43. He was succeeded in the throne by Leotychides, who concurring with the views of Cleomenes, punished the Æginetans by placing ten of the most guilty citizens in the hands of the Athenians: while Cleomenes, some time after, being detected of having suborned the priestess, slew himself in a fit of despair.

44. On the other hand, the Æginetans complained of the se verity of their treatment; but finding no likelihood of redress, they resolved to obtain that justice by force, which was refused to their supplications. Accordingly they intercepted an Athe nian ship, which in pursuance of an annual custom ever since the times of Theseus, was going to Delos to offer sacrifice. This produced a naval war between these two states: in which, after a variety of fortunes, the Eginetans was worsted, and the Athenians possessed themselves of the sovereignty of the seas.

45. Thus these civil discords, which seemed at first to favour the designs of the common enemy, turned out to the general advantage of Greece. For the Athenians, thus acquiring great power at sea, were put in a capacity of facing the Persian fleets, and of cutting off those supplies which were continually carrying to their armies on land.

46. In the mean time, the preparations on both sides for a general war, were carried on with the greatest animosity and despatch. Darius sent away his generals, Datis and Artaphernes, whom he had appointed in the room of Mardonius, to what he supposed a certain conquest. They were furnished with a fleet of six hundred ships, and an army of a hundred and twenty thousand men; their instructions were to give up Athens and Eretria, a little city which had joined in the league against him, to be plundered; to burn all the houses and temples of both, and to lead away all the inhabitants into slavery. The country was to be laid desolate, and the army was provided with a sufficient supply of chains and fetters for binding the conquered nations.

47. To oppose this formidable invasion, the Athenians had only their courage, their animosity, their dread of slavery, their discipline, and about ten thousand men. Their civil commotions with the other states of Greece, had given them a spirit of war and stratagem, while the genius of their citizens, continually excited and exercised, was arrived at its highest pitch, and fitted them for every danger.

48. Athens had long been refining in all those arts which qualify a state to extend, or to enjoy conquest; every citizen was a statesman and a general, and every soldier considered himself as one of the bulwarks of his country. But in this little state, from whence first flowed all those improvements that have since adorned and civilized society, there were at that time three

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men who were considered as superior to all the rest; all remarkable for their abilities in war, and their integrity in peace; for those qualifications that can advance the glory of states, or procure the happiness of the individual.

49. Of these, Miltiades, as being the most experienced, was at that time the most known. He was the son of Cimon, and nephew of Miltiades, an illustrious Athenian, who accepted the government of Doloncy, a people of the Thracian Chersonesus. Old Miltiades dying without issue, he was succeeded in his government by Stesagoras, his nephew, and he also dying, young Miltiades was chosen as his successor.

50. He was appointed to that government the same year that Darius undertook his unsuccessful expedition against the Scythians. He was obliged to attend that prince as far as the Isther with what shipping he was able to supply; but, ever eager to throw off the Persian yoke, it was he who advised the Ionians to destroy the bridge, and leave the army of Darius to its fate.

51. When the affairs of the continent began to decline, Miltiades, rather than live in dependence, resolved to return once more to Athens; and thither he returned with five ships, which were all that remained of his shattered fortune.

52. At the same time, two other citizens, younger than Miltiades, began to distinguish themselves at Athens, namely, Aristides, and Themistocles. These were of very different dispositions; but from this difference resulted the greatest advantage to their country.

53. Themistocles was naturally inclined to a popular government, and omitted nothing that could render him agreeable to the people, or gain him friends. His complaisance was boundless, and his desire to oblige sometimes outstepped the bounds of duty. His partiality was often conspicuous. Somebody talking with him once on the subject, told him he would make an excellent magistrate if he had more impartiality: God forbid, replied he, that I should ever sit upon a tribunal, where my friends should find no more favour than strangers.

54. Aristides was as remarkable for his justice and integrity, Being a favourer of aristocracy, in imitation of Lycurgus, he was friendly, but never at the expense of justice. In seeking honours he ever declined the interest of his friends, lest they should, in turn, demand his interest when his duty was to be impartial.

55. The love of the public good was the great spring of all his actions, and with that in view, no difficulties could daunt him, no success or elevation exalt. On all occasions he preserved his usual calmness of temper, being persuaded that he was entirely his country's, and very little his own. One day when an

actor was repeating some lines from Eschylus on the stage, coming to a passage which described a man as not desiring to appear honest, but to be so, the whole audience cast their eyes on Aristides, and applied the passage. In the administration of public offices, his whole aim was to perform his duty without any thought of enriching himself.

56. Such were the characters of the illustrious Athenians that led the councils of the state, when Darius turned his arms against Greece. These inspired their fellow citizens with a noble confidence in the justice of their cause; and made all the preparations against the coming invasion, that prudence and deliberate valour could suggest.

57. In the mean time, Datis and Artaphernes led on their numerous forces towards Europe; and after having made themselves masters of the islands in the Egean sea without any opposition, they turned their course towards Eretria, that city which had formerly assisted the Ionians in their revolt.

