count of which occupies nearly half of the volume-and after all, the fubject is left unfinished. The interval, our Author remarks, between the fall of the two empires (the Eaftern and Western), making a period of about a thousand years, is called the MIDDLE AGE. During this term, republics without number arose in Italy, whirled upon their axles or fingle centres; foamed, raged, and burst, like fo many water fpouts upon the ocean. They were all alike ill conftituted; all alike miferable; and all ended in fimilar difgrace and defpotifm. It would be curious to pursue our subject through all of them, whofe records have furvived the ravages of the Goths, Saracens, and bigotted Chriftians; through thofe other republics of Caftile, Arragon, Catalonia, Gallicia. and all the others in Spain; through thofe in Portugal; through the feveral provinces that now compofe the kingdom of France, through those in Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, England, Scotland, Ireland, &c. But, if fuch a work fhould be fufficiently encouraged by the Public (which is not probable, for mankind in general dare not as yet read or think upon CONSTITUTIONS), it is too extenfive for my forces, and ought not to be done in fo much haste.'

The Author then apologizes for his own performance, it having been written, as he fays, on the fpur of the occafion;' and publifhed with precipitation. With due deference to Dr. Adams's judgment, we should have thought that where so much was to be omitted, perhaps the whole of thofe hiftorical deductions might have been fet afide; especially as we obferve, that, in the course of his particular inveftigation, he refts his arguments chiefly on the hiftories of Rome, Athens, Carthage, and Lacedemon; which are very generally known.

The portion of this work which we think might have conftituted the text, as being the most important and original part, and to which the following remarks folely relate, begins at the 209th page of this volume, and is entitled The right Conftitution of a Commonwealth examined. This long and important letter profeffes to be a particular examination of a once very popular treatife, printed in the year 1656, by Marchamont Nedham*, under the title of "The excellency of a free ftate, or the right conftitution of a republic." This was an able defence of the commonwealth of England, and is, we prefume, a favourite book in America, where republican principles have long been highly cultivated. It is therefore with great propriety that our Author, at this time, beftows his particular attention on it; that he analyzes its principles, and traces, with great care, the effects of each inftitution recommended in that work, on the happiness of the people, and the general welfare of the community. In this particular department, Dr. Adams fhows himself to be an

It was reprinted in 1768, with a preface by the Editor, Richard Barron: See Review, vol. xxxviii. p. 38.

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able and attentive obferver, an acute reafoner, and particularly well acquainted with hiftory, and the ufes that ought to be made of it. He feems to have attentively ftudied the human heart, and he developes its natural bent and tendencies with ftrength, juftnefs, and precifion. His expreffions are ftrong, and manly; and though they may not poffefs all that elegance which enchants the man of tafte, they are clear, and intelligible to the understanding. The language is, indeed, unequal, often diffufe, and abounding in repetitions of the fame idea; but these, confidering the readers to whom the work is chiefly addreffed, may perhaps be thought rather excellencies than defects. In fhort, had this letter, with a very few alterations, been printed by itself, we are perfuaded it would have been very generally read by his countrymen, and might have proved of effential service, to direct their judgment in the prefent interefting crifis.

The great point that Dr. Adams wishes to establish is, that a democracy, if fuch a government could exift, is the very worst poffible form of government; that thofe devices which have been often recommended as of fuch effential confequence for preferving liberty,-fuch as frequency of elections into the general council, a general right of voting among the people, rotations among perfons in office, &c. &c. are of very little confequence to mankind, and that freedom can only be preferved by eftablishing proper checks on the different branches of adminiftration, or, as he calls it, balances,--and by dividing the legiflative from the executive power, and rendering the judicial independent of either in thort, by making it in every respect as much as poffible the fame with the actual conftitution of Great Britain.

