DAVIS ተ. THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH, [76] Jan. 15. 78] * Commons to make some provision for the more honourable support of the Duke's dignities in his posterity, a pension of 5,000l. (issuing out of the revenues of the Post Office) was granted to the Duke for life, and after his decease to Sarah, his Duchess, for life, and after her decease to such persons severally and successively to whom, and in such manner as the title, honours, and dignities, were by a previous Act limited. After directing that the annuity should be paid by the post-masters, &c. to John Duke of Marlborough, and "to all others severally and successively to whom the same should, after the decease of the said Duke, come, descend, remain, or belong by virtue of this Act;" and that the acquittances of the Duke, and of every such other person, should be a sufficient discharge, the Act contains a proviso, "that neither the said Duke of Marlborough, or any person to whom the said annuity or yearly pension of 5,0001, hereby enacted to be paid as aforesaid, shall come, descend, remain, or belong, by virtue of the limitations aforesaid, shall have power by any act, assurance, or conveyance in the law whatsoever, to hinder, bar, or disinherit any the person or persons to whom the said annuity or yearly pension is, by virtue of this Act, limited or appointed to come, descend, or remain from holding, enjoying, receiving, or taking the same, according to the limitations thereof made by this Act, but that every such act, assurance, or conveyance shall be, and is hereby declared and enacted to be, void." The bill stated, that by indenture of the 21st of March, 1811, George Duke of Marlborough, then Marquis of Blandford, in consideration of the sum of 999l., granted to the plaintiff an annuity of 155l. for the term of 99 years, if the Duke should so long live, and for securing payment of the annuity, conveyed to a trustee [among other property] the pension of 5,000l. per annum, for a term of 500 years, to commence from the death of the then Duke of Marlborough. [The bill further stated the death of the Duke of Marlborough on the 30th January, 1817, and that the annuity had been unpaid and in arrear since the 21st of September, 1815, and prayed among other things an account of the arrears of the plaintiff's annuity and the appointment of a receiver of the pension of 5,000l.] On this day Mr. Hart and Mr. Seton, for the plaintiff, moved that it might be referred to the Master to approve a proper person to be the receiver of * the pension of 5,000l. per annum. Sir Samuel Romilly, Mr. Bell, and Mr. Hampson, against the The pension payable out of the revenues of the Post Office, granted (according to the express terms of the Act) (1) as a provision for maintaining the dignity of the dukedom in perpetual memorial of the eminent services of which it was the reward, is inalienable. The law qualifies the rights of ownership by reference to the purpose for which they were conferred. The precise point in this case is laid down in an early authority in Dyer (2); and an argument à fortiori may be deduced from the decisions that the future pay of a military officer is not assignable at law (3) or in equity (4). The design of the grant would be defeated by alienation. It might as reasonably be contended *that the Judges may assign their salaries, given for the support of the dignity of their office. The inalienability of the pension is farther evinced by the provision in the Act (5), which renders the remedy for the recovery, and the acquittance for the receipt, personal to the Duke and his posterity. Can the order of this Court, or the receipt of the receiver, be a discharge to the post-masters in passing their accounts? DAVIS t. THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH. [ *79 ] * The counsel for the plaintiff not having expected opposition to the motion for a receiver on the ground taken, desired time to refer to the authorities. THE LORD CHANCELLOR: A case involving so many important questions certainly requires full discussion. A pension for past services may be aliened; but a pension for supporting the grantee in the performance of future duties is inalienable. Can it be contended that the Lord Chancellor could (1) Stat. 5 Ann. c. 4. (2) "If a man were created Duke, and, for the maintenance of his dignity, the King granted him 207. as an annuity, he could not grant that to any other, for it is incidental to his dignity." Dyer, 2 a. (3) Flarty v. Odlum, 2 R. R. 375 (3 T. R. 681); Lidderdale v. The Duke of Montrose, 1 R. R. 791 (4 T. R. 248); (4) Stone v. Lidderdale, 3 R. R. 622 (5) 5 Ann. c. 4, §§ 2, 3. DAVIS v. THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH. [ *80 ] Jan. 29. March 4. [84] alien his