at 30 days' sight. The other was a similar bill fo £285. The present plaintiff was the last indorsee and holder, and the defendant was one of seven prior indors Mr. Prinsep was proceeding to address the court, but was stopped by their Lordships. Sir Edward Ryan. We do not think it necessary to ers. To these counts were added the common mone call upon the defendent's counsel, because the want of counts. Defendant pleaded want of due notice, the sufficient notice bars this action. These bills were redishonoured bills not having been presented for paymenturned, dishonoured and protested, to Messrs. Cantor to the indorser until December 1837. and Co. in June 1836, now they held a general power of attorney, sufficient to authorize them to take the nec-sary steps and to act as the plaintiff's agents. But what to they do? they make no enquiries and take no steps whatever until the June of the following year. If they had made enquiries they would, in all probability, have found the defendant, who is proved to have been in CalWhen the address of a party is not known, it is sufficient to use a due degree of diligence in inquiring for it, and to give the notice when he is discovered; but we are of opinion in this instance due diligence was not used. Verdict for the defendant. The Advocate General and Mr. Marnell for the plaintiff. Mr. Prinsep and Mr. Cochrane for the defendant. THURSDAY, MARCH 15. (Before Sir Edward Ryan and Sir J. P. Grant.) The Advocate General moved to make a rule nisi absolute. was for. The Advocate-General replied that it was for a new trial. The Advocate General stated the case for the plaintiff He presumed that the plea dispensed with all necessity for proving the making the indorsements, the dishonour and protest; he should, therefore, confine himself to a statement of the facts relating to the alleged want of notice. and shew that the notice, though apparently late, was given within a reasonable time. The plaintiff was a mer-cutta at an intervening date, namely in December 1836. chant then resident at Calcutta ; and, having consigned certain goods to the Mauritius, received the present bills, amongst others in payment, and shortly afterwards trans mitted them to England for realization. The bills were duly accepted by the Treasury; but, on being presented for payment, were refused, and, in due course, protested. The reason why the Treasury refused to pay these bills was, that the prior indorser had made the instruments payable to the order of Henry Sheldon, while the defendant (who was the party intended by that indorsement) Hurk, March 14. indorsed them over, under the signature of Henry T. Sheldon. The non-payment, therefore, arose from an irregularity, and that caused by the defendant's act. I: was an exceedingly hard case for the plaintiff, and Mr. Sheldon might, at any time, if he chose, cause the bills to be altered and the mistake to be rectified, without prejudice. The delay in giving due notice of dishonour was thus explained :-Mr. Morell had left India for Europe before the dishonoured bills were returned to this country, Mr. Clarke said that it was usual for common motions nor was he aware of the fact until Messrs. Coutts and to be taken before those likely to occupy a considerable Co., the London Agents, apprized him of it by letter time. while he was sojourning to Paris, whereupon he imme- Sir E. Ryan said that this was generally a matter of diately took active steps and wrote on the subject to discretion, and that counsel were not bound to postpone India. In the meantime the protested bills had been their motion, and he enquired what the rule in question received in Calcutta by Messrs. Cantor and Co., who were not acting as agents, but as personal friends, of Mr. Morell, and these gentlemen not knowing anything about the defendant, (who was a wanderer upon the face of the earth!) waited until they received directions from Mr. Morell himself. Mr. Morell's letter reached them in June 1837, and they immediately wrote to the Mauritius concerning the whereabouts of the defendant, but DOE ON THE DEMISE OF JAUN BEEBEE, versus ABDOOLwere unable to meet with him until December 1837. The defendant then, on being applied to for payment, positively refused. The learned counsel contended, that against the rule which had been obtained on the points under these circumstances, although certainly a long of Mahommedan law. They admitted all the law and period had intervened, the notice of dishonour was, in authorities cited and relied on by the opposite side, but fact, given to the defendant within a reasonable time, and contended that they were not applicable. This is not a as soon as the state of things would admit, and he cited bequest in extremis, for the instrument was executed Bayley on Bills to shew that the reasonableness of the two