REX ተ. COLLETT. [ *340 ] [*341, n. ] endeavours were made to procure employment for them. All that the Court can now say is, that undoubtedly it is the primary duty *of the overseers to find employment for the poor if possible. And I express that opinion now for the sake of the poor themselves, labourers, but merely that, with the justice of peace for the county of money coming of such sale, more stuff shall be bought for the purpose of being manufactured. Thus the law remained until the passing of the *39 & 40 Eliz. c. 3, which it is unnecessary to notice, as all the provisions of it are embodied in the 43 Eliz. c. 2. It appears by Lambard's Eirenarcha, chap. 7, p. 206, that soon after the passing of the latter statute, certain resolutions, commonly ascribed to her Majesty's Justices at Westminster, were pretty generally known, and considered as tending to the right execution of the law. The eighth and ninth resolutions are applicable to the present question. "If the parents be able to work, and may have work, they are to find their children by their labour, and not the parish; but if they be overburthened with children, it shall be a very good way to procure some of them to be placed apprentices according to the statute." "No man is to be put out of the town where he dwelleth, nor to be sent to their place of birth (or last habitation) but a vagrant rogue, nor to be found by the town, except the party be impotent, but [*342, n.] ought to set themselves to labour, if they be able and can get work; if they cannot, the overseers must set them to labour." There is not in any of those resolutions (twenty in number) any recognition of a power in the overseers to give relief to able-bodied persons, otherwise than by finding them employment. Whether any subsequent statute has altered the law on this subject, or whether the opinion above suggested, as to the effect of the earlier statutes, be or be not correct, remains to be decided whenever this important question shall be distinctly brought before the Court. In Strype's "Annals of Church and State, under Queen Eliz." b. 2, p. 90, there is a letter, which was addressed to Lord Treasurer Burghley by a Somerset, which shows that the great evils arising from habits of idleness amongst the poor began then to be understood, and strengthens the idea that one great object of the legislative provisions for the poor made about that time, was to prevent able-bodied men from being unemployed. After observing upon the great increase of crime, and the number of wandering, idle vagabonds then committing depredations in that part of the country, the writer proceeds, "And when these lewd people are committed to the gaol, the poor country that is robbed by them are forced to feed them, which they grieve at. And this year there hath been disbursed to the relief of the prisoners in the gaol 737., and yet they allowed but 6d. a man weekly. And if they were not delivered at every Quarter Sessions, so much more would not serve, nor two such gaols would hold them. But if this money might be employed to build some houses adjoining to the gaol for them to work in, and every prisoner, committed for any cause, and not able to relieve himself, compelled to work, and as *many of them as are delivered upon their trials, either by the acquittal of the grand jury or petty jury, burning in the hand or whipping, presently transferred thence to the houses of correction to be kept in work, except some present will take any into service; I dare presume to say the tenth felony will not be committed that now is." This letter also shows that at that time prisoners committed for trial, although they could not be compelled, and were not willing to work, were in point of fact in some places supported at the expense of the public. It seems, however, that they could not legally claim to be so maintained. See the case of The Justices of the North Riding of Yorkshire, 2 B. & C, 286, to whom no greater kindness can be done than by enabling them to earn their own living by labour, instead of suffering them to eat the bread of idleness, by which their habits and morals must soon be corrupted. Case sent back to Sessions. REX COLLETT. [ *341 ] [ *342 ] JAMES SAUNDERSON, ANN HIS WIFE, AND LYDIA WHITE, SPINSTER, v. GRIFFITHS (1). (5 Barn. & Cress. 909-916; S. C. 8 Dowl. & Ry. 643; 4 L. J. K. B. 318.) DECLARATION stated that by an agreement made between the plaintiffs and the defendant, the plaintiffs agreed to let to the defendants certain premises therein described. The agreement was then set out. Averment that the defendant became and was tenant to the said plaintiffs of the premises upon the terms mentioned in the agreement, and was put into possession; and in consideration of the premises, and that the plaintiffs had then and there undertaken, and promised the defendant to do and perform all things in the said agreement by them to be done and performed, he the defendant undertook and faithfully promised the said plaintiffs that he, during the continuance of his tenancy, would perform the terms and conditions thereinbefore particularly mentioned. Several breaches were assigned for not repairing during the term, underletting without licence, and for not using the farm. (1) The judgment of HOLROYD, J., in this case is relied on in the dissenting judgment of A. L. SMITH, L. J. in Durant & Co. v. Roberts and Keighley, Maxsted & Co. [1900] 1 Q. B. 629, 636; COLLINS, L. J. (at p. 652) did not think it had any real bearing on the point in discussion, which was whether a man R.R.-VOL. LIII. can ratify as principal a contract made 11 1826. BAYLEY, J. HOLROYD, J. [ 5 B. & C. 909] GRIFFITHS. [ *910 ] SAUNDERSON in a husbandlike manner. Another count stated that in consideration that the defendant had become and was tenant to the said plaintiffs of certain other farm-lands and premises, being the freehold of the said Ann and Lydia, he the defendant undertook and promised to use the lands in a husbandlike manner. At the trial at the Spring Assizes, 1826, before the justices of the Court of Great Sessions for the county of Glamorgan, the plaintiff's proved an agreement for a lease made on the 1st of February, 1822, between A. Murray, agent, on behalf of Miss White of Park Street, London, and Mrs. Saunderson of Brighton, of the one part, and the defendant of the other part, whereby the said A. Murray, on behalf of Miss White and Mrs. Saunderson, agreed to let unto the defendant all that part of the grass lands south of Miskin House, formerly occupied by Lewis Williams, containing about fifty-seven acres, and the defendant agreed to a term for one year from that date, to continue in force from year to year, and