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ported that count. The second count does not allege that the plaintiff was deprived of the use of the water, but that the defendant wrongfully prevented the water from flowing past the lands of the plaintiff along its usual course, in its usual calm and smooth manner, as the same ought to have done, and that his lands were thereby injured. It is true, that in trespass for a wrongful entry into the land of another, a damage is presumed to have been sustained, though no pecuniary damage be actually proved. So in the case of an action for the obstruction of a right of common, or a right of way, any obstruction of that right, is a sufficient cause of action. The doing of any act calculated to injure that right is a sufficient ground of action, but, generally speaking, there must be a temporal loss or damage accruing from the wrongful act of another, in order to entitle a party to maintain an action on the case. Now, assuming that the stopping of the water was a wrongful act of the defendant, has the plaintiff thereby sustained any temporal loss or damage? He alleges that he has sustained a damage, by his banks having been injured in consequence of the water flowing in a more impetuous manner. He does not allege that he has sustained any damage by the actual loss of the water. The jury have found that he has not sustained the damage alleged; and, therefore, they have negatived the ground of action stated in his declaration. Water is of that peculiar nature, that it is not sufficient to allege in a declaration, that the defendant prevented the water from flowing to the plaintiff's premises. The plaintiff must state an actual damage accruing from the want of the water. The mere right to use the water does not give a party such a property in the new water constantly coming, as to make the diversion or obstruction of the water, per se, give him any right of action. All the king's subjects have a right to the use of flowing water, provided that, in using it, they do no injury to the rights already vested in another by the appropriation of the water.

Rule discharged.

ACTON V. BLUNDELL.
EXCHEQUER CHAMBER. 1843.

[Reported 12 M. & W. 324.] TINDAL, C. J.? The question raised before us on this bill of exceptions is one of equal novelty and importance. The plaintiff below, who is also the plaintiff in error, in his action on the case, declared in the first count for the disturbance of his right to the water of certain underground springs, streams, and watercourses, which, as he alleged, ought of right to run, flow, and percolate into the closes of the plaintiff, for supplying certain mills with water; and in the second count for the draining off the water of a certain spring or well of water in a certain close of the plaintiff, by reason of the possession of which close, as he alleged, he ought of right to have the use, benefit, and enjoyment of the water of the said spring or well for the convenient use of his close. The defendants by their pleas traversed the rights in the manner alleged in those counts respectively. At the trial the plaintiff proved, that, within twenty years before the commencement of the suit, viz. in the latter end of 1821, a former owner and occupier of certain land and a cotton-mill, now belonging to the plaintiff, had sunk and made in such land a well for raising water for the working of the mill; and that the defendants, in the year 1837, had sunk a coal-pit in the land of one of the defendants at about three-quarters of a mile from the plaintiff's well, and about three years after sunk a second at a somewhat less distance ; the consequence of which sinkings was, that, by the first, the supply of water was considerably diminished, and by the second was rendered altogether insufficient for the purposes of the mill. The learned judge before whom the cause was tried directed the jury, that, if the defendants had proceeded and acted in the usual and proper manner on the land, for the purpose of working and winning a coalmine therein, they might lawfully do so, and that the plaintiff's evidence was not sufficient to support the allegations in his declaration as traversed by the second and third pleas. Against this direction of the judge the counsel for the plaintiff tendered the bill of exceptions which has been argued before us. And after hearing such argument, and consideration of the case, we are of opinion that the direction of the learned judge was correct in point of law.

1 See Mason v. Hill, 5 B. & Ad. 1. ? The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

The question argued before us has been in substance this: whether the right to the enjoyment of an underground spring, or of a well supplied by such underground spring, is governed by the same rule of law as that which applies to, and regulates, a watercourse flowing on the

surface.