58. The Eretrians, now driven to the last extremity, saw no hopes of meeting their enemy in the field, wherefore they sent back four thousand men that the Athenians had supplied them with, and resolved patiently to stand a siege. For six days the Persians attempted to storm the city, and were repulsed with loss; but on the seventh, the city, by the treachery of some of the principal inhabitants, being betrayed into their hands, they entered, plundered, and burned it.

59. The inhabitants were put in chains, and sent as the fruits of the war to the Persian monarch; but he, contrary to their expectations, treated them with great lenity; and gave them a village in the country of Cissa for their residence, where Apollonius Tyanæus found their descendants six hundred years after.

success,

60. After such splendid success at Eretria, nothing now remained but the apparently easy conquest of Greece. Hippias, The expelled tyrant of Athens, still accompanied the Persian army; and led them by the safest marches into the heart of the country; at length, flushed with victory, and certain of he conducted them to the plains of Marathon, a fertile valley but ten miles distant from Athens. From thence they sent to summon the citizens, acquainting them with the fate of Eretria, and informing them that not a single inhabitant had escaped their vengeance.

61. But the Athenians were not to be intimidated by any vicinity of danger. They had sent, indeed, to Sparta to implore succour against the common enemy, which was granted without deliberation; but the superstition of the times rendered their as

sistance ineffectual; for it was an established law among the Spartans, not to begin a march before the full moon.

62. They applied also to other states, but they were too much awed by the power of Persia to move in their defence. An army of a hundred and twenty thousand men, exulting in the midst of their country, was too formidable for a weak and jealous confederacy to oppose. The inhabitants of Platea alone furnished them with a thousand soldiers, and they were left to find all other assistance in their courage and their despair.

63. In this extremity they were obliged to arm their slaves for the safety of all, and their forces, thus united, amounted to but ten thousand men. Hoping, therefore, to derive from their discipline what they wanted in power, they placed their whole army under the conduct of ten generals, of whom Miltiades was chief; and of these, each was to have the command of the troops day about in regular succession.

64. An arrangement, in itself so unpromising, was still more embarrassed, by the generals themselves disputing whether they should hazard a battle, or wait the approach of the enemy within their walls. The latter opinion seemed for awhile to prevail; it was urged that it would be rashness itself to face so powerful and well appointed an army with a handful of men.

65. It was alleged that the soldiers would gather courage from their security behind the walls, and that the forces of Sparta without, might make a diversion in case of a sally from within. Miltiades, however, declared for the contrary opinion, and showed that the only means to exalt the courage of their own troops, and to strike a terror into those of the enemy, was to advance boldly towards them with an air of confidence and desperate intrepidity.

66. Aristides also strenuously embraced this opinion, and exerted all his masculine eloquence to bring over the rest. The question being put, when the suffrages came to be taken, the opinions were equal on either side of the argument. It now, therefore, remained with Callimachus, the polemarch, who had a right of voting as well as the ten commanders, to give his opinion, and decide this important debate.

67. It was to him Miltiades addressed himself with the utmost earnestness, alleging that the fate of his country was now in his power; that his single vote was to determine whether his country should be enslaved or free; that his fame might now by a single word, be made equal to that of Harmodius and Aristogiton, who were the authors of Athenian liberty.

68. Thus exhorted, Callimachus did not long debate, but gave his voice in favour of an open engagement; and Miltiades,

thus seconded, prepared to marshal up his little army for the great encounter.

69. In the mean time, it appeared that so many leaders commanding in succession, only served to perplex and counteract each other. Aristides perceived that the command, which changes every day, must be incapable of projecting or executing any uniform design; he therefore gave it as his opinion that it was necessary to invest the whole power in one single person, and to induce his colleagues to conform, he himself set the first example of resignation.

70. When the day came on which it was his turn to command, he resigned it to Miltiades, as the more able and experienced general; while the other commanders, warmed by so generous a preference, followed his example.

71. Miltiades, thus vested in the supreme command, which was now the post of highest danger, like an experienced general, endeavoured by the advantage of his ground, to make up his deficiency in strength and numbers. He was sensible that by extending his front to oppose the enemy, he must weaken it too much, and give their dense body the advantage.

72. He therefore drew up his army at the foot of a mountain, so that the enemy should not surround him or charge him in the rear. On the flanks on each side, he caused large trees to be thrown down, which were cut down for the purpose, and these served to guard him from the Persian cavalry, that generally wheeled on the flanks in the height of an engagement.

73. Datis, on his side, was sensible of this advantageous disposition; but relying on his superiority of numbers, and unwilling to wait till the Spartan reinforcements should arrive, he determined to engage. And now was to be fought the first great battle which the Greeks had ever engaged in. It was not like any of their former civil contests, arising from jealousy, and terminating in an easy accommodation; it was a battle that was to be decided with the greatest monarch of the earth, with the most numerous army that had been hitherto seen in Europe.

74. This was an engagement that was to decide the liberty of Greece; and what was infinitely of greater moment, the future progress of refinement among mankind. Upon the event of this battle depended the complexion which the manners of the west were hereafter to assume; whether they were to adopt Asiatic customs with their conquerors, or to go on in modelling themselves upon Grecian refinements, as was afterwards the case. This, therefore, may be considered as one of the most important battles that ever was fought; and the event was as little to be expected as the success was glorious.