to farm the land in a good and husbandlike manner, to be kept constantly in grass, and to bestow all the muck and manure made upon the lands yearly; the defendant also agreed to take the grass occupied by Thomas Williams of Miskin House, from the 2nd of August next, at the yearly rent of 571. for the land south of Miskin Road, and 351. for the lands occupied by Thomas Williams of Miskin House, the term to commence the 2nd of February, 1822, for the first parcel, and the 2nd day of August for the second parcel. There were stipulations by the tenant not to let or underlet without the landlord's licence, to keep in repair all gates, &c. There was a stipulation by the landlord to put the fences and premises into repair as soon as convenient, to allow rough timber for the defendant's repair to be marked and pointed out by the steward, and the parties were to *enter into and execute a lease of the above premises; and this agreement was signed by A. Murray and the defendant. Murray proved that he demanded the rent from the defendant for Mr. and Mrs. Saunderson and Miss White; that he had received the same for Mr. and Mrs. Saunderson and Miss White, and that he had paid over one moiety to Mrs. Saunderson, by the direction of her husband, and the other moiety to Miss White. It was objected that there was a variance between the agreement declared on in the first count and that given in evidence, the agreement declared on being described to have been made by the three plaintiffs, and that given in evidence only purporting to have been made on behalf of two; and that the same objection applied to the other count, for [ 911 ] v. the consideration there stated for the promise was that the defen- SAUNDERSON dant had become tenant to the three plaintiffs, whereas he was tenant GRIFFITHS. only to two. The learned Judges were of opinion that the objections were fatal, and the plaintiffs were nonsuited. A rule to set aside the nonsuit was obtained in last Easter Term, against which Malkin and Whitcombe now showed cause: The agreement set out in the first count of the declaration is stated to be an agreement made by the three plaintiffs. The agreement proved only purported to be the agreement of two. It was necessary to prove that the agreement was the agreement of the three ab initio, because the promise to perform the stipulations therein contained on the part of the plaintiffs is alleged as the consideration for the promise of the defendant; and if there was any period during which any one of the plaintiffs was not bound to perform the stipulations, the consideration is *not proved. Assuming that the receipt of rent by Murray on account of Mr. Saunderson may amount to a ratification of his authority to make the agreement, still until such rent was received, there was no promise by the plaintiff, Mr. Saunderson, to perform the stipulations in the agreement. Before such receipt of rent the tenant could not have maintained an action against Mr. Saunderson for breach of the agreement. Then, as to the other count, it alleges that the defendant was tenant to the plaintiffs. The proof is, that he was only tenant to two. Besides, that count is founded upon a contract by the tenant to use the lands in a husbandlike manner. It was proved that he undertook to use them in a husbandlike manner, keeping the same in grass. The latter part of the stipulation qualifies the former, and it ought to have been so stated in the declaration. Latham v. Rutley (1) is an authority in point. Upon this point Clark v. Gray (2), Thornton v. Jones (3), Tempany v. Burnand (4) were also cited. Maule, contrà: The receipt of rent by Saunderson was a ratification of the authority of Murray to make the agreement on his behalf; and then the maxim, omnis ratihabitio retro-trahitur et mandato æquiparatur applies to the present case. As soon, therefore, as he received the rent he became bound by the contract ab initio; and if that be so, then the consideration stated in the first count is proved. The receipt of rent was, at all events, an acknowledgment that (3) 6 Taunt. 581; 2 Marsh. 287. (4) 4 Camp. 20. (1) 2 B. & C. 20. [ *912 ] t. GRIFFITHS. SAUNDERSON the defendant was tenant. As to the objection to the other count, the keeping in *grass is not a qualification of the agreement to use the farm in a husbandlike manner; for the keeping of the land in grass would be according to good husbandry. [ 913] [ *914] BAYLEY, J.: I am of opinion that the nonsuit in this case was right. Looking at the form of the first count of the declaration, and the nature of the consideration there stated for the promise made by the defendant, I am of opinion, that in order to support that count, there ought to have been proof of an agreement to which the husband was a party ab initio, and that proof of a subsequent ratification by him of an agreement to which he was originally no party, was not sufficient. There was a contract of demise in writing, and therefore no parol evidence to explain or vary that contract was admissible. The agreement imports to have been made by Murray, as the agent of Mrs. Saunderson and Miss White. Mr. Saunderson was a stranger to that agreement, unless his subsequent ratification of it made him a party to it. We have been pressed with the maxim, omnis ratihabitio retro-trahitur et mandato æquiparatur; but I think, that when the nature of the contract stated in the first count of the declaration is considered, it is apparent that the subsequent ratification was not equivalent to a previous authority. The contract, at the time it was made, was intended to give to the landlord and the tenant a right of action against each other for the breach of any of the stipulations entered into by them respectively. Now, suppose within six months after the tenancy had commenced, and before any rent had been paid, the tenant had brought an action upon the agreement against Mr. and Mrs. Saunderson and Miss White for not repairing, he must have been nonsuited, because he would not have been able to show that Mr. Saunderson ever became a party to the agreement. There was, therefore, a period subsequent to the execution of the agreement, during which Saunderson was not bound by it. It cannot be predicated of him, that during that period he had promised to perform any of the stipulations of that agreement. The first count of the declaration, after setting out the agreement, states that the defendant in consideration of the premises, and in consideration that the plaintiffs had undertaken to perform all things in the agreement by them to be done and performed, undertook and faithfully promised. Now the plaintiffs were bound to prove the whole consideration. Here |