The Original PositionTimothy Hinton At the centre of John Rawls's political philosophy is one of the most influential thought experiments of the twentieth century: which principles of justice would a group of individuals choose to regulate their society if they were deprived of any information about themselves that might bias their choice? In this collection of new essays, leading political philosophers examine the ramifications and continued relevance of Rawls's idea. Their chapters explore topics including the place of the original position in rational choice theory, the similarities between Rawls's original position and Kant's categorical imperative, the differences between Rawls's model and Scanlon's contractualism, and the role of the original position in the argument between Rawls and other views in political philosophy, including utilitarianism, feminism, and radicalism. This accessible volume will be a valuable resource for undergraduates, as well as advanced students and scholars of philosophy, game theory, economics, and the social and political sciences. |
Contents
Justice as fairness utilitarianism and mixed conceptions | 18 |
the many | 39 |
The strains of commitment | 59 |
Nozick on the original | 77 |
Rawls and Dworkin on hypothetical reasoning | 97 |
Feminist receptions of the original position | 119 |
G A Cohens critique of the original position | 139 |
Liberals radicals and the original position | 159 |
The original position and Scanlons contractualism | 179 |
The Kantian roots of the original position | 201 |
Stability and the original position from Theory to Political Liberalism | 224 |
The original position in The Law of Peoples | 247 |
| 266 | |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
agents agreement reached argues autonomy average utilitarianism average utility basic structure categorical imperative choose choosers citizens claim Cohen conception of justice constructivism contract contractarian contractual argument depends difference principle distributive justice Dworkin egalitarian equal moral persons equal persons ethical facts favor feminist considered convictions free and equal freedom fundamental G. A. Cohen gender global Harsanyi human idea ideal individuals inequalities initial situation institutions interests John Rawls justice as fairness justified Kantian liberal maximin maximize metaethical nature normative Nozick objection one’s original position argument outcome overlapping consensus particular parties people’s Philosophy Pogge political liberties primary principles of justice procedure question Rational Advantage Model rational choice Rawls says Rawls thinks Rawls’s original position Rawlsian reflective equilibrium relevant represent requires respect role self-enforcing self-respect sense of justice special conception specific strains of commitment talents theory of justice veil of ignorance well-ordered society