The Memory is affifted in such a manner, as fhews how, from a Multitude of Matters, and a confufed Heap of Natural History in general, particular Hiftories may be deduced, ranged and difpofed; fo as that the Judgment shall act with Freedom, and perform its Office to Advantage: For a fober Eftimation must be made of the Powers of the Mind, without hoping that they may extend to the Infinity of Things; as 'tis manifeft that the Memory is unable to comprehend and retain any vaft Number of Particulars; or to fuggeft all thofe that belong to any particular Enquiry. A Remedy is propofed for the firft Defect by this Rule, That no Enquiry or Discovery be trufted but in writing; tho' this alone is not fufficient, unless the Matter be thrown into a regular Table, at once to affift both the Memory and the Reafon.

And after the Subject of an Enquiry is fix'd upon, well defin'd, diftinguished, feparated from the Mass of other Things, and fet in a clear Light, there are three Affiftances afforded the Memory. The First. is, to fhew what Matters thofe are which ought to be enquired into with relation to the Subject propos'd; or to fuggeft particular Heads of Enquiry, from a Survey of the Hiftory of Nature. The Second is, to fhew in what Order the Things themselves are to be ranged and digested into Tables; tho' this without expecting to hit upon the true Order of Things originally established in Nature: for the Divifion here propofed is arbitrary; and only ferves to make fome Separation of Things, that the Mind may act upon them: as Truth will easier rife from Falfhood than from Confufion; and as Reafon may eafier correct a Divifion than enter the Mafs of a Subject at once. The Third Affiftance, is to fhew by what Means, and at what Times, an Enquiry is to be renew'd; and how the preceding Tables are to be tranfpos'd and form'd into fresh ones; and bow often the Enquiry fhould be repeated: for the first, or even the fecond Sett of Tables are not to stand; as being no more than Effays or first Attempts towards an Enquiry. This general Affiftance, therefore, to the Memory, confifts of three Points; or regard the (1.) Head of Enquiry, (2.) the forming of Tables, and (3) the renewing of the Enquiry.

Affiftance is next afforded to the Reafon; for tho' the former Affiftances have regard "thereto, yet thofe of themselves do not teach how to form Axioms; but only diftinct Notions, and a digefted Hiftory. And here that Affiftance to the Reafon is most defirable, which best fits it for performing its Office, and obtaining its End.

The Operation of the Reason, tho' but one thing in itself, is yet double in its End and Ufe: for the End of Man is either Knowledge and Contemplation, or Action and Execution; fo that he defires either to know and confider Caufes; or to have a Power and Opportunity

of

of producing Effects. Whence 'tis the Intention of human Knowledge to understand the Causes of an Effect, or Nature affign'd, in any Subject; and the Intention of the human Power to procure, or fuperinduce, within all poffible Limits, any Effect, or Nature, upon a given Bafis of Matter.

But thefe two Intentions, if duly confider'd, come in Effect to one and the fame Thing: for that which in Contemplation holds the Place of the Caufe, holds, in Operation, the Place of the Means; fince we understand by Caufes, and operate by Means. So that if all the Means requifite to the Production of every Work were ready at the Call of Man; there would be no Occafion for treating these two Separately. But Mens Power in operating is confin'd to much narrower Bounds than their Knowledge; by Reafon of their various Neceffities and Wants: whence they frequently require to the operative Part, not a general and open Knowledge, fo much as a prudent, ready, and well-vers'd Sagacity in the Choice of fuch Things as they have at hand; on which account it might feem proper to treat the Theory and Practice feparate, were it not for the pernicious and inveterate Custom of running into abftract Notions; which makes it neceffary to join them together; and accordingly the Author mixes the contemplative with the executive Part. The Contemplative Part is Shewn to confift wholly in one Thing; which is no other than the forming of juft Axioms, or Chains of Axioms, which are folid Portions of Truth; as if they had all three Dimensions: whereas fimple Notions are, in comparison with them, but as Surfaces. And there. is no other Way of drawing, and raising thefe Axioms, but by a legitimate and proper Form of Induction; capable of breaking and fepa-· rating Experience; and concluding of neceffity, after all the proper Rejections and Exclufions are made. For 'tis manifeft, that whatever is concluded by Induction of any Kind, is at the fame Time both difcovered and judged of; and does not depend upon Principles or Mediums, but ftands entirely upon its own Foundation, without farther Proof or Support: much more muft Axioms, rais'd by a true and legitimate Form of Induction, fubfift from within themselves; and prove more folid, juft, and certain, than even thofe call'd Principles. The Author, therefore, is extremely follicitous to deliver, with Diligence and Perfpicuity, this whole Affair of Induction, or the Doctrine of raifing Axioms.

There are found to be three Things of capital Importance in this Bufinefs of Axioms; and without an Explanation whereof, the Enquiry propofed, tho' excellent in itself, might yet be thought tedious and

VOL. II.

U u

operofe

9

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operofe in ufe. These three Things are the Method of (1.) continuing, (2.) varying, and (3) contracting an Enquiry; fo that nothing in the whole Procedure may be left abrupt, contradictory, or be protracted too long, with respect to the Shortness of Life. The Ufe of the Axioms difcover'd by legitimate Induction is, therefore, next taught; fo as by their Means to investigate and raise up others, of a higher and more general Nature; 'till, by fure, and uninterrupted Steps, Men come, without Stop or Gap, to the Top-round, or Unity of Ñature; there being, at the fame time, added, a Way of examining and verifying thefe higher Axioms by primary Experiments; to preferve them from tumbling back again to Conjectures, Probabilities, and Idols. And this is the Doctrine of the Continuation of Enquiries.