This is rather a practical treatise, than a fpeculative differtation on the principles of government. The Author does not, with Locke and his followers, enter into long difquifitions concerning the natural rights of mankind, or frive to rear up a fyftem of government on principles of abftract fpeculation. Without flopping to enquire what are the natural rights of man, he proceeds directly to examine, by the teft of facts and experience, what fyftem of government is moft likely to infure the peace of fociety, and promote the happiness of the perfons governed. The Author whofe opinions he fcrutinizes, was an advocate for the republican form of government in preference to all others, particularly that kind of republic which has been called a democracy, in which the fupreme power is lodged with the people themselves; and his work confifts of certain directions, regulations, and cautions, founded on the beft arguments he could adduce, all tending to prove, that under this form of government alone, liberty and happiness can be enjoyed, and effectually fecured to the people. Dr. Adams follows him, ftep

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by step, through all his arguments, and in every particular endeavours to fhew that he has reasoned unfairly, and has drawn conclufions that could not be authorifed from the facts adduced. It would far exceed the bounds to which we muft confine ourselves, fhould we endeavour to give but a flight idea of the various topics infifted on at large in this differtation; but, after what we have already faid of the former part of this performance, it behoves us, in juftice to its Author, to enable the reader to judge, in fome measure, of his mode of arguing in this part.

Nedham lays it down as a fundamental principle, " that the people, that is, fuch as fhall be fucceffively chosen to reprefent the people, are the best keepers of their own liberties." Dr. Adams controverts this pofition: If by the people,' fays he, is meant the whole body of a great nation, it should not be forgotten, that they can never act, confult, or reafon together, because they cannot march five hundred miles, nor fpare the time, nor find a place to meet; and therefore the propofition that they are the beft keepers of their own liberties is not truethey are the worft; they are no keepers at all; they can neither act, judge, think, nor will, as a body politic, or corporation... If it is meant by the people,' as our Author explains himself," a representative affembly, "fuch as fhall be fucceffively chosen to reprefent the people; they ftill are not the best keepers of the people's liberties or their own, if you give them all the power, legiflative, executive, and judicial: they would invade the liberties of the people, at leaft the majority of them would invade the liberties of the minority, fooner and oftener than an abfolute monarchy, fuch as that of France, or Spain, or Ruffia, or than a well checked ariftocracy, like Venice, Bern, or Holland.'Again; Nedham fays, that the people never think of ufurping over other men's rights; but Dr. Adams thinks this propofition thould be reverfed, and that it fhould have been faid that they mind fo much their own, that they never think enough of others.'.. A great majority of every nation,' he obferves, is wholly deftitute of property, except a fmall quantity of clothes, and a few trifles of other moveables. Would Mr. Nedham be refponfible, that if all were to be decided by a vote of the majority, the eight or nine millions who have no property would not think of ufurping over the rights of the one or two millions who have? Property is, furely, a right of mankind as real as liberty. Perhaps, at first, prejudice, habit, fhame, fear, principle, or religion, would reftrain the poor from attacking the rich, and the idle from enfringing on the induftrious: but the time would arrive when courage and enterprize would come, and pretexts be invented, by degrees, to countenance the majority in a division of all the property among them, or at leaft in fharing it equally with its prefent poffeffors, Debts would be abolished firft; taxes

laid

laid heavy on the rich, and not at all on the others; and at laft a downright partition of every thing be voted. What would be the confequence? The idle, the vicious, the intemperate, would rush into the utmost extravagance and debauchery, fell and spend all their fhare, and then demand a new divifion of thofe who purchafed from them.' He fupports thefe opinions by a variety of examples from hiftory, and proves that many of the disorders that have fo often diftreffed fociety have proceeded from the temporary injuftice of democratic majorities. Dr. Adams has perhaps had, before his eyes, examples of the power of fuch popular majorities, and the ufes which have been made of them, which probably left a ftrong impreffion on his mind, though he does not choose to adduce them as authorities. Abundance of others occurred to him, that, in his fituation, were lefs exceptionable.