years before the death of the party, and the terms time must always be judged of by the particular circum-are very different from a will or last testament. instrument is a wuqf, or donation for charitable purIt appeared in evidence from the cross-examination poses, and such endowments, according to the 24 vol. of Mr. Cantor himself, that Morell had appointed the of the Hindaya (Hamilton's Translation, p. 334) follow firm to act during his absence from India by a general different rules of construction, and the restriction requirpower of attorney, but the power had never been acteding the consent of coheirs to the alienation of a larger pro upon at all, and had since been returned at the request portion than one-third does not apply. The donor had of Morell. The defendant was proved to have been in appointed herself matwallee or trustee during her lifeCalcutta about December 1836, but he received no time, and had named others to act after her death. notice until a year afterwards. In December 1837, Such an appropriation of the property destroyed its when applied to for payment, he objected to the want oferitable qualities, and as long as the trusts were performnotice of dishonour, and refused; but he called several ed, the trustees could not be removed. The learned times at Messrs. Cantor's office, and was apparently anxi counsel referred to a French work, quoted by the Advoous to compromise the matter, offering to get the billsate-General when moving for the rule, D'Husson's negociated for the plaintiffs and proposing to alter his Tableau de l'Empire, Ottoman, which they said was a signature in the indorsement. The dishonoured bill ealed book to them, and the authoriety of which they were received in Calcutta in June 1836. Mr. Canto considered dubious. said that the reason why he had not sent the dishonoured The Advocate-General, in support of the rule, contendbills to the Mauritius or Australia in search of the de-ed, that this instrument was to all intents and purposes fendant or some of the prior parties was, that the sets were incomplete. stances of the case. Sir E. Ryan then said that all motions, of course, must be taken before motions for a new trial. LAH BARBER, Mr. Clarke and Mr. Leith shewed cause in this case' This i donation in contemplation of death, and it was utterly immaterial how long before the decease of the party endowment for charitable or pious purposes, but endow Sir E. Ryan said, that the court were satisfied that ments were appropriationst o the service of God, where all neither Hurryloll nor his attorneys were in fact contemporal uses were renounced by the donor. Such was senting parties to this order. A common consent paper not the case here. But, even admitting that it was an was put into counsel's hands, and it seems the practice endowment, how had it been shewn that a different rule of is for the opposite attorney to give the instructions upon construction ought to prevail as to the period of talking an understanding between the attornies themselves, aleffect. The general principle had been admitted, that though nominally the counsel are instructed by the according to Mahommedan law, a gift in prospectu can attorney of their own client. Now the court was of not be valid the owner must divest himself of the opinion that it is the duty of counsel when handing property at the time. Now here the property was not in a consent paper to be so far acquainted with the immediately aliened-the proprietorship was retained, circumstances of the case as to be able to exercise for the owner might have disposed of it at any subse- his discretion in the event of matters taking an unforequent period. The treatise of M. D'Husson had been seen turn, and any alteration being suggested in the sneeringly referred to on the other side, because the terms of the order. Yet under the circumstances, dictum was in point against them. It must be admitted, especially as their Lordships were satisfied that the indeed, to be nothing more than the opinion of a learned attorney for the creditors must have been aware that no and able man, reasoning from what he had seen or consent would ever have been given voluntarily 10 heard. But what more was Mr. Hamilton's opinion. the altered terms, they could not hold this party or Sir F. Macnaghten's? they were opinions certainly bound by an order to which he never in fact conentitled to considerable weight. Nay, what was the sented. As to the costs of the present application, Hadaya itself? Undoubtedly a book of authority, when they must be paid by the respective attornies of the the meaning could be discovered, but the writers of defendant Hurryloll and of the two creditors. The that work appeared to resemble the ancient scholiasts, costs of the proceedings in the Master's office to who used to boast that they could