ACCOUNT OF THE INSURRECTION AT TAVOY AND
MERGUI, IN 1829.

Moulmein, 30th August, 1829.

To GEORGE SWINTON, ESQUIRE,

Chief Secretary to the Government, Fort William.

SIR,-To anticipate any exaggerated accounts that may have been sent to Calcutta via Rangoon, respecting an insurrection which occurred at Tavoy in the beginning of this mouth, but which has now been completely and satisfactorily quelled, I have deemed it my duty to take up a small vessel, in order to convey to you the present report of the whole matter.

It is already known to Government, that at the time the Civil Commissioner, Mr. Maingy, was summoned on public duty to Calcutta in June last, he placed Tavoy in temporary civil charge of Mr. Assistant Surgeon Maule, and removed me to Moulmein, where he considered my presence would be most useful during his absence. I made it my duty, however, in the beginning of July, to pay a visit to both Mergui and Tavoy, and to hold a jail delivery at each of those places; and in the beginning of the present month, upon learning by a private letter from Mr. Maule that some rumour prevailed at Tavoy of the convicts confined in the jail there meditating an escape, I thought it my duty, notwithstanding the weather was most unfavorable, to embark again in the H.C.'s steam vessel Diana, and go down to Tavoy.

Most providential shall I ever consider it that I did come to such a resolution, for upon my arrival near the town of Tavoy at 9 A.M. of the 13th instant, I found the whole of the troops and Europeans, with the Chinese, Malays, and Moormen and their families, gathered in a crowd upon the wharf. Upon landing, the first accounts which I received of the state of affairs were most discouraging. I heard, that at 3 o'clock in the morning of the 9th, a large party of two or three thousand Burmese had attacked the magazine guard of one naick and six sepoys in order to obtain prossession of the ammunition, but had been fortunately repulsed; that another party of one or two hundred men had burst into the jail and released the whole of the ninety prisoners confined there; that the whole of the inhabitants of the town had, on the first alarm, fled out of it; that the Burmese native officers of Government had deserted Mr. Maule; that a party of conspirators, headed by the former Ye-woon, and pensioner of our Government, Mongda, had planned the revolt in order to restore the country to the Burmese Government, and that this party had entered the town and occupied it, as soon as the commanding officer of our troops had deemed it judicious to retire and take up a post at the wharf. I found Captain Cuxton, the officer commanding the troops, in a most deplorable state of health. He had but lately arrived at Tavoy, and was quite unprepared to determine whom he should trust or whom distrust. One of his subaltern officers, Lieutenant Shepherd, and two of his native officers were absent on a Court-Martial at Mergui. His detachment consisted of only 120 men fit for duty, and they appeared to be losing their strength and confidence. When I was told also, that a great portion of the town of Tavoy was burnt, and that some of those native officers of Government, even whom I had considered as bound to me by personal obligations, were in command of the guns immediately in front of the wharf, I own, for a short time, I was of opinion that all was lost, and that the best course would be, to remove the troops and party collected on the wharf to Goodridge's plains,

hasty letter to Brigadier Vigoureux, reporting our situation, and I drafted an address to the inhabitants of Tavoy, in which I proclaimed martial law.*

Upon further enquiry and investigation, however, among the Chinese, Malays and Moorish inhabitants of Tavoy, who had retired with the troops to the wharf, I became satisfied that the inhabitants of the town had fled, from a belief that a body of 120 sepoys must be overpowered by the conspirators, and that it would be unable to afford them protection. I ascertained that the conspirators were devoid of all plan and resources; that their having failed to get possession of the magazine had totally disconcerted them; that those who had joined them subsequently to the troops retiring from the town, had done so from intimidation, and that the revolt was by no means general, but confined to a set of persons who had possessed power under the Burmese Government, and being dissatisfied with the loss of that power and influence under our Government, had twice before, in the years 1825 and 1826, planned a similar plot to get rid of our rule. Having ascertained these facts, and being assured from personal knowledge that the inhabitants of Tavoy are, as a race, eminently unwarlike, and that Moungda and his principal adherents were men of the most pusillanimous character, I proposed to the commanding officer, Captain Cuxton, not to remain where he was, but to advance on the insurgents and act on the offensive. I pointed out to him, that a disciplined force remaining as his did, on the defensive, gave up almost all the advantages it possessed over a set of barbarians. I expressed my conviction that Moungda and his party would never stand to receive our attack, and I recommended it should be made, whilst the arrival of the steam vessel and of myself had excited some sensation in the town. But Captain Cuxton and his officers, very naturally, entertained a higher opinion of the insurrectionary force, and less confidence in our means than what I did. I despatched the steam vessel therefore to Moulmein under charge of Mr. Corbyn, the Master Attendant of Amherst, with my letter to Brigadier Vigoureux; but I revised the draft of my proclamation and expunged the part proclaiming martial law.

