Opinion of the Court. only $15,000, leaving a large balance due him, which remains unpaid, together with accrued interest. The defendant admits that he received from Le Bourgeois $4000 for the rent of the property for the year 1885; that he has rented for two years from January 1, 1886, at $5000 per annum; and that he has given Le Bourgeois the privilege of purchasing at the expiration of his lease for $15,000, payable in instalments. After the answer was filed both Edward F. Stockmeyer and McCan died, and the suit was revived in the name of C. Stockmeyer, testamentary executor of E. F. Stockmeyer, against t'e appellees, the widow and children of McCan. Upon final hearing the bill was dismissed with costs. Mr. Alfred Goldthwaite for appellant submitted on his brief. Mr. J. D. Rouse for appellee. Mr. William Grant was with him on the brief. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, after making the above statement, delivered the opinion of the court. The case will be considered in the two aspects in which it is presented in behalf of the appellant. The first one is, that at the time Edward F. Stockmeyer entered into the agree ment of the 25th day of January, 1884, before the notary, he was in a condition of great mental weakness; that there was gross inadequacy of consideration for the mortgage; and that from these circumstances imposition or undue influence ought to be inferred. The bill does not allege that Stockmeyer was incapable, in law, of executing the agreement in question. The averment that at the time of making it he was losing, and to a great extent had lost, his capacity to attend to business and to manage his affairs, and that his mind was seriously impaired so as to affect his understanding and judgment, and so continued until he was judicially interdicted by a judgment rendered November 11, 1884, does not meet the requirements of the Civil Code of Louisiana. By that Code it is provided: Opinion of the Court. "Art. 401. All acts done by the persons interdicted from the date of the filing of the petition for interdiction until the day when the same is pronounced are null. Art. 402. No act anterior to the petition for interdiction shall be annulled, except where it shall be proved that the cause of such interdiction notoriously existed at the time when the acts, the validity of which is contested, were made or done, or that the party who contracted with the interdicted person could not have been deceived as to the situation of his mind. Notoriously, in this article, means that the cause of the interdiction was generally known by the persons who saw and conversed with the party. Art. 403. After the death of a person, the validity of acts done by him cannot be contested for cause of insanity, unless his interdiction was pronounced or petitioned for previous to the death of such person, except in cases in which the mental alienation manifested itself within ten days previous to the decease, or in which the proof of want of reason results from the act itself which is contested." Other articles of the Code are as follows: "Art. 1782. All persons have the capacity to contract except those whose incapacity is specially declared by law. These are persons of insane mind, those who are interdicted, minors and married women. Art. 1783. All cases of incapacity are subject to the following modifications and exceptions. Art. 1784. Persons interdicted can, in no case whatever, make a valid contract after the petition has been presented for their interdiction until it be legally removed. Art. 1788. The contract, entered into by a person of insane mind, is void . for want of consent. It is not the judgment of interdiction, therefore, that creates the incapacity, it is evidence only of its existence, and from these principles result the following rules: 1. That, after the interdiction, no other evidence than the interdiction itself is necessary to prove the incapacity of the person, and to invalidate any contract he may have made after the day the petition for interdiction was presented . . . 2. As to contracts made prior to the application for interdiction they can be invalidated by proving the incapacity to have existed at the time the contracts were made. 3. But in order to pre Opinion of the Court. vent imposition, it is not enough to make the proof mentioned in the last rule; it must also, in that case, be shown that the person interdicted was known by those who generally saw and conversed with him, to be in a state of mental derangement, or that the person who contracted with him, from that or other circumstances, was acquainted with his incapacity. 4. That, except in the case of death, hereafter provided for, no suit can be brought to invalidate a contract on account of insanity, unless judgment of interdiction be pronounced before bringing the suit. . 5. That if the party die within thirty days after making the act or contract, the insanity may be shown by evidence, without having applied for the interdiction; but if more than that time elapse, the insanity cannot be shown to invalidate the act or contract, unless the interdiction shall have been applied for, except in the case provided for in the following rule: 6. That if an instrument or other act of a person deceased contain in itself evidence of insanity in the party, then it shall be declared void, although more than thirty days have elapsed between the time of making the act and the death of the party, and although no petition shall have been presented for his interdiction. 