ply themselves to God by earnest prayer à disengagement from such impressions, and themselves endued with a power to resist them; so that the bonds which formerly held them, fall off.

This, he said, must be the effect of a heat in nature. It was only the strong diversion of the thoughts that gave the seeming victory, and did not doubt but if one could turn to a problem in Euclid, or to write a copy of verses, it would have the same effect.

To this, I answered, that if such methods. did only divert, the thoughts, there might be some force in what he said; but if they not only drove out such inclinations, but begat impressions contrary to them, and brought men into a new disposition and habit of mind, then he must confess there was somewhat more than a diversion in these changes, which were brought on our minds by true devotion. I added, that reason and experience were the things that determined our persuasions; that, as experience without reason may be thought the delusion of our fancy, so reason without experience had not so convincing an opera tion; but these two meeting together, must needs give a man all the satisfaction he can. desire.

He could not say it was unreasonable to believe that the Supreme Being could make some thoughts stir in our minds with more of less force, as it pleased him; especially the

force of these motions being, for the most part, according to the impression that was made on our brains, which that Power which directed the whole frame of nature, could make grow deeper as it pleased. It was also reasonable to suppose God a being of such goodness, that he would give his assistance to such as desired it. For though he might, upon some greater occasions, in an extraordinary manner, turn some people's minds, yet, since he had endued man with a faculty of reason, it is fit that men should employ that as far as they could, and beg his assistance, which certainly they can do.

All this seemed reasonable, and at least probable. Now good nien, who felt, upon their frequent applications to God in prayer. a freedom from those ill impressions that formerly subdued them, and inward love to virtue and true goodness, and easiness and delight in all the parts of holiness, which was fed and cherished in them by a seriousness in prayer, and did languish as that went off; had as real a perception of inward strength in their minds, that did rise and fall with true devotion, as they perceived the strength of their bodies increased or abated, according as they had or wanted good nourishment.

After many discourses upon this subject, he still continued to think all was the effect of fancy. He said that he understood nothing of

but acknowledged that he thought they

were very happy, whose fancies were under the power of such impressions, since they had somewhat on which their thoughts rested and centred. But when I saw him in his last sickness, he then told me, he had another sense of what he had talked concerning prayer and inward assistances.

This subject led us to discourse of God, and of the notions of religion in general. He believed there was a Supreme Being. He could not think the world was made by chance; and the regular course of nature seemed to demonstrate the eternal power of its Author. This, he said, he could never shake off; but when he came to explain his notion of the Deity, he said, he look upon it as a vast power that wrought every thing by the necessity of its nature; and thought that God had none of those affections of love or hatred, which breed perturbation in us; and consequently could not see there was to be either reward or punishment, He thought our conceptions of God were so low, that we had better not think much of him. And to love God seemed to him a presumtuous thing, and the heat of fanciful men.

Therefore he believed there should be no other religious worship, but a general celebration ofthat Being, in some short hymn. All the other parts of worship he esteemed the inventions of priests, to make the world believe they had a secret of incensing and appeasing God as they pleased. In a word, he was neither pers

suaded that there was a special providence about human affairs, not that prayers were of much use, since that was to look on God as a weak being, that would be overcome with importunities. And for the state after death. he thought the soul did not dissolve at death, yet he doubted much of rewards or punishments; the one he thought too high for us to attain by our slight services, and the other was too extreme to be inflicted for sin. This was the substance of his speculations about God and religion. quod loque tiv

good

I told him his notion of God was so low, that the Supreme Being seemed to be nothing but nature. For if that Being had no freedom or choice of its own actions, nor cerated by wisdom and goodness, all those reasons which led him to acknowledge a God, were contrary to this conceit. For if the order of the universe persuaded him to think there was a God, he must at the same time conceive him to be both wise and good, as well as powerful, since these all appeared equally in the creation: though his wisdom and goodness had ways of exerting themselves, that were far beyond our notions or measures.

If God was wise and good, he would naturally love and be pleased with those that resembled him in these perfections, and dislike those tha were opposite to him. Every rational being naturally loves itself, and is delighted in others like itself, and averse from what is not so. Truth

is a rational nature, acting in conformity to itself in all things, and goodness is an inclination to promote the happiness of other beings. So truth and goodness were the essential perfections of every reasonable being, and certainly most eminently in the Deity. Nor does his mercy or love raise passion or perturbation in him; for we feel that to be a weakness in ourselves which idea only flows from our want of power or skill to do what we wish or desire.

It is also reasonable to believe that God would assist the endeavours of the good, with some helps suitable to their nature. And it could not be imagined that those who imitated him should not be especially favoured by him; and therefore since this did not fully appear in this state, it was most reasonable to think it should in another, where the reward shall be, an admission into a more perfect state of conformity to God, with the felicity that follows it; and the punishment shall be, a total exclusion from him, with all the horror and darkness that must follow.

These seemed to be the natural results of such several courses of life, as well as the effects of divine justice, rewarding or punishing. For since he believed the soul had a distinct substance, separated from the body, upon its dissolution, there was no reason to think it passed into a state of utter oblivion of what it had been in formerly. But that as the re