losophy, which comprised all the sciences; and in these there were many masters, very conversant, but, as is common, their vanity still greater than their pretensions.

18. All the subordinate states of Greece seemed to make Athens the object of their imitation; and though inferior to it upon the whole, yet each produced great scholars, and remarkaDe warriors in its turn. Sparta alone took example from no other state; but still rigorously attached to the institutions of its great lawgiver Lycurgus, it disdained all the arts of peace, which, while they polished, served to enervate the mind; and, formed only for war, they looked forward to campaigns and bat tles, as scenes of rest and tranquillity.

19. All the laws of Sparta, and all the institutions of Lycurgus, seemed to have no other object than war; all other employments, arts, polite learning, sciences, trades, and even husbandry itself, were prohibited amongst them.

20. The citizens of Lacedæmon were of two sorts, either those who inhabited the city of Sparta, and, who for that reason were called Spartans, and those who inhabited the country dependent thereon. In the times of Lycurgus the Spartans amounted to nine thousand men; the countrymen to thirty thousand. This number was rather diminished than increased in succeeding times; but it still composed a formidable body, that often gave laws to the rest of Greece.

21. The Spartan soldiers, properly so called, were considered as the flower of the nation; and we may judge of their estimation by the anxiety the republic expressed, when three hundred of them were once taken prisoners by the Athenians.

22. But notwithstanding the great valour of the Spartan state, it was formed rather for a defensive than an offensive war. They were always careful to spare the troops of their country; and, as they had very little money, were not in a capacity to send their armies upon distant expeditions.

23. The armies, both of Sparta and Athens, were composed of four sorts of troops: citizens, allies, mercenaries, and slaves. The greatest number of troops in the two republics were composed of allies, who were paid by the cities who sent them, Those which received pay from their employers, were styled The number of slaves attending on every army was very great; and the Helotes in particular were employed as light infantry.

mercenaries.

24. The Greek infantry consisted of two kinds of soldiers; the one heavy armed, and carrying great shields, spears, and scimi tars; the other light armed, carrying javelins, bows, and slings. These were commonly placed in the front of the battle, or upon

the wings, to shoot their arrows, or fling their javelins and stones at the enemy, and then retire through the intervals behind the ranks, to dart out occasionally upon the retiring enemy.

25. The Athenians were pretty much strangers to cavalry; and the Lacedæmonians did not begin the use till after the war with Messena. They raised their horse principally in a small city, not far from Lacedæmon, called Sciros; and they were always placed on the extremity of the left wing, which post they claimed as their rightful station.

26. But to recompense this defect of cavalry, the Athenians, in naval affairs, had a great superiority over all the states of Greece. As they had an extensive sea coast, and as the profession of a merchant was held reputable among them, their navy increased; and was at length sufficiently powerful to intimidate the fleets of Persia.

27. Such were the two states, that in some measure engrossed all the power of Greece to themselves; and though several petty kingdoms still held their governments in independence, yet they owed their safety to the mutual jealousy of these powerful rivals; and always found shelter from the one against the oppressions of the other. Indeed, the dissimilarity of their habits, manners, and education, served as well to divide these two states, as their political ambition.

28. The Lacedæmonians were severe, and seemed to have something almost brutal in their character. A government too rigid, and a life too laborious, rendered their tempers haughtily

sullen and untractable.

29. The Athenians were, naturally, obliging and agreeable, cheerful among each other, and humane to their inferiors: but they were restless, unequal, timorous friends, and capricious protectors.

30. From hence, neither republic could sufficiently win over the smaller states of Greece to their interests; and although their ambition would not suffer the country to remain in repose, yet their obvious defects were always a bar to the spreading of their dominion. Thus the mutual jealousy of these states kept them both in constant readiness for war, while their common defects kept the lesser states independent.

CHAPTER V.

From the Expulsion of Hippias to the Death of Darius.

1. It was in this disposition of Athens and Sparta, and of the lesser states, their neighbours, that the Persian monarchy began to interest itself in their disputes; and made itself an

umpire in their contentions for liberty, only to seize upon the liberties of all. It has been already related, that Hippias being besieged in Athens, and his children being taken prisoners; in order to release them, he consented to abdicate the sovereign power, and to leave the dominion of Athens in five days. Athens, however, in recovering its liberty, did not enjoy that tranquillity, which freedom is thought to bestow.

2. Two of the principal citizens, Calisthenes, a favourite of the people, and Isagoras, who was supported by the rich, began to contend for that power which they had, but a little before, joined in depressing. The former, who was become very popular, made an alteration in the form of their establishment; and, instead of four tribes, whereof they before consisted, enlarged their numbers to ten.

3. He also instituted the manner of giving votes by Ostracism, as it was called. The manner of performing this, was for every citizen, not under sixty years old, to give in a name written uran a tile, or oystershell, (from whence the method of voting had its name) and he upon whom the majority fell, was pronounced banished for ten years. These laws, evidently calculated to increase the power of the people, were so displeasing to Isagoras, that, rather than submit, he had recourse to Cleomenes king of Sparta, who undertook to espouse his quarrel. In fact, the Lacedæmonians only wanted a favourable pretext for lessening and destroying the power of Athens, which, in consequence of the command of the oracle, they had so lately rescued from tyranny.