maintain any question remain as before, and unaffected by this application. equally well on either sided. The Court at the conclusion of the argument said, that they should consider the case, and deliver judgment on a future day. In the course of the argument Sir E Ryan intimated that in motions for new trials, or to se aside verdicts, notice ought always to be given to the clerk of the papers, by the party intending to make the motion, in order that the exhibits produced in evidence at the trial, might be brought into court. NIBBUNMONEY DABEY V. SHAMYLOLL TAGORE AND HURRYLOLL TAGORE. Motion granted for the withdrawal of the consent. The cases of Rodriguez v. Syed Buksh, and Bebee Hoorun v. Shaik Khyroolla stand on the Common Law Board fo: to-morrw, Friday (this day.) Hurk., March 16. FRIDAY, MARCH 16. (Before Sir Edward Ryan and Sir J. P. Grant.) MARCELLINO RODRIGUEZ v. SYED RUKSH. The Advocate-General and Mr. Tandes appeared for Mr. Leith and Mr. Grant renewed the application the plaintiff, no counsel were instructed on behalf of previously made to the court, that the order, in which the defendant, who had let judgment go by default. the consent of the defendant Hurryloll, had been inserted through mistake, might be altered. The necessary affi- This was a writ of inquiry to assess damages, the davits both of the attorney and of Hurryloll were now action being in assumpsit for rupees 656, with interest put in, deposing that neither the party nor his attorney at 12 per cent., lent by the plaintiff to the defendant. were in court at the time that the alteration was made A written instrument was put in, and the signature duly proved. The case did not fall within 21 of the new rules of pleading which directs that in certain actions brought for re-payment of money only, the prothonotary shall compute principal and interest. in the terms of the order. Mr. Prinsep, on behalf of the creditors, strenuously contended that the consent ought not to be withdrawn. It was either a lapse of counsel, or a dereliction of duty in the attorney, and the client was bound. If a consent paper is put in, it is the duty of the counsel or the attorney to exercise their discretion, whether under an altered state of circumstances the consent ought to be withheld or not. It is too late to object afterwards, and the retraction involves an innocent party in great hardship and expense, at all events the party in making the present application ought to pay not only the full costs of the application itself, but all the costs of the reference which had been going on in the interim in the master's office. The Advocate-General also opposed the application. appearing on behalf of Shamyloll the co-defendant, but he did not speak of costs, as his client could not be liable. Mr. Clarke, as counsel for the complaint in the suit, said that it a was matter of indifference to him whether the disputed consent was given or withdrawn; but he had found it necessary to watch the proceedings in order that the disputes of the other parties might not have the effect of delaying his client in obtaining the benefit of his decree. It was for this reason that he had considered it to be his duty to urge upon the court that the reference ought not to be suspended in the Master's office during the continuance of these proceedings. The Court assessed the damages at the full amount claimed. BEEBEE HOORUN v. SHAIK KHYROOLLAH. Mr. Prinsep and Mr. Leith were for the plaintiff-no counsel appeared for the defendant, who had allowed judgment to pass by default, and against whom the damages were now assessed. The action was assumpsit, on a special agreement, instituted by a wife against her husband. This agreement was a formal post-nuptial settlement, by which the husband undertook to pay a marriage-portion of Sa. Rs 4,000, one moiety immediately, and the other during wedlock; and, further, to find food and raiment for his wife, and not to marry a second wife without her consent and approbation. The breaches were, 1st, the nonpayment of the stipulated marriage portion; 2dly, default in providing for and maintaining the wife; 3dly, marrying a second wife without the consent of the plain tiff; and lastly, marrying a third wife. The Court at first questioned whether an agreement not to marry a plurality of wives (that privilege being recognized by Mahommedan law) was not allegal, as being against public policy, and in restraint of marriage in general; but its legality was afterwards admitted." The deed of marriage settlement was put in and proved by the attesting witness and by the Mullah, who The half-brother of the plaintiff was called to prove | September, and the contract was broken in July, the the circumstances. By his evidence it appeared, that plaintiffs might have sold immediately and obtained the the wife (the