for having convinced them of the extreme difficulty of the subject, arising from the impossibility of our allowing seamen to withdraw themselves from our service during war, and from the inefficacy of all the regulations which they had been enabled to propose for preventing their entering into American ships. They, on the other hand, persuaded us that they were themselves sincere in wishing to prevent it; and we saw no reason for suspecting that the government of the United States was less so. But though they professed, and I believe felt, a strong wish to enforce such a provision, they did not convince us that they had the power or means of enforcing it. There was, consequently, no article in the treaty upon the subject. Upon this omission and upon other more frivolous pretexts, but with the real purpose and effect of defeating Mr. Monroe's views on the presidentship, Mr. Jefferson refused to ratify a treaty which would have secured his countrymen from all further vexations, and prevented a war between two nations, whose habits, language, and interests should unite them in perpetual alliance and good-fellowship.

"I had an opportunity during this negotiation of observing the influence of situation over men's opinions. The atmosphere of the Admiralty made those who breathed it shudder at anything like concessions to the Americans; while the anxiety to avoid war and to enlarge our resources by commerce, so natural in the Treasury, softened natures otherwise less yielding, and led them to listen with favor to every conciliatory expedient."

Events were driving the two nations into a collision which might have been averted by diplomacy, but which soon developed into war. On July 24 the American commissioners, in accordance with their instructions, had reopened a correspondence with Mr. Canning, now foreign secretary in the Portland ministry, and on the very next day intelligence was received in London that the British ship Leopard, asserting the right to search for deserters, had attacked the American frigate Chesapeake, off the Chesapeake capes.1 Of course this brought still more delay. After the settlement of this aggression had been transferred from London to Washington, the treaty was again brought up for reconsideration by the British minister in October. Before much progress could be made, the famous "orders in council," full of menace to American commerce, were passed, and remonstrances against them were presented by Pinkney, who now assumed the entire responsibility of the legation.

Monroe returned to America near the close of 1807, and soon drew up an elaborate defence of his diplomatic conduct in England in a letter to Madison, which covers ten folio pages of the State Papers.2 The enthusiasm with which he might have been received immediately after 1 June 23, 1807. 2 February 28, 1808.

the Louisiana purchase was dampened by his failure in the English negotiations. Politicians were already discussing the presidential succession, the Republican party being divided in their preferences for Madison and Monroe. Jefferson endeavored to remain neutral; Wirt was in favor of Madison; at length the legislature of Virginia settled the choice by pronouncing in favor of the latter. Monroe's friends acquiesced. Soon afterwards Madison was placed in the chair of the president, and Monroe, after a brief interval, was reëlected to the post of governor. It was a mark of the confidence of those who knew him best that thus a second time, on his return from a foreign land, more or less disappointed, if not under a cloud, he should be called to the highest office in the gift of the people of the State.

I cannot discover that the failure of Monroe to accomplish the purpose of his mission to Spain and England indicates any want of intelligence, assiduity, or fidelity on his part. Although there is a curious gap in the published papers just before his departure for England, I do not see any evidence that the administration lost their confidence in him. He failed because the times were not propitious for success. Spain was not ready to give up the Floridas. England was determined not to yield the right

of search; not even after a disastrous war would she acknowledge the wrongs against which the United States protested. During Monroe's short mission to London he was obliged to be absent from that city several months, and he was actually brought into negotiations with six successive foreign secretaries, besides the two special commissioners; and these secretaries were involved in the perplexities which arose from prolonged hostilities with a most vigorous foe. The delays which were thus occasioned may have been inevitable, but they were very costly. War followed in their train.

CHAPTER V.

SECRETARY OF STATE AND OF WAR.

Mon

MADISON became President in 1809. roe, who had been a rival aspirant for the office, was called to the post of secretary of state in 1811, as the successor of Robert Smith of Maryland. His associates in the cabinet at that time were Gallatin, Eustis, Paul Hamilton, and, a little later, William Pinkney. The war which for several years had seemed inevitable was now imminent. Congress indicated a desire for positive measures, and although the President still favored peace, bills were passed for augmenting the army and navy, for enlisting volunteers, and for organizing the militia. The administration was floated onward by the current of public opinion. The British "orders in council" were the immediate occasion of this spirit of resistance, but the troubles had begun long before. After hearing Mr. Perceval's public declaration in February, 1812, that England could not listen to the pretensions of neutral nations, the American minister in London, Mr. Russell, wrote home that war could not honor