The rule of law which governs the enjoyment of a stream flowing in its natural course over the surface of land belonging to different proprietors is well established; each proprietor of the land has a right to the advantage of the stream flowing in its natural course over his land, to use the same as he pleases, for any purposes of his own, not inconsistent with a similar right in the proprietors of the land above or below; so that, neither can any proprietor above diminish the quantity or injure the quality of the water which would otherwise naturally descend, nor can any proprietor below throw back the water without the license or the grant of the proprietor above. The law is laid down in those precise terms by the Court of King's Bench in the case of Muson v. Hil, 5 B. & Ad. 1; 2 Nev. & M. 747, and substantially is declared by the Vice-Chancellor in the case of Wright v. Howard, 1 S. & S. 190, and such we consider a correct exposition of the law. And if the right to the enjoyment of underground springs, or to a well

supplied thereby, is to be governed by the same law, then undoubtedly the defendants could not justify the sinking of the coal-pits, and the direction given by the learned judge would be wrong.

But we think, on considering the grounds and origin of the law which is held to govern running streams, the consequences which would result if the same law is made applicable to springs beneath the surface, and, lastly, the authorities to be found in the books, so far as any inference can be drawn from them bearing on the point now under discussion, that there is a marked and substantial difference between the two cases, and that they are not to be governed by the same rule of law.

The ground and origin of the law which governs streams running in their natural course would seem to be this, that the right enjoyed by the several proprietors of the lands over which they flow is, and always has been, public and notorious: that the enjoyment has been long continued — in ordinary cases, indeed, time out of mind -- and uninterrupted; each man knowing what he receives and what has always been received from the higher lands, and what he transmits and what has always been transmitted to the lower. The rule, therefore, either assumes for its foundation the implied assent and agreement of the proprietors of the different lands from all ages, or perhaps it may be considered as a rule of positive law (which would seem to be the opinion of Fleta and of Blackstone), the origin of which is lost by the progress of time; or it may not be unfitly treated, as laid down by Mr. Justice Story, in his judgment in the case of Tyler v. Wilkinson, 4 Mason's (American) Reports, 401, in the courts of the United States, as “an incident to the land ; and that whoever seeks to found an exclusive use must establish a rightful appropriation in some manner known and admitted by the law.” But in the case of a well sunk by a proprietor in his own land, the water which feeds it from a neighboring soil does not flow openly in the sight of the neighboring proprietor, but through the hidden veins of the earth beneath its surface: no man can tell what changes these underground sources have undergone in the progress of time: it may well be, that it is only yesterday's date, that they first took the course and direction which enabled them to supply the well: again, no proprietor knows what portion of water is taken from beneath his own soil : how much he gives originally, or how much he transmits only, or how much he receives : on the contrary, until the well is sunk, and the water collected by draining into it, there cannot properly be said, with reference to the well, to be any flow of water at all. In the case, therefore, of the well, there can be no ground for implying any mutual consent or agreement, for ages past, between the owners of the several lands beneath which the underground springs may exist, which is one of the foundations on which the law as to running streams is supposed to be built; nor, for the same reason, can any trace of a positive law be inferred from long-continued acquiescence and submission, whilst the very existence of the underground springs or of the well may be unknown to the proprietors of the soil.

But the difference between the two cases with respect to the consequences, if the same law is to be applied to both, is still more apparent. In the case of the running stream, the owner of the soil merely transmits the water over its surface: he receives as much from his higher neighbor as he sends down to his neighbor below: he is neither better nor worse: the level of the water remains the same. But if the man who sinks the well in his own land can acquire by that act an absolute and indefeasible right to the water that collects in it, he has the power of preventing his neighbor from making any use of the spring in his own soil which shall interfere with the enjoyment of the well. He has the power, still further, of debarring the owner of the land in which the spring is first found, or through which it is transmitted, from draining his land for the proper cultivation of the soil: and thus, by an act which is voluntary on his part, and which may be entirely unsuspected by his neighbor, he may impose on such neighbor the necessity of bearing a heavy expense, if the latter has erected machinery for the purposes of mining, and discovers, when too late, that the appropriation of the water has already been made. Further, the advantage on one side, and the detriment to the other, may bear no proportion. The well may be sunk to supply a cottage, or a drinking-place for cattle ; whilst the owner of the adjoining land may be prevented from winning metals and minerals of inestimable value. And, lastly, there is no limit of space within which the claim of right to an underground spring can be confined: in the present case, the nearest coal-pit is at the distance of half a mile from the well : it is obvious the law must equally apply if there is an interval of many miles.

