". part of the consideration was, that the three plaintiffs had under- SAUNDERSON taken to do certain things from the time when the agreement was GRIFFITHS. executed. The proof was, that one of the plaintiffs had not undertaken, in the first instance, to do those things. There having been no evidence to show that there was any such previous promise from the husband, I think that part of the consideration was not made out, and upon that ground I think that the nonsuit on the first count was right. I am also of opinion that the other count is not made out in proof. That count states a contract by the defendant to use the farm in a husbandlike manner. The contract proved was, to farm that part of the land consisting of fifty-seven acres, formerly occupied by L. Williams, in a husbandlike manner, to be kept constantly in grass. Now the first objection is, that this stipulation applied to a part only, and not to all the lands demised. Another objection is, that the contract proved was, to farm the land in a husbandlike manner, to be kept constantly in grass. Now, although in most cases the keeping of the land in grass would be *farming it in a husbandlike manner, still there may be some cases in which it would not be so. It was therefore a qualification of the previous stipulation, and ought to have been stated in the declaration as part of the description of the contract. Upon the whole, I think that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover upon any of the counts in this declaration, and that the rule for setting aside the nonsuit must therefore be discharged. HOLROYD, J.: I think that the agreement set out in the first count of the declaration, and there stated to be the consideration for the promise made by the defendant, was not proved, because the agreement proved was not a joint agreement by the husband and wife to demise. the land. It was either the agreement of the agent or of the person for whom he professed to be the agent. Taking it to be the agreement of the other persons from whom he assumed to derive his authority, it was then only the agreement of two persons, and was not, in point of law, the agreement of the husband. It was said, however, that he at a subsequent time assented to that agreement, and that such subsequent assent made it his agreement ab initio. There might have been some weight in that argument, if the agent at the time when he made the agreement had professed to have authority to act for the husband, because then the subsequent ratification would have been a recognition of the authority which [ *915] GRIFFITHS. [ *916 ] SAUNDERSON the agent assumed to have when he made the agreement. But here the husband never previously authorized the agent to make the agreement on his behalf, nor is he named as a party for whom the latter professed to act. The subsequent receipt of rent by the husband, cannot make him a joint contractor ab initio *with the persons for whom the agent had authority to act. It could amount only to an acknowledgment that the defendant was his tenant, and it might have the effect of binding the husband so far as to prevent him from turning the tenant out of possession. The fourth section of the Statute of Frauds enacts, "that no action. shall be brought upon any contract or sale of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or any interest in or concerning them, unless the agreement upon which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing, signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some other person thereunto by him lawfully authorized." Now I think that there was no note in writing in this case to show that this was the contract of the husband, and supposing this to amount to an agreement to demise in future, it would still be an agreement concerning land, and would, as it seems to me, fall within the fourth section of the Statute of Frauds; but whether that be so or not, I think there was in this case no proof of a joint contract by the husband and wife, and that the mere acceptance of rent by the husband would not make that his contract, which on the face of it did not import to have been made in his behalf. I also think that the other count was not supported by proof, because there was not any unqualified stipulation to use the land in a husbandlike manner, but so to use it keeping it in grass. The rule for setting aside the nonsuit must therefore be discharged. Rule discharged. REX v. THE LONDON GAS LIGHT AND COKE (8 Barn. & Cress. 54-62; S. C. 2 Man. & Ry. 12; 6 L. J. (O. S.) M. C. 113.) The 7 Geo. III. c. 37, which enacts that certain lands to be embanked from the river Thames shall be "free from all taxes and assessments whatsoever," exempts the occupiers of premises built on those lands from payment of poor-rates in respect of such occupation. UPON appeal against a rate made for the relief of the poor of the parish of St. Bride's, London, the Sessions confirmed the rate, (1) Cited in Sion College v. London Corporation [1900] 2 Q. B. 581, 69 L. J.Q. B. 766; affirmed (C. A.) [1901] 1 K. B. 617, 70 L. J. K. B. 369.-R. C. subject to the opinion of this Court on the following case: By a certain rate or assessment, being the rate or assessment appealed against, duly made and allowed by two justices of the peace for the city of London, on the 22nd of September, 1826, on the several inhabitants and others, and every occupier of lands, houses, shops, warehouses, and other tenements, or hereditaments within the parish of St. Bridget, otherwise St. Bride, in the ward of Farringdon Without, in the city of London, for and towards the relief, maintenance, and employment of the poor of the same parish, from Midsummer Day then last past to Michaelmas Day then next ensuing, the said rate being a rate or assessment of 1s. 6d. in the pound upon the rent or value of the said lands, houses, shops, warehouses, and other tenements and hereditaments of and in the same parish, as far as the same could be ascertained, the City of London Gas Light and Coke Company was rated as follows: REX v. THE LONDON GAS СОКЕ COMPANY. [55] £90 0 0 £1,200. The City of London Gas Light and Coke Com- £12. £0 18 0 £24. The City of London Gas Light and