Risk-Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign PolicyRisk plays a dramatic role in international relations as leaders make decisions about such issues as war and peace, disarmament, and about lowering economic barriers to trade and investment. How a country's leaders think about risk in making foreign policy decisions is important in understanding why and how they make decisions. Rose McDermott applies prospect theory, a theory developed by psychologists to understand decisionmaking under conditions of risk, to four cases in American foreign policy. Prospect theory suggests that decisionmakers who are confronting losses are more likely to take risks than are those decisionmakers who are satisfied with the status quo. The cases used to demonstrate this dynamic include: the Suez Crisis, the U-2 affair, the decisions surrounding the admission of the Shah of Iran to the United States in 1979, and the attempted rescue of the American hostages in Iran in 1980. McDermott shows how prospect theory enables us to understand cases that are otherwise inexplicable. Risk Taking in International Relations offers a unique application of a sophisticated psychological model to international relations theory. The book will be of interest to political scientists and psychologists interested in decision making, in international relations and in American foreign policy. Rose McDermott is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Cornell University. |
Contents
Introduction | 1 |
Prospect Theory | 15 |
The Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission | 45 |
The Decisions about Admitting the Shah | 77 |
The U2 Crisis | 107 |
The 1956 Suez Crisis | 135 |
Conclusions | 165 |
Notes | 187 |
225 | |
233 | |
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Common terms and phrases
admit the Shah advisors Allen Dulles allies Amos Tversky analysis argued assessment Baruch Fischhoff behavior biases British and French Brzezinski Canal cognitive concerning cover-up Daniel Kahneman DDE Diary-Whitman decision makers domain of gains domain of losses Dwight Egypt Eisenhower Library Eisenhower's Embassy emotional exclude the Shah factors Fischhoff force framing effects Gary Sick Goodpaster Herter Iran Iranian issue Jimmy Carter Library Jordan judgment Khrushchev leaders loss aversion Memo military action models Mollet Nasser National normative noted NSC Meeting offered operation options overflights Paul Slovic percent perspective pilot plane position possible predict President Press probability problem prospect theory psychological rational choice reference point relative release rescue mission response risk propensity risk seeking risky Secretary Shah's situation Slovic Soviet Union statement status quo subjective expected utility Suez crisis tion U-2 Incident U-2 Incident Vol U.S. government United Vance variance in outcome WHCF York