present plaintiff) had been sent on a visit full price agreed for. They have sustained no loss, to her father, and the defendant, in the meantime availed therefore, which the court can recognize, because they himself of the opportunity to take unto himself another might themselves have prevented it. It may be argued bride. His first wife returned once to the house; but, on the other side, that the time for the performance having quarrelled with her husband for his conjugal of the contract was not terminated at the expiration of infidelity, was promptly turned out, and never took up the period of ten days, and that, therefore, the plaintiff's her abode with him again. She had been living ever would not then have been at liberty to re-sell the indigo. since with her mother, and her personal expenditure But it is clear, from the terms of the agreement, that ten might amount to about eight rupees per month, besides days were limited absolutely, and that, at the close of four rupees for a servant, and the expenses of a child that time, the plaintiffs might have either re-sold the prowhich she had bought! perty, or brought an action immediately for the stipulated price. Sir Edward Ryan.-The court is of opinion, that the plaintiff is entitled to Rs 2,000, being that half of The Advocate-General in support of the rules. They the dower payable immediately; but the other moiety first contended that, admitting there was no loss from the cannot be said to have yet fallen due, because no par-deterioration of the value of indigo in the market up to ticular time having been specified, the husband must be September, they were entitled to some addition to the allowed the whole period of wedlock for the payment. verdict for nominal damages, on the ground that interest We also think that the wife is entitled to Rs 10 per on the money was due from the time of weighing. month for maintenance. As to the third and fourth breaches, we cannot consider the non-fulfilment of an doubt whether the interest ran from the time of weigh Sir Edward Ryan said, that there was considerable engagement against marrying a plurality of wives, aing, or from the expiration of ten days. subject matter for damages, unless you can give posi tive proof what damages have been sustained. Mr. Prinsep suggested, that as it was a valid breach, nominal damages, at all events, ought to be entered, pro forma. The Court acquiesced. Verdict for the plaintiff accordingly. [Hurkaru, March 17. MONDAY, MARCH 19. (Before Sir Edward Ryan, and Sir John P. Grant.) AMELIA DENT versus DE SOUZA AND OTHERS. The Advocate-General moved that it be referred to the Master to inquire and report what sum may be requisite to be set apart out of the estate for the purchase of a commission in the army and outfit expenses of an in fant ward. The learned counsel said, that he moved upon notice, and as there was no doubt that the infant was entitled to the property, he appreheaded that there would be no opposition made. Motion Granted. The Advocate-General said that, if that was the case, and no advantage gained by either party. there would be no possible object in weighing the goods, Sir E. Ryan. Yes, there would. As soon as the goods were weighed an action might have been brought for their value immediately, as the property would be changed by the act, and the goods would thenceforth remain at the risk of the purchaser. The Advocate General then urged his main ground of argument, viz., that this was a continuing contract, and that the time of performance was not limited to the ten days, because the payment of interest was the penalty to which the defendants were to submit for the privi lege of enlarging the time. The defendants treated it as an open contract by the negotiation which they kept on foot, and their application in September to have the price remitted. Again, it appears from the evidence that there were no sales of indigo between the months of July and December; this is a sufficient explanation of the alleged circumstance that the value was not depreciated for a long period. The price could not be said to have either risen or tallen, because, in fact, no sale could have been effected at all. Mr. Prinsep followed on the same side. Sir Edward Ryan.