4. Cleomenes, therefore, availing himself of the divided state of the city, entered Athens, and procured the banishment of Calisthenes, with seven hundred families more, who had sided with him in the late commotions. Not content with this, he endeavoured to new model the state; but being strongly opposed by the senate, he seized upon the citadel, from whence, however, in two days he was obliged to retire. Calisthenes perceiving the enemy withdrawn, returned with his followers; and finding it vain to make any further attempts for power, restored the government as settled by Solon.

5. In the mean time, the Lacedæmonians repenting the services they had rendered their rival state, and perceiving the imposture of the oracle, by which they were thus impelled to act against their own interests, began to think of reinstating Hippias on the throne. But previous to their attempt, they judged it prudent to consult the subordinate states of Greece, and to see what hopes they had of their concurrence and approbation. Nothing, however, could be more mortifying than the universal

detestation with which their proposal was received by the deputies of the states of Greece.

6. The deputy of Corinth expressed the utmost indignation at the design; and seemed astonished that the Spartans, who were the avowed enemy of tyrants, should thus espouse the interests of one noted for cruelty and usurpation. The rest of the states warmly seconded his sentiments, and the Lacedæmonians, covered with confusion and remorse, abandoned Hippias and his cause for ever after.

7. Hippias, being thus frustrated in his hopes of exciting the Greeks to second his pretensions, was resolved to have recourse to one who was considered as a much more powerful patron. Wherefore, taking his leave of the Spartans, he applied himself to Artaphernes, governor of Sardis, for the king of Persia, whom he endeavoured by every art to engage in a war against Athens. 8. He represented to him the divided state of the city; he enlarged upon its riches, and the happiness of its situation for trade: he added the ease with which it might be taken, and the glory that would attend success. Influenced by these motives, the pride and the avarice of the Persian court were inflamed, and nothing was so ardently sought as the pretext of a dispute with the Athenians. When, therefore, that city sent to the Persian court to vindicate their proceedings, alleging that Hippias deserved no countenance from so great a people; the answer returned was, That if the Athenians would be safe they must admit Hippias for their king.

9. Athens having so lately thrown off the yoke, had too lively a sense of its past calamities to accept safety upon such base conditions: and resolved to suffer to the last extremity, rather than open their gates to a tyrant. When Artaphernes, therefore, demanded the restoration of Hippias, the Athenians boldly returned him a downright and absolute refusal. From this arose the war between Greece and Persia, one of the most glorious and the most remarkable that ever graced the annals of kingdoms.

10. But there were more causes than one tending to make a breach between these powerful nations, and producing an irreconcileable aversion for each other. The Greek colonies of Ionia, Eolia, and Caria, that were settled for above five hundred years in Asia Minor, were at length subdued by Crœsus, king of Lydia; and he in turn, sinking under the power of Cyrus, his conquests of course fell in with the rest of his dominions.

11. The Persian monarch, thus possessed of a vast extensive territory, placed governors over the several cities that were thus subdued; and as men bred up in a despotic court, were likely enough to imitate the example set them at home, it is proba

ble enough they abused their power. Be this as it may, in all the Greek cities they were called tyrants; and as these little states had not yet lost all idea of freedom, they took every opportunity to recover their liberty, and made many bold, but unsuccessful struggles in that glorious cause. The Ionians particularly, who bore the greatest sway among them, let no occasion slip which promised the smallest hopes of shaking off the Persian yoke. 12. That which favoured their designs upon the present occasion, was the expedition of Darius into Scythia, into which country he sent a numerous army, laying a bridge over the river Isther for that purpose. The Ionians were appointed to guard this important pass; but were advised by Miltiades, whom we shall afterwards find performing nobler exploits, to break down the bridge, and thus cut off the Persian retreat. The Ionians, however, rejected his counsel; and Darius returned with his army into Europe, where he added Thrace and Macedon to the number of his conquests.

13. Histiæus, the tyrant of Miletus, and the person who opposed the advice of Miltiades, being of an ambitious and intriguing disposition, was willing to lessen the merit of all his contemporaries, in order to enhance his own: but he was deceived in his expectations of success: from these schemes Darius, justly suspecting his fidelity, took him with him to Susa, under pretence of using his friendship and advice, but in reality of preventing his future machinations at home. But Histiæus saw too clearly the cause of his detention, which he regarded as a specious imprisonment: and therefore took every opportunity of secretly exciting the Ionians to a revolt, hoping that himself might, one day, be sent to bring them to reason.

14. Aristagoras was at that time statesman's deputy at Miletus, and received the instructions of his master to stir up the Ionian cities to revolt with the utmost alacrity. In fact, from a late failure of this general upon Naxos, his credit was ruined at the Persian court; and no alternative remained for him, but to comply with the advice of Histiæus in stirring up a revolt; and of trying to place himself at the head of a new confederacy.

5. The first step Aristagoras took to engage the affections of the Ionians, was to throw up his power in Miletus, where he was deputy, and to reinstate that little place in all its former freedom. He then made a journey through all Ionia, where, by his example, his credit, and perhaps his menaces, he induced every other governor to imitate his example.

16. They all complied the more cheerfully, as the Persian power, since the check it had received in Scythia, was the less able to punish their revolt, or to protect them in their continued attachment. Having thus united all these little states by the