Coke Com- £1 16 0 The premises for which the Company is rated and charged in the said assessment at the sum of 907., upon the annual rental or value of 1,200l., consist of a wharf, buildings, and premises abutting on the river Thames, near Blackfriars Bridge, held by the Company under a lease granted by the New River Company, a part of which premises is in the said parish of St. Bridget, otherwise St. Bride, and liable to be rated thereto at the sum of 60l., upon the annual rental or value of 800l., and the remaining parts of such buildings, together with the wharf and premises, covering and comprising a space of 22,642 feet, superficial measure, which are assessed in the said rate, upon the annual rental or value of 400l., and which the London Gas Light and Coke Company claim to be exempted from the said rate, are built upon ground and soil which were formerly part of the ground and soil of the river Thames, and were inclosed and embanked by the New River Company, and became vested in REX V. THE LONDON GAS [ *57 ] the City of London Gas Light and Coke Company as lessees for a term, yet unexpired, of the adjoining wharf and ground in front of which the said ground and soil of the said river were so inclosed. and embanked. The inclosure and embankment were made by the New River Company under the Act 7 Geo. III. c. 37, by which (after reciting that it would tend to remove many inconveniences if the ground and soil of the river Thames between certain limits, including the land in question, was inclosed and embanked,) it was enacted, that it should and might be lawful for the mayor, aldermen, and commons, in common council assembled, to inclose and embank the said ground. By the second section the owners of wharfs abutting on this ground were authorized to inclose that part of it opposite their premises at their own expense, giving certain notices to the town clerk of the city; and by the 51st section it was enacted, that the ground and soil of the said river so to be inclosed and embanked in the front of every such wharf, should vest in the owner of such adjoining wharf, free from all taxes and assessments whatsoever. By the 52nd section certain quit-rents were imposed upon the land so to be inclosed; and a quit-rent, amounting to 231. 118. 8d. per annum, payable by virtue of the Act for the land in question, was redeemed by the New River Company, in the year 1769, for the sum of 4711. 14s. 2d. An Act was passed in the 39 Geo. III. entitled, "An Act for the better relief and employment of the poor of the parish of St. Bridget, otherwise St. Bride, Fleet Street;" by the 18th section of which the churchwardens and overseers of the poor were required "to make one general equal pound-rate or assessment for and towards the relief of the poor, and other the ends and purposes of the Act, upon all and every person and persons who did or should inhabit, hold, occupy, possess, or enjoy any land, house, shop, *warehouse, coach-house, stable, cellar, vault, or any other building, tenement, or hereditament within the said parish, and on every other person and persons who by law was, were, or should be chargeable or liable to be assessed for or towards the relief of the poor." In the 7 Geo. IV. an Act to amend this Act was passed, but the 35th section, relating to the poor-rates, was the same as in the former statute. The New River Company, whilst in possession of the ground and soil for which the exemption is now claimed by the London Gas Light and Coke Company, were several years regularly rated to the poor-rate of the parish of St. Bridget, otherwise St. Bride, in REX v. THE LIGHT AND COKE COMPANY. respect of the same, and of the buildings erected thereon, and paid their rates until 1825, when a new and higher assessment having been made, they objected to the rate, and claimed a total exemption. LONDON GAS The question for the opinion of this Court was, whether the said land, comprising the said space of 22,642 superficial feet, the said wharf and premises, and the said buildings erected thereon, and which are assessed in the said rate upon the annual rental or value of 400l., are liable to be rated to the relief of the poor of the said parish of St. Bridget, otherwise St. Bride? If the Court should determine that the said last-mentioned wharf and premises, and the said buildings erected thereon, are liable by law to be rated to the relief of the poor of the said parish, the said rate is to be confirmed; but if they should be of opinion that the said lastmentioned premises are not liable to be so rated, the said rate is to be confirmed as to the sum of 60l. upon the annual rental or value of 8001., and to be amended by striking out of the said rate the annual rental or value of 1,200l., and *inserting instead thereof 8001., and by striking out the sum of 901. so assessed as aforesaid, and inserting instead thereof the sum of 60l. Brodrick in support of the order of Sessions: The Gas Light Company are rateable to the relief of the poor in respect of their occupation of the premises erected on the land. embanked under the authority of the 7 Geo. III. c. 37. The exemption which they claim rests upon the fifty-first section of that statute, which provided that the land embanked should be free from all taxes and assessments. Those words have never hitherto been considered as including poor-rates, for the occupiers of the land have always, from the time when it was embanked up to the time when the rate in question was made, paid the rate without dispute. And this is the more remarkable as several questions have at different times been raised as to the construction of the exemption. Thus, in Williams v. Pritchard (1) it was held that the land was exempt from land-tax: but the land-tax is imposed in a gross sum upon the district, and then sub-divided amongst the different land-owners in that district; and whether a particular spot be exempted from payment of its proportion or not, the sum raised for government by the district is still the same; and as this Act was in the nature of a private Act obtained by the Corporation of the city of London, they might agree that this land should be (1) 2 R. R. 310 (4 T. R. 2). [ *58 ] |