7. In the case mentioned in the preceding rule, other proofs of insanity may be offered, etc. 8. That where insanity is alleged to avoid a donation or other gratuitous contract, it is not necessary to show that the insanity was generally known; it will be sufficient to show that it existed, and if the party be dead, without having been interdicted, it is not necessary to show in this case that interdiction had been applied for." It is apparent from these provisions that the allegations of the bill as to the condition of Stockmeyer's mind on the 25th of January, 1884, do not entitle the plaintiff to relief upon the ground that he was incapable in law of making a binding agreement. And the proof fails to show that the persons who at that time generally saw and conversed with him, knew or even believed him to be in a state of mental derangement, or that McCan had any ground whatever to doubt his capacity to contract. Louisiana Bank v. Dubreuil, 5 Martin, 416, 425; Opinion of the Court. Phelps v. Reinach, 38 La. Ann. 547. On the contrary, the evidence shows that when he intervened in the McCan mortgage, he was, although of peculiar and at times eccentric manners, not incompetent for the transaction of business. He recognized the fact that Henry and George Godberry needed more money to carry on their plantation, and that, unless they obtained it, his interests under the prior pledge would be put in peril. He was not himself able to make further advances, and approved, if he did not suggest, that application be made for that purpose to McCan. The latter agreed to make advances for the current year only upon the condition, among others, that his mortgage and crop lien should take precedence of all others. This Stockmeyer perfectly understood and distinctly assented to with full apprehension of what he was doing. And that condition was plainly expressed in the contract; for it is therein stipulated that the mortgage and privilege then existing for the two notes for $8750 each, as well as for the indebtedness to Stockmeyer of $32,000 for and on account of advances to the Angelina plantation, were "subordinate" to the McCan notes and mortgage. The testimony of the notary before whom the McCan mortgage was executed is positive to the effect that, at that time, there was nothing peculiar in Stockmeyer's conversation, and that he presented the same appearance as on several previous occasions when transacting business with that officer. The truth is, that Stockmeyer's mind did not commence to give way, so far as his friends could perceive, until within a few days — not more than a week or ten days — prior to February 20, 1884, when he was transferred to the Louisiana Retreat for the Insane. The physician who examined him on that day, and by whose advice he was removed to that institution, testified that he was engaged in the transaction of his business all the time until about a week before being committed to the asylum. Undoubtedly he was, on and after that date, incapable of making a binding contract. But we are not to infer incapacity to have existed on the 25th of January, 1884, from the mere fact that he became insane within a few days before his removal to the asylum for treatment. Opinion of the Court. The suggestion that there was gross inadequacy of consideration is without force. Stockmeyer consented that his mortgage be subordinated to McCan's, because, in his judgment, further advances to the plantation could not be otherwise obtained, and without such advances he supposed, and reasonably, that it would run to waste, destroying all chance to save his debt. Besides, the advance by McCan, in consideration of his mortgage being accorded priority, was enough to sustain the agreement to that effect. After a close scrutiny of all the evidence we are of opinion that nothing is disclosed to support the contention, that the McCan mortgage and crop lien were obtained by imposition or undue influence. No such inference is justified by the evidence. The other aspect in which the case is presented by the appellant involves the validity of the sale by the sheriff under the proceedings for executory process. The first point made in support of this general contention is that the clause in the McCan mortgage, dispensing with appraisement, was not valid or binding under the laws of Louisiana; that, without appraisement, a legal sale could not occur. Under the Louisiana law, Code of Practice, 1870, art. 745, "when the Sheriff sells property which he has seized conformably to the provisions contained in this chapter [relating to executory process], he must cause the same appraisements to be made, and observe the same delays and formalities, as are prescribed for the sale of property seized in execution." The latter sales are provided for in Article 663 to 704 inclusive of the Code. In Levicks, Barrett & Kuen v. Walker, 15 La. Ann. 245,- a case much relied upon by the appellant-the suit was upon a note executed in Pennsylvania, the maker describing himself as residing in Louisiana, and promising to pay, without defalcation, and "without any relief whatever from appraisement or valuation laws." Judgment, in that form, was refused, and the plaintiff appealed. Chief Justice Merrick, in affirmance of the judgment, said: "We think the stipulation in a contract that the property of the debtor shall be sold without appraisement in the event of non-payment at maturity, one of those pacts which ought not |