Considering, therefore, the state of circumstances upon which the law is grounded in the one case to be entirely dissimilar from those which exist in the other; and that the application of the same rule to both would lead, in many cases, to consequences at once unreasonable and unjust; we feel ourselves warranted in holding, upon principle, that the case now under discussion does not fall within the rule which obtains as to surface streams, nor is it to be governed by analogy therewith.

No case has been cited on either side bearing directly on the subject in dispute. The case of. Cooper v. Barber, 3 Taunt. 99, which approaches the nearest to it, seems to make against the proposition contended for by the plaintiff. In that case the defendant had for many l'ears penned back a stream for the purpose of irrigation, in consequence of which the water had percolated through a porous and gravelly soil into the plaintiff's land: but as this percolation had been insensible, and unknown by the plaintiff until the land was applied for building purposes, the court held, that the defendant had gained no right thereby, so as to justify its continuance. The case of Partridge 1. Scott, 3 M. & W. 230, is an authority to show, that a man, by building a house on the extremity of his own land, does not thereby acquire any right of easement, for support or otherwise, over the adjoining land of his neighbor. It is said in that case, “ he has no right to load his

own soil, so as to make it require the support of that of his neighbor, unless he has some grant to that effect.” It must follow, by parity of reason, that, if he digs a well in his own land so close to the soil of his neighbor, as to require the support of a rib of clay or of stone in his neighbor's land to retain the water in the well, no action would lie against the owner of the adjacent land for digging away such clay or stone, which is his own property, and thereby letting out the water; and it would seem to make no difference as to the legal rights of the parties, if the well stands some distance within the plaintiff's boundary, and the digging by the defendant, which occasions the water to flow from the well, is some distance within the defendant's boundary; which is, in substance, the very case before us.

The Roman law forms no rule, binding in itself, upon the subjects of these realms; but, in deciding a case upon principle, where no direct authority can be cited from our books, it affords no small evidence of the soundness of the conclusion at which we have arrived, if it proves to be supported by that law, the fruit of the researches of the most learned men, the collective wisdom of ages, and the groundwork of the municipal law of most of the countries in Europe.

The authority of one at least of the learned Roman lawyers appears decisive upon the point in favor of the defendants; of some others the opinion is expressed with more obscurity. In the Digest, lib. 39, tit. 3, De aqua et aquæ pluviæ arcendæ, s. 12, “Denique Marcellus scribit, Cum eo, qui in suo fodiens vicini fontem avertit, nihil posse agi, nec de dolo actionem ; et sane non debet babere, si non animo vicini nocendi, sed suum agrum meliorem faciendi, id fecit.”

It is scarcely necessary to say, that we intimate no opinion whatever as to what might be the rule of law, if there had been an uninterrupted user of the right for more than the last twenty years; but, confining ourselves strictly to the facts stated in the bill of exceptions, we think the present case, for the reasons above given, is not to be governed by the law which applies to rivers and flowing streams, but that it rather falls within that principle, which gives to the owner of the soil all that lies beneath his surface; that the land immediately below is his property, whether it is solid rock, or porous ground, or venous earth, or part soil, part water ; that the person who owns the surface may dig therein, and apply all that is there found to his own purposes at his free will and pleasure; and that if, in the exercise of such right, he intercepts or drains off the water collected from underground springs in his neighbor's well, this inconvenience to his neighbor falls within the description of damnum absque injuria, which cannot become the ground of an action.

We think, therefore, the direction given by the learned judge at the trial was correct, and that the judgment already given for the defendants in the court below must be affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

Couling, for the plaintiff.
Addison, for the defendant.

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