Page images
PDF
EPUB

no very certain fixed rule; but the lesser offces and instances of our duty went much by the fancies of men, and customs of nations; and consequently could not have authority enough to bear down the propensities of nature, appetite or passion. For which I instanced in those two points.

The one was about that maxim of the Stoics, to exterpate all sorts of passion and concern for any thing. That, take it on one hand, seemed desirable, because if it could be accomplished, it would make all the accidents of life easy; but I think it cannot, because nature, after all our striving againtst it, will still return to itself. Yet, on the other hand it dissolved the bond of nature and friendship, and slackened industry, which will move but dully without an inward heat; and if it delivered a man of many troubles, it deprived him of the chief pleasures of life which arise from friendship.

The other was concerning the restraint of pleasure, how far that was to go. Upon this he told me the two maxims of his morality then were, that he should do nothing to the hurt of any other, or that might prejudice his own health. And he thought that all pleasure, when it did not interfere with these, was to be indulged as the gratification of our natural appetites. It seemed unreasonable to imagine these were put into a man only to be restrained or curbed to such a narrowness. This he applied to the free use of whie and women.

To this I answered, that if appetites being natural was an argument of indulging them, then the revengeful might as well allege it for murder, and the covetous for stealing, whose appetites are no less keen on those objects; and yet it is acknowledged that these appetites. ought to be curbed. If the difference is urged from the injury another person receives, the injury is as great, if a man's wife is defiled, or his daughter corrupted: and it is impossible for a man to let lose his appetites to vagrant lusts, and not transgress in these particulars, So there was no curing the disorders that must rise from thence, but by regulating these appetites. And why should we not as well think that God intended our brutish and sensual appetites should be governed by our reason, as that the fierceness of beasts should be managed and tamed by the wisdom, and for the use, of man? So that it is no real absurdity, to grant that these appetites were put into men, on purpose to exercise their reason in the restraint and government of them; which, to be able to do, ministers a higher and more lasting pleasure to a man, than to give them their full scope and range. And if other rules in philosophy be observed, such as the avoiding of those objects that stir passions, nothing raises higher passions than ungoverned lusts, nothing darkens the understanding and depresses a man's mind more, nor is any thing managed with more frequent returns of other immor,

alities, than such oaths and imprecations as are only intended to compass what is desired. The expense that is necessary to maintain these irregularities, makes a man false in his other dealings.

All this he freely confessed was true; upon which I urged, that if it was reasonable for a man to regulate his appetite in things which he knew to be hurtful to him, was it not reasonable for God to prescribe a regulation of these appetites, whose unrestrained courses did produce such mischievous effects? That it could not be denied, but doing to others what we would others do unto us, was a just rule. Those men then, that knew how extremely sensible they themselves would be of the disgrace of their families, in case of the dishonour of their wives or daughters, must needs condemn themselves for doing that which they could not bear from another. And it the peace of mankind, and the entire satisfaction of our whole life, ought to be one of the chief measures of our actions, then let all the world judge, whether a man that confines his appetite, and lives contented at home, is not much happier than those who let their desires: run after forbidden objects.

The thing being granted to be better in itself, than the question falls between the restraint of appetite in some instances, and the freedom of a man's thoughts, the soundness of his health, his application to affairs, with

the easiness of his whole life,

Whether the

one is not to be done before the other? As to the difficulty of such a restraint, though it is not easy to be done when a man allows himself many liberties in which it is not possible to stop; yet those who avoid the occasions that may kindle these impure flames, and keep themselves well employed find the victory and dominion over them, no such impossible or hard matter as may seem at first view.

So that though the philosophy and morality of this point were plain, yet there is not strength enough in that principle to subdue nature and appetite.

Upon this I urged, that morality could not be a strong thing, unless a man was determined by a law within himself: for if he only measured himself by decency, or the laws of the land, this would teach him only to use such caution in his ill practices, that they should not break out too visibly; but would never carry him to an inward and universal probity. That virtue was of so complicated a nature, that unless man became entirely within its discipline, he could not adhere stedfastly to any one precept; for vices are often made necessary supports to one another That this cannot be done either steadily, or with any satisfaction, unless the mind does inwardly comply with, and delight in, the dictates of virtue; and that could not be effected, except a man's D JANG

nature was internally regenerated and changed by a higher principle. Till that came about, Corrupt nature would be strong, and philosophy but feeble; especially when it struggled with such appetites or passions as were much kindled, or deeply rooted in the constitution of one's body.

This, he said, sounded to him like enthusiasm or canting. He had no notion of it, and so could not understand it. He comprehended the dictates of reason and philosophy, in which, as the mind became much conversant, there would soon follow, as he believed, a greater easiness in obeying its precepts.

I told him, on the other hand, that all his speculations of philosophy would not serve him in any stead, to the reforming of his nature and life, till he applied himself to God for inward assistance. It was certain that the impressions made in his reason governed him, as they were liyelily presented to him. But these are so apt to slip out of our memory, and we too apt to turn our thoughts from them, and sometimes the contrary impressions are so strong, that let a man set up a reasoning in his mind against them, he finds that celebra ted saying of the Poet,

Video meliora proboque; deteriora sequor. I see what is better, and approve it; but follow what is worse.

To be all that philosophy will amount to. Whereas those, who upon such occasions ap

« PreviousContinue »