1 told Captain Cuxton that I should wave my superior military rank in his favor, as himself and his officers and sepoys belonged to another presidency, and were little acquainted with me; but that I would not forego my military character, but take my full share of responsibility in assisting and advising him in every operation which was to be undertaken. I hope Government will approve of the course which I adopted. It was calculated to give satisfaction to both Captain Cuxton and his sepoys.†

My first measure was to put Mr. Lindguist, the Commander of the Hon'ble Company's steam vessel Diana, and four of his lascars under Captain Cuxton, and to call upon the Chinese and Malays to assist them in throwing upa breast-work in front of the wharf, in dividing the ammunition into two portious, in case of accident, one portion being placed on board a vessel afloat, and in conveying to the wharf a supply of rice from the granary, which it was most fortunate the insurgents had not burnt in an attack that they had made on our party on the morning of the 13th. I made it a point also to obtain from the Chinese juuks some salt-fish, oil, sugar, and tamarinds for the sepoys, in addition to the dry rice which was before served out to them; and I called together the native Christians, inhabitants of the town, who had retired with the troops to the wharf, to assist us in manning another 6-pounder gun. To inspire more confidence in some of our party I shewed them in

Whilst Major Burney was hearing from Captain Cuxton and Mr. Maule an account of all that had passed, the whole of the pickets and sentries outside fell back upon the party on the wharf in a state of the utmost disorder and confusion, owing to a false alarm that the Burmese were com ing down to attack. Major B. cried out, " Captain Cuxton this will never do-twenty bold mea will drive us all into the river. If the sepoys cannot keep their ground better, we must retire to Goodridge's plain." This speech was afterwards recollected, and Major B. was charged with hav ing proposed to retreat to Goodridge's plain.

At this period Government had not issued the rule, that Military Officers holding a Civil situation cannot claim or exercise the right of command as senior officers, by virtue of their com

missions.

a work which I had with me, the account of the defence of Mergui, under the French, in 1689, by a party of 54 soldiers against 12,000 Siamese, for upwards of six weeks.

On the 14th I prepared two copies of my revised proclamation, calling upon the inhabitants of Tavoy to return to their duty, and pointing out to them the folly of trusting to the representations of such a notorious traitor as Moungda, and what little chance they possessed of coping with a power, which the King of Ava and his whole empire had been unable to resist. A sepoy of the 19th Madras Regt. volunteered for a reward of 100 rupees, which I offered, to go under cover of our guns and plant this proclamation close to the gate of the town. When I saw the paper taken into the town, I recommended Captain Cuxton to batter the town with two 6-pounders, and let the insurgents see that we did not intend to be idle. On the 15th the Chinese reported to me, that during the night they had seen from their junks a vast number of the inhabi tants flying to the southward out of the town. In the same morning Captain Cuxton agreed to make a sortie from our breast-work, and endeavour to reconnoitre the inside of the town, and destroy the defences which the insurgents had prepared on the walls in front of the wharf. I arranged that two large parties of Chinese who had volunteered to join us in the sortie should make a demonstration on the extreme right and left of the wall, in order not only to distract the attention of the insurgents, but give us timely notice, should any force of their's attempt to interpose itself between the storming party and the breast-work. This attack on the wall was most successful; and Che Esing's party of Chinese converted their false attack into a real one, having taken possession of the dead gate. It was my wish to have advanced into the town the moment I saw that the gallant fellows who served the 6-pounder, had burst open the gate, but the men appeared to be fatigued, and fearing we might be drawn into an ambuscade, whilst they were in this condition, I recommended Captain Cuxton, to return to our breast-work, making the Malays and Chinese who were with us, convey to the wharf the jinjals and guns of which we took possession. The Chinese appeared much distressed at my not having advanced into the town and secured the families of some of them, who had been seized by Moungda, and who were said to be in confinement in our jail; but who, the Chinese believed, would be massacred now that they had given such an unequivocal proof of their attachment to us, and hostility to Moungda.