It was before obferved, that the practical or executive Part, is, by the Form of Induction, continually intermix'd and blended along with the contemplative Part: for the Nature of Things is fuch, that Propofitions and Axioms deduced, by logical Arguments, from general Principles, and derived down to Particulars and Works, give but a very obfcure and uncertain Information; whereas Axioms, drawn from Particulars, lead on to new Particulars, as it were, by a manifeft Correfpondence, and continued Thread. And here Men are required to remember, that in all active or practical Enquiries they must perpetually proceed downward, or in the defcending Scale; which is of no Ufe or Service in contemplative Enquiries: For every Operation confifts in Individuals, which are Things of the lowest Class; and therefore must be defcended to by Steps from Generals. Nor, again, is it poffible to arrive at them by fimple Axioms; for all Works, and the Methods of working, are perform'd and laid out from a Collection of different Axioms.

This active or practical Doctrine confifts of three Parts; the First whereof propofes a diftinct and proper Method of Enquiry, where not a Caufe nor an Axiom, but the effecting of a Work, is the Point in View, and the Subject of the Enquiry. The Second teaches a Method of making General Practical Tables, by Means whereof all Kinds of Plans for Works are laid down with greater Eafe, and Readiness. The Third delivers a certain Method of difcovering or investigating Works, which, tho' incomplete, has ftill its Ufes; as, by Means thereof, Men may proceed from Experiment to Experiment, without the raising of Axioms: for as one Axiom leads to another, fo likewife there is a certain Method of Difcovery open from one Experiment to another and this Method, tho' uncertain and fallacious, ftill deferves to be mention'd.

Next are fhewn the Methods of varying Enquiries, both according to the different Reafons for which they are undertaken, and the different Natures of the Things upon which they turn. Where, dropping the Confideration of final Caufes, which have entirely perverted natural Philofophy; the Method of varying, turning, and tabling Enquiries is fhewn for investigating the Forms, or true peculiar discriminating Natures and Properties of Things: which, 'till now, was ever look'd upon as a desperate and hopeless Attempt; as well it might, whilst none but logical Arguments, and cafual Reafonings, were employ'd

about it.

The Design of the Contraction of Enquiries, is to fhew the shortest Ways of coming at the Things fought for, by cutting across the winding Roads that lead to them indirectly. And here Things are fhewn to have two Prerogatives, or extraordinary Natures, greatly conducing to the Abridgment of Enquiries; viz. one which fits them to be produced as Inftances; and another for being propofed as Subjects of Enquiry. It is here fhewn, therefore, what are the Inftances, Obfervations, and Experiments, that have a prerogative Light; or excel others in bringing Enquiries to an Iffue; fo that a few of them may ferve inftead of a larger Number, and thus prevent the Labour of an extraordinary Search, and fwelling the Bulk of the Hiftory. In the laft Place'tis fhewn, what thofe Enquiries are which ought to lead the Way in the Business of Interpreting Nature; as having a Tendency and Difpofition to give Light to all the reft, either on Account of their extraordinary Certainty, their univerfal Nature, or their Ufefulness, and Neceffity, to mechanic Arts, Inventions, and new Difcoveries. And thus the Whole is clofed with pointing out and directing to Leading Experiments, and Leading Enquiries, for a full Interpretation and Understanding of all Nature; and the Production of all neceffary Works and Effects.

This is the general Scheme of the Novum Organum; in the Execution whereof, the Author feems to have proceeded upon the Strength and Direction of the following Aphorifms, laid down by himself, concerning the Qualifications of a juft Interpreter of Nature.

7

APHORISMS for a juft INTERPRETATION of NATURE.

As

APHORISM I.

'S Man is but the Servant and Interpreter of Nature, he can work and understand no farther, than he fhall, either in Action or Contemplation a, obferve of the Proceedings of Nature; to whose Laws he remains fubject.

APHORISM II.

The Limits, therefore, of the human Power and Knowledge, lie in the Qualifications wherewith Man is by Nature endow'd, for acting and perceiving; and again in the State of Things prefented to him and beyond thefe Limits his Inftruments and Abilities can never reach.

APHORISM III.

Mens Qualifications and Endowments, tho' of themselves but flender, and unequal to the Work; yet, when properly and regularly used and applied, are capable of bringing fuch Things before the Judgment, and into Practice, as lie extremely remote from the ordinary Senfe and Action; and again of conquering greater Difficulties in Works and Obfcurities in Science, than any one at prefent knows so much as to wish for b.

APHORISM IV.

As Truth is but one fimple Thing; fo likewife is the Interpretation of Nature but the Senfes are fallacious, the Mind unstable, and the Caufe preffing; yet the Bufinefs of Interpretation is rather uncommon than difficult.

APHORISM V.

He who is not practis'd in doubting, but forward in afferting and 413 laying down fuch Principles as he takes to be approved, granted, and manifeft; and according to the establish'd Truth thereof, receives or

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rejects

a Viz. In what we vulgarly call Theory and Practice. We have many Inftances hereof in Mathematicks, Mechanicks, Aftronomy, Opticks, Acousticks, Chemistry, and particularly in the modern Mathematical Philosophy.