Many good people in England feem to entertain a very high idea of the beneficial effects of a quick fucceffion of election for reprefentatives; and it feems that in America equal confidence at leaft was put in this measure, as a prefervative of the liberties of the people. But Dr. A. thinks that this opinion is far from being well founded; and that thefe frequent elections would be productive of many bad confequences. When thefe elections,' fays he, are in a fingle city, like Rome, there will be always two fets of candidates: if one fet fucceeds one year, the other will endeavour to fucceed the next. This will make the whole year a scene of faction and intrigue, and every citizen, except perhaps a very few who will not meddle on either fide, a partizan or factious man. If the elections are in a large country, like England for example, or one of the United States of America, where various cities, towns, boroughs, and corporations are to be reprefented, each fcene of election will have two or three candidates, and two or more parties, each of which" will ftudy its fleights [words of Nedham] and projects, difguife its defigns, draw in tools, and worm out enemies " We must remember, that every party, and every individual is now ftruggling for a fhare in the executive and judicial power, as well as legiflative, for a share of the diftribution of all honours, offices, rewards and profits. Every paffion and prejudice of every voter will be applied to, every flattery and menace, every trick and bribe that can be bestowed, and will be accepted, will be ufed; and, what is horrible to think of, that candidate or that agent who has fewest fcruples; who will propagate lies and flanders with most confidence and secrecy; who will wheedle, flatter, and cajole; who will debauch the people by treats, feafts, and diverfions with the leaft hefitation, and bribe with the most impudent front, which can confift with hypocritical concealment, will draw in tools, and worm out enemies the fafteft: unfullied honour, fterling integrity, real virtue, will stand a very unequal chance. When vice, folly, impudence, and knavery have carried an election for one year, they will acquire in the course of it fresh influence and power to fuccced the next,' &c. &c.

Nor will thefe evils, he thinks, be prevented by establishing a rotation in respect to the perfons elected, that is, a law forbidding the fame perfon to be continued in office beyond a certain fpecified time. This he confiders as, in the first place, a violation of the natural rights both of electors and candidates.

There is no right (he obferves) clearer, and few of more importance, than that the people fhould be at liberty to choose the ableft and best men, and that men of the greatest merit should exercise the most important employments; yet, upon the prefent fuppofition, the people voluntarily refign this right, and fhackle their own choice. This year the people choose thofe members who are the ableit, wealthieft, and beft qualified, and have molt of their confidence and affection. In the courfe of the three years [that he fuppofes they are allowed to continue in office] they encreafe their number of friends, and confequently their influence and power, by their adminiftration, yet at the end of three years they must all return to private life, and be fucceeded by another fet, who have lefs wifdom, wealth, and virtue, and lefs of the confidence and affection of the people. Will either they or the people bear this? Will they not repeal the fundamental law, and be applauded by the nation, at least by their own friends and conflituents, who are the majority, for fo doing? But fuppofing fo unnatural and improbable a thing as that they should ftill refpect the law, what will be the confequence? They will, in effect, nominate their fucceffors, and govern fill. Their friends are the majority, their fucceffors will be all taken from their party, and the mortified minority will fee themselves duped. Those who have the most weight, influence, or power, whether by merit, wealth, or birth, will govern, whether they stay at home or go to parliament. Such a rotation, then, will only encrease and multiply factions.'

Those who are well acquainted with the management of particular corporations, even in this country, will be beft able to judge whether the foregoing picture is juft. The examples of Appius, Sylla, Marius, and Cæfar, among the Romans, are produced as appofite illufirations of the doctrine here inculcated. Our Author paints, in very ftriking colours, the devices which artful men adopt for duping the people, when all depends on their votes at an election, and continuing themfelves in power; but our limits do not permit us to follow him in thefe interefting details.

After having fhewn, by a variety of examples, that democracies always run into abfolute power under one form of another, Dr. Adams confiders a long paffage in Nedham, in which that writer difcuffes the various changes that took place in the government of Athens; after which the Doctor thus proceeds:

• Abfolute monarchy, unlimited power, in a particular person who governed by his own will, runs through all the history of Athens, according to Nedham' own account, even when the people had placed the fupreme power in an orderly revolution of perfons elective by themselves. Why? Because the people did not keep a frict 7

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