When our party had recruited its strength, I recommended Captain Cuxton to try a second attack, selecting for it those sepoys principally who had before remained to protect our breast-work. I arranged, that a strong party of Chinese and Malays should assist the store-lascars to drag the 6-pounder. This attack was also most successful. Moungda was little prepared for our assaulting him a second time on that day, and the moment our gun again nobly serv ed, had enabled us to enter the town, the insurgents fled in every direction before us, and happily, with them escaped all who were in confinement. I made the Chinese carry off to the rear, the whole of the jinjals which the insurgents had mounted inside of the town, and thus deprived them of every means of offence and defence. It was fortunate that we attacked the insurgents so soon again, as they had begun to throw up some works around the Court House. On the morning of the 16th, hearing that the insurgents had dispersed in every direction, I recommended Captain Cuxton to re-occupy the town, leaving a strong guard in charge of the breast-work at the wharf, should circumstances oblige us to retire there again.

The moment I entered the town the inhabitants began to return and re-join me. The position which Captain Cuxton had so judiciously taken up at the wharf, was excellent as far as ourselves were concerned, but it was unfortunate for the peaceable and well-disposed part of the Burmese inhabitants, who had, in the first instance, fled from the town, believing that our little party of sepoys must be overpowered, and who afterwards, upon seeing us retire to the wharf and Moungda in actual occupation of the town, were satisfied

One of the prisoners afterwards declared on his trial, that the intelligence of Major Burney's arrival had upset the town, and determined the inhabitants to desert Moungda as soon as possible.

that his party was victorious, and that their mostsafe and prudent course was to submit to him. But as soon as they saw us re-occupy the town, they flocked back to it, and an extraordinary re-action took place in our favour. The villagers came in and offered to seize Moungda and his principal adherents, and when one of them brought me information of the place where Moungda was secreted, about an hour's journey from the town, I pressed Captain Cuxton to allow a native in my employ (a havildar's guard) to go and apprehend him, immediately and whilst Moungda was supposing that we should rest contented that day with the re-occupation of the town. I had before offered a reward of 5,000 rupees to any one who would bring Moungda to me. The havildar's guard came suddenly to the spot where Moungda and his brother with their families and principal adherents were lying concealed, and apprehended the whole of them and brought them into the town. I immediately held a special Deputy Com missioner's Court and tried Moungda and six of his principal adherents, and having found them guilty of revolt and taking up arms against the British Government, I sentenced them to death. Under ordinary circumstances the sentences passed by me, are not carried into execution until confirmed by the Civil Commissioner, but acting as I am at present for that officer, who is absent from this coast, and fearing that some attempt at rescuing the prisoners might be made, I conceived the public peace and safety required my exercising the power vested in him, and I therefore directed my sentence to be immediately carried into execution.

Moungda, has brother and five other persons, were hung on the night of the 16th, and on the following day, I tried, and having sentenced to death five more persons, who had been most active in the rebellion, I had them also executed, I beg to enclose a copy of my proceedings at these trials.

The moment I had thus executed Moungda and the principal rebels, the inhabitants recovered their confidence in us, and all began to return to the former state of peace and tranquillity. The inhabitants became most anxious to remove the very unfavorable impression which their defection in the first instance had excited in our minds, and they have been most active in seizing and bringing in all who had rendered themselves conspicuous in their attachment to Moungda. I have between thirty and forty prisoners whom I propose to reserve for the Civil Commissioner to try, as I am anxious that Government should have an opportunity of possessing, through a strict and impartial investigation to be made by that officer, a corroboration of my report of the nature and causes, and objects of the present insurrection. It will be seen by the enclosed proceedings of the trial of Moungda, that the cause which he declared to have excited the revolt, was generally our revenue arrangements; but the principal rebels paid little or no revenue to Government; they were men of notoriously seditious characters, having most of them planned a similar revolt on two former occasions, before the present revenue arrangements had even existence; and it is an undoubted fact, that Moungda during his short rule of seven days, collected more revenue by arbitrary exactions than what was ever done by me in three months. The chance which the weak garrison held out to a set of turbulent and sed tions characters to recover the power and influence which they had exercised under the Burmese Government, appears to me to have been the leading motive to this revolt.