-There is no doubt whatever of SRFEKISSEN SING versus GOVINDCHUNDER BUNDOPADUYA. the justice of this case; nevertheless, we are of opinion, The Advocate General on a former day had obtained a that the form of action ought in strictness to have been rule nisi to set aside the nominal verdict given at the for goods, bargained and sold. The plaintiffs would then trial of this case, and to enter a verdict for Rs 33,653, have been entitled to recover the full contract price, and instead. The action was for not accepting, and paying they might have maintained that action in July, as soon for 155 maunds of indigo agreed to be purchased at as the limited period of ten days had expired. In the Sa. Rs 248 per maund. The agreement was entered into present form they are tied down to proving the precise on the 16th July, 1837, and the defendants undertook amount of damages which they sustained by the defen to weigh the indigo within ten days, to remove it from dants' nonfulfilmant, and it is clear, that if the marketthe premises of the plaintiffs, and to pay the full amount price was not lower than the contract-price at the time of the purchase-money, or on default to payment interest when the contract ought to have been performed, the on the whole at the rate of 9 per cent. This the defen- plaintiffs actually suffered no loss, and are entitled only dant failed to do, and, in September, they endeavoured to to nominal damages. However, we think the verdict compromise the matter, and to obtain a remission of the ought to be increased on a different ground. price, as the value of indigo was likely to be consider-cording to the evidence, although the price was susably deteriorated. From the evidence adduced at the trial, it appeared, that indigo began to fall in the month of September, and that the greatest depreciation occurred in the following month, and that no sales in fact took place between July and December. Mr. Clarke shewed cause. The plaintiffs are only entitled to a noininal verdict, because in this form of ac. tion they are bound to shew what precise amount of damages they sustained by the breach of contract. Now Ac tained for a long time, no sales were effected at all until after the fall had taken place. For this reason we shall allow the plaintiffs damages at the rate of Sa. Rs 20 per maund, but we cannot give them the costs of the present application. The councel for the plaintiffs urged another applicato the court, in the event of the first being refused, viz. that the plaintiff, might be allowed to discontinue and commence de novo. This point, however, becoming intimated that there was no authority in the books of practice for allowing a discontinuance of the action, after a general verdict. Rule absolute for increasing the damages at the rate of Sa. Rs 20 per maund. SUMBOOCHUNDUR Mookerjee AND OTHERS versus NUBBOO but we cannot make a special order relating to the ser vice, unless the parties have absconded, or some other special reason be shewn. Rule nisi granted.-Hurk., March 20. THURSDAY, MARCH 22. (Before Sir E. Ryan, and Sir J. P. Grant.) WALKER V. BRUCE. The court this morning delivered judgment in this Sir Edward Ryan.-This was an action on the case for an injury alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiffs, by means of a false and fraudulent representation on the part of the defendants. It will be necessary for me to state the facts at some length, as several questions were raised during the argument, concerning the facts which really were or were not proved at the trial. Mr. Clarke (with whom was Mr. Barwell, for the plaintiffs) shewed cause against a rule obtained by Mr. Prinsep, for setting aside proceedings for irregularity. The plaintiffs had obtained a judgment in the original action, and several of the parties, plaintiff and defend- case. ants, having since died off, writs of scire facias, and alin scire facias were successively issued at different periods to revived the judgment. The revived proceedings were against the representatives of all the defendants, and the rule nisi was obtained on the ground that the judgment ought to have been revived against the representatives of the survivor only. Now there is no authority to be found in the books precisely in point, but it is contended that, as the rule of English law allows execution under The plaintiffs are merchants in Calcutta, and the dea scire facias against the personal and real representa fendants carry on business as insurers at the same place, tives of the survivor, and against the real represen-under the style and firm of the Union Insurance Comtatives of the deceased, in this country where there is no pany One Dear Christian applied to Jones, the agent distinction between real and personal representatives, the of the defendants, to grant a policy on certain goods injudgment ought to be revived indiscriminately against the general representatives both of the survivor and the deceased. The Court inquired whether counsel recollected the decision given upon this point, or an analogous point, in the Tagore's case in March 1835. Mr. Prinsep as counsel for the defendants, and Mr. Grant is Amicus Curia, mentioned that, in the case in question, the court held, after long deliberation, that the scire facias ought to be against the representatives of the survivor only. Mr. Clarke said, that if that were really the case, he should not take up the