herd; and that venerable nonfenfe fhould be prefer'd before new-fense: He confiders, that that which we call antiquity, is properly the nonage of the world; that the fageft of his authorities were once new; and that there is no other difference be tween an ancient author and himself, but 'tis only that of time; which, if of any advantage, 'tis rather on his fide, as living in a more refined and mature age of the world. And thus having caft off this intellectual flavery, like one of the brave 'Exhexlix, mention'd by Laertius, he addicts himfelf to no author, fect or party; but freely picks up truth wherever he can find it; puts to fea upon his own bottom; holds the ftern himself; and now, if ever, we may expect new discoveries.

There are other notable impediments to the improvement of knowledge, fuch as paffion, intereft, fear of being tax'd with inconftancy, fcorn of being inform'd by another, envy, the humour of contradiction, and fometimes flattery in applauding every thing we hear, and the like. Now as to the manner how all thefe are remov'd by thinking, it may fuffice to fay in general, that they are all obviously abfurd and ridiculous; and however unthinking men may be abuted by them, yet a free and close thinker muft needs quickly perceive that they are fo: And there is no better moral way that I know of to be quit of ill habits, than the being convinc'd of their folly and mifchief.

But the greateft advantage of thinking is yet behind, that it improves our morals as well as our intellectuals; and serves to make us better, as well as wifer. This is in a great measure included in the other. All therefore that I fhall farther remark concerning it is this, that confidering the

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