The native history of Tavoy is replete with such instances of treason, and the character of the Tavoyers for treachery is proverbial throughout Burmah. Moungda was the very person, Government may be aware, who betrayed Tavoy to our force in 1824. It will be seen from the trials and from the accompanying copies of two letters addressed to the Court of Ava and to the Chief Oojenah, that the conspirators looked to those sources for encouragement, and aid in their projects.

1 had recommended a detachment of three companies of sepoys and a detail of European artillery for the garrison of Tavoy. Superior authorities having determined, that two companies should be tried, the Civil Commissioner and I acquiesced, although I know both he and I always deprecated the removal of the European artillery from Tavoy. Our experience of these small out-posts to the eastward taught us to consider the junction with sepoys of a few European

artillery-men as most indispensable. But, it was objected, that the discipline of the Europeans would be deteriorated at such an out-post, an objection which might have been easily obviated, by taking care that the detail at Tavoy was relieved once a quarter or half year. I am bound to say, that if there had been at Tavoy a detail of European artillery-men, the present insurrection would never have succeeded so far as it did, and, in truth, it has been now quelled, inmy opinion, mainly by the assistance of the few Europeans who volunteered to man our guns.

It is no more than gratitude then in me to submit to the most favorable consideration of the Governor General in Council, the admirable conduct of SubConductor Corley, Staff Serjeant Richardson, and Sub-assistant Surgeon Bedford, throughout the operations, which I witnessed. The cool intrepidity and animated and zealous exertions with which they served the 6-pounder, delighted all who saw them on our side, and gave the sepoys the strongest encouragement.

I am anxious also to bring to the especial notice of Government the conduct of Mr. Lindguist, the commander of the Hon'ble Company's steam vessel Diana, who was not only our Superintendent of Marine, but Engineer and Pioneer, and who, on every occasion, displayed such energy, ardour, gallantry, and resources, as won general respect and admiration.

I beg leave to enclose a copy, with which he has kindly favored me, of Captain Cuxton's official report of the military operations. I trust Government will appreciate duly the difficult and novel situation in which that officer was suddenly thrown, labouring under sickness which appeared every hour to be about to terminate his existence, and the energetic and gallant manner in which he extricated himself out of it, assisted by his two very promising young officers Lieutenant Kennedy and Ensign Young.

The sepoys conducted themselves during both attacks with admirable steadiness, preserving their ranks and order, and obeying their officers in the most praiseworthy manner; and I am also bound to state, that after we re-occupied the town, the sepoys attended implicitly to our injunctions against plundering any of the houses or inhabitants. The conduct of the small guard of sepoys at the magazine must attract the highest approbation of Government.*

Mr. Dromgoole, an European settler at Tavoy, joined Captain Cuxton on the first day, and afforded us very valuable assistance.

I hope the Governor-General in Council will also allow me to bring to his favorable notice the conduct of my Chinese friends. Before my arrival, some of them had been treated rather harshly, in consequence of our officer's not knowing them sufficiently; but they bore this treatment with great forbearance, and upon my joining them, they afforded me the most zealous and cheerful and efficient aid, although some of their wives and children had been seized by Moungda as hostages for their neutrality. I hope some token of the approbation of Government may be granted to the principal men of these Chinese, to Ghomok, Che Fsing, Che Ta", and Che Seong.

On the morning of the 19th instant, through the able and zealous exertions of Mr. Corbyn, the Diana steam vessel returned to Tavoy with the re-inforcement of 100 Europeans, which Brigadier Vigoureux forwarded under the command of Colonel Kelly. Before its arrival every thing had been restored to the former state of tranquillity; and requesting Colonel Kelly therefore to superintend the civil details, I deemed it judicious to return to Moulmein for two or three days, in order to communicate with Brigadier Vigoureux, and enable all parties in this quarter, particularly the Burmese in Oojenah's Camp, to receive early intellegence that the insurrection at Tavoy had been completely quelled.

I have recommended Brigadier Vigoureux to relieve the European force which he has sent to Tavoy by another company of sepoys, and to place as the future garrison of Tavoy the force which I had before suggested, viz. three companies of sepoys and a detail of European artillery.

Some invidious attempt was afterwards made to deprive the sepoys of this magazine-guard of all credit, but that they did resist the sudden attack of two or three hundred men in a proper manner may surely be inferred from these facts. One of the sepoys was killed at his post. The leader of the rebels, Taingda, a bold and desperate charater, was wounded in the groin by a musketball and rendered hors de combat, and none of the guns or powder could be carried off before the Fe-inforcements arrived.