time of the court by pressing the argument further, but he apprehended the decision would be found to be not quite in point. tended to be consigned from Dinapore to Calcutta. The policies were accordingly made out by this agent, who sent peons on board, with directions to take charge of the goods laden on board the boats. It was proved that according to the custom of trade, the peons were always the servants of the Insurance Company, and distinguished by particular numbers, but the boats were that in general, the policies are not made out and given supplied by the party insured. It was further proved, to the party, until it is ascertained that the goods have been actually shipped; and that, therefore, the agent ought not to have previously parted with the policies. Now, Jones was aware, at the time, that he granted the policies, that the goods were not on board; but, he himself swears, that he would not have parted with them, had it not been for his confidence in Christian's inte grity and good faith. In these policies the goods are expressed to be laden on board. There was also an indorsement, (never seen, however, by Jones), in the hand-writing of Christian, empowering the present plaintiffs to adjust in the event of loss. Christian, on obtain. ing the policies, transmitted them to the plaintiffs, ad. vising them at the same time that he had consigned to them the goods mentioned therein, and that he had The Advocate-General moved, upon the usual twenty-drawn bills against the proceeds. These bills were ac. four hours' notice, for eight days further time to plead.cepted by the plaintiffs, and paid when due, but the The defendant was up the country, and a consultation was necessary between the attorney and his client before a plea could be filed. The Court, after some further discussion, ordered the matter to stand over, for the purpose of ascertaining the former decision. Stood over. PARKER versus HILLS. Rule nisi granted. RAMNARAIN MOKERJEE versus ANNA MARIA GONSALVES. goods, prevented to be consigned, never arrived, having never been shipped on board at all. Christian, after Successfully practising this fraud, absconds, and the consignors bring their action for the consequential injury they allege themselves to have sustained, through the representation made on the part of the Insurance Company. At the trial, we were of opinion, that the plainThe Advocate-General for a rule to shew cause why tiffs would not have accepted the bills, but for the rethe judgment should not be set aside on the ground of presentation made by the defendants, at the same time, gross fraud. From the facts sworn to in the affidavit, however, we negatived all fraudulent intention in general it appeared that Mrs. Gonsalves had been induced to and, therefore, by implication, any intent to defraud the sign certain papers, in the belief that they were securities plaintiffs individually. Under these circumstances we to herself for certain sums of money which she had lent at different times; but the papers so signed turned out to be a deed of mortgage of a house and premises, and bond for Rs 40,000, with a warrant of attorney to enter up judgment thereon. The judgment had been entered up on this same warrant of attorney. The learned counsel also applied to the court for a special order that service of the rule nisi on the attorney of the plaintiffs might be deemed good service; but he shewed no grounds. found a verdict for the plaintiffs, reserving liberty to move for a nonsuit. This rule having been obtained, and argued before us in the course of the present term, we are now of opinion that it must be made absolute. The earlier cases clearly do not affect the present question, as they all proceeded upon the ground of posiive fraud. These are Palsy v. Freeman, Papp v. Lee, Haycroft v. Creasy, Ashllin v. White, and Scott v. Lara. But two decisions of a more recent date approach nearer and afford some ground of argument for the defendant No cause was shewn. RAMCHUNDER CHOWDRY v. SHAMYLOLL TAGORE. Corbett v. Brown, 8 Bing. By these cases a distinction is taken between moral fraud, and fraud in law, and it is held that a statement, false within his own knowledge, made bythe defendant to the plaintiff, and occasioning an injury to the latter, will furnish a ground of action, without proof of any interested or malicious motive. The distinction, however, consists in this, that in all the cases stood for hearing ex-parte, on the equity board for torelied on for the plaintiffs, the false representation was day. made directly to he plaintiffs, and with an intention to Sir Edward Ryan said, that it would be more regular induce them to act upon the faith of it. The strongest to postpone it until to-morrow, as Thusday was a motioncase of all is Polhill v. Walter, 3 Barnewall, and day. Adolphus's Reports, p. 114,yet it is no exception to the previously established rule. In that case, the defen dant had, in good faith, accepted a bill of exchange by the first of four cases, which are entered on the plea RAMCHUNDER CHOWDRY V. SHAMYLOLL TAGORE is procuration for the drawee, but without any authority from the latter, and an endorsee, having been nonsuited side for Friday (This day.)