ingston, in company with other American gentlemen, Marbois appeared in the garden and presently joined the party. Before leaving he led Livingston into a free conference upon the cession, and invited him to continue the talk at a later hour after the company had dispersed. Livingston went to the house of Marbois, and stayed there till midnight. The whole country of Louisiana was then offered to the United States for one hundred million francs, and the claims. Livingston pronounced it an exorbitant price, and Marbois did not deny that it was. No conclusion could be reached without consulting Monroe; but Livingston, without waiting to do so, sat up until three o'clock and wrote a midnight dispatch to Madison, narrating the interview with Marbois, and saying that he was sure the purchase was wise. He also made a suggestion, which in these days is astounding, that if the price is too high, the outlay may be reimbursed by the "sale of the territory west of the Mississippi, with the right of sovereignty, to some Power in Europe, whose vicinity we should not fear." This is not precisely in accordance with what was afterwards known as the Monroe doctrine.

1

From this time on, Talleyrand was not conspicuous in the scenes, though it is more than 1 State Papers, ii. 554.

possible that behind them his hand was at work, perhaps obstructively. At any rate, for one reason or another, he delayed the presentation of Monroe to Bonaparte until May 1, and even then failed to be personally present, leaving to Livingston the ceremonious duty of naming his colleague. Probably he was annoyed that the First Consul agreed with Marbois, and had given to him the authority to proceed.

Livingston and Monroe, after reviewing the situation, made up their minds that they could give fifty millions, and, in the bargaining spirit which governed both sides, offered forty millions, one half to be returned to American claimants. Marbois expressed his regret that they could not give more, and proposed to consult the Consul. He came back from St. Cloud, saying that the business might be considered as no longer in his hands, so coolly had Bonaparte received their proposition. He advised that some pressure be brought to bear upon Talleyrand in order to secure the early presentation of Monroe. Later in the day Marbois came in to a dinner which Cambacérès was giving, and told the American envoys that if the Consul did not reopen the question they might consider the plan relinquished. They quickly proceeded to offer fifty millions. Marbois doubted whether this would be accepted..

Here came a significant pause lasting for several days. "We were resting on our oars," says one of the negotiators.

On April 17 Bonaparte made an official announcement to the Pope and others that in consequence of England's violation of the Peace of Amiens, France was involved in war with her. It is easy to see the bearing of this on the American negotiations. Ten days later Marbois laid before Livingston and Monroe the draft of a treaty given him by the government,1 and another, his own. In the latter he proposed as the price eighty million franes, which was to include the sum requisite for the American claimants. Our envoys offered fifty millions and twenty more for the claimants, but at last acceded to the figures of Marbois.

This concluded the business. Marbois tells us that Bonaparte when he heard what sum had been agreed upon received the intelligence with opposition. He had forgotten or feigned to forget his original willingness to sell for fifty millions, and he objected to the allowance of twenty millions to the American suitors; but he soon grew calmer and acquiesced in the ces

1 In the Correspondance de Napoléon, vol. viii., the projet of a secret convention between France and the United States is printed (without signature), dated April 23, 1803, from the Archives de France.

sion. "I have given to England," he said exultingly, “a maritime rival which will sooner or later humble her pride." Some details were worked out in respect to the mode of payment; Monroe's presentation to the Consul soon followed; and at length, May 2, the plenipotentiaries signed the French copy of the treaty, and two or three days later the copy in EngTish. On the thirteenth of the month a ratified copy was transmitted to Madison. Two conventions proceeded from the treaty of cession, the first in respect to the mode of payment for the cession; the second in respect to American claims.

1

As soon as they had signed the treaty the plenipotentiaries rose and shook hands, when Livingston said, expressing the general satisfaction, "we have lived long, but this is the noblest work of our whole lives." This harmonious conclusion was not reached without some personal rivalry (if jealousy is too harsh a term to be employed) between the American representatives; and there is a long letter still extant in which Monroe recounts the embarrassments of the situation arising from the conduct of his colleague. But their personal feelings were fortunately kept in the background until the

est.

1 His speech as reported by Marbois, p. 310, is full of inter

business was concluded, although they may be incidentally traced in their public and official correspondence.1

On May 21 Marbois received the following. letter of acknowledgment: 2

"Sur les 240,000 francs, Citoyen Ministre, que doivent les six banquiers du trésor public, 48,000 francs seront donnés en gratification, conformément à ma lettre de ce jour; 192,000 francs seront à votre disposition pour suppléer à l'insuffisance de votre traitement, ayant l'intention que vous voyiez dans cette disposition le désir que j'ai de vous témoigner ma satisfaction de vos travaux importants et du bon ordre que vous avez mis dans votre ministère, qui ont valu à la République un grand nombre de millions. "BONAPARTE."

Monroe took leave of Bonaparte June 24, having been presented to him for this purpose by Talleyrand at St. Cloud. The First Consul asked if he were about going to London, and Monroe replied that he had lately received the orders of the President, in case our affairs here were amicably adjusted, to repair to London; that the resignation of our minister there, and the want of a chargé, made it necessary to go at once. He then gave a formal expression of American good-will; to which Bonaparte re

1 Monroe MSS.

2 Correspondance de Napoléon I, An XI. (1803).