—Hurkaru, March 23. FRIDAY, MARCH 23. (Before Sir E. Ryan and Sir J. P. Grant.) in his action against the drawee, brought an action for the consequential injury thus sustained through the wrongful representation of the defendant, that he was duly authorized to accept by procuration. It was held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, because the defendant had in effect made the representation to each party to the bill individually, and the giving credit to such representation, was, according to the ordinary course of business and dealing, and was a natural and necessary result. If in the case before the Court, the insurers had express ly represented to the plaintiffs in particular that the goods were on board, and if the giving credit to the statement had been a matter within the ordinary course of dealing in the commercial world, the case would not have been distinguishable from Polhill v. Walter, and our judgment must have been for the plaintiffs. But we 1st Question. Whether, according to Mahommedan do not in the least degree interfere with the principle law, an endowment to charitable uses is valid, when established by the cases adverted to. Our decision pro-qualified by a reservation of the rents and profits to the ceeds upon the principle that a man can only be liable donor himself during his life? for the natural and necessary results, and not for the remote and indirect consequences of his acts. Sir John Grant fully concurred with the Chief Justice: His Lordship went over the facts, and stated at considerable length, the reasons upon which he grounded his judgment. The Advocate-General Mr. Prinsep, and Mr. Clarke, for the plaintiffs. Mr. Leith and Mr. Grant, for the defendants. JUGGUTCHUNDER MOOKERJEE v. RAJAH BURRO DICAUNT Roy. DOE ON DEMISE OF JAUN BEBEE versus Abdoolah, Barber. Sir Edward Ryan intimated to the counsel in this ejectment case that the court found some difficulty in deciding the points which had arisen on Mahommedan law, and that they purposed, therefore, before giving judgment, to refer five questions for the opinion of the Moulavie, who would be directed to cite authorities for each position. 2d Question. Whether delivery of the property is essential, to render an endowment valid, according to the rule which governs other gifts? 3d Question.-Whether the endower can lawfully constitute himself Mutawallee or trustee? 4th Question.-Whether a female can lawfully be Mutawallee? 5th Question. Whether the instrument in question is a will, or a deed of endowment? BRODEAH BEBEE versus RUSSUM TUNDELL. Mr. Prinsep stated the case for the plaintiff. This was In this case a demurrer had been filed by the defendant, to a bill of review. The complainant now moved that the bill may be dismissed, on payment of costs. The Advocate-General and Mr. Prinsep for the com-box under long lock and key containing forty gold mohurs, plainant. Mr. Clarke and Mr. Leith for the defendant. DOE v. PRESTON. The Advocate-General for the lessor of the plaintiff had obtained a rule nisi upon affidavits, for dispauper ing the parties who had entered into the rule to be made defendants in the place of the casual ejection, and who had been admitted to defend in formá pauperis. Mr. Marnell shewed cause upon affidavits that the property of the defendants was altogether worth a sum below the limited amount. Rule discharged. CUBBIN v. CURRIE. and several gold and silver ornaments. On her return after an absence of two years, the ornaments were duly returned, but the box in question was found to contain only eleven gold mohurs. The learned counsel apprehended that it would be for the defendant to explain how the deficiency occurred, when it had been proved for the the defendant's custody, and that the defendant had acplaintiff that the specified coins had been committed to cepted the trust. Two sepoys having been examined in support of the plaintiff's case, it appeared from their testimony that the box had been broken open by the defendant, and the money abstracted. The court then interrupted the examination, and enquired how the case could be proceeded with when it appeared from the plaintiff's own witnesses that (if trust at all) the alleged cause of action amounted to a felony. The plaintiff's counsel admitted that they could not at-get over the objection, Mr. Leith moved to make a rule absolute for an tachment on non-performance of an award, which had Plaintiff nonsuited. |