pension, payable out of the revenue of the Post Office, granted for sustaining the dignity of the office? This case differs from that of a grant to the grantee and his assigns; the pension being granted to the individual, in what mode can the assignee recover out of funds which are not accessible by the common forms of law? If a subject gives land to A. for his life, he gives to A. and his assigns; but where property is granted by a warrant from the Crown, does it follow that the warrant extends to a person who is in no way described in that instrument? Considering the many important doctrines on the effect of grants by warrant and by sign manual, regard being had to the funds out of which the grant is made, I must be cautious not to confound the law on a point of so much moment. On this day the case was mentioned again by Mr. Hart and Mr. Seton, in support of the motion for a receiver. On this day the LORD CHANCELLOR, without further observation, [refused the order for a receiver as to the pension]. DAVIS v. THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH. A receiver appointed by the Court is appointed on behalf of all parties. On this day the plaintiff moved that the order for the receiver might be varied and extended to the judgment creditors. Mr. Hart and Mr. Seton, in support of the motion. Mr. Bell and Mr. Roupell, against the motion. THE LORD CHANCELLOR : The former order proceeds on the principle of not affecting the rights of parties not before the Court. The judgment creditors are now defendants; it appears that their judgments are subsequent to the plaintiffs' annuity; and other debts may be suggested. It will be sufficient to expunge so much of the order as excepts them from its operation. I cannot order a judgment creditor in possession to attorn. Mr. Bell and Mr. Roupell then applied that Mr. Withy might be declared at liberty to propose himself as receiver, on the ground that, in the annuity deed, it had been agreed by the plaintiff and the Duke that he should hold that office. THE LORD CHANCELLOR : A receiver appointed by the Court is appointed on behalf of all parties, not of the plaintiff, or of one defendant only. I see no reason for releasing Mr. Withy from any difficulties which prevent his appointment. DAVIS v. THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH. CURRIE v. GOOLD AND UX. (2 Maddock, 163--165.) 1817. June 17. PLUMER, V.-C. Where the agent of an executor paid interest on a legacy for 17 years, without deducting the property tax: Held, that he could not afterwards [2 Madd. 163] deduct the arrears of property tax out of succeeding payments of interest. On this cause coming on for further directions, it appeared that a legacy of 500l. was left to a married woman, and after her death, in certain events, to her children. The executors, who were in India, where the testator died, remitted the 500l. to one Goold, a merchant, as their agent, for payment of the legacy. Goold paid the interest on the legacy from the 4th of February, 1795, until the 4th August, 1812, without deducting the property tax. When the next payment of interest became due, he insisted on deducting out of it the property tax in respect of all the precedent payments; and the question was, whether having paid this interest so long without deducting the property tax, he could now claim the same, although he might properly insist on deducting future payments of the tax out of future payments of the interest. Mr. Raithby contended, he could make such deduction, and that it would be great injustice to oblige him to pay this property tax out of his own pocket. Mr. Treslove, contrà, insisted he could not make the deduction, and cited Atwood v. Lamprey (1), [Bilbie v. Lumley (2), Nicholls v. Leeson (3), and other cases]. (1) Mentioned in a note to East v. Thornbury, 3 P. Wms. 127. R.R. -VOL. LIII. (2) 6 R. R. 479 (2 East, 469). 3 [ *164] The VICE-CHANCELLOR was of opinion, the authorities cited were conclusive to show the deduction could not be made, although the doctrine established by those cases might, in many instances, be a great hardship on the party. Here, however, he observed, this defendant was in business, and, probably, made some advantage by the capital being suffered to remain in his hands, instead of being paid into Court, as might have been insisted on, and that, probably, he made no claim of the property tax, as an inducement to leave the money in his hands. 1818. April 9. LEACH, [3 Madd. 191] [ *192 ] GRIFFITHS v. ROBINS. (3 Maddock, 191–192.) A deed of gift ordered to be delivered up, as obtained by undue influence over the donor, who was eighty-four years old, and nearly blind, and placed confidence in the donee. THE VICE-CHANCELLOR: This cause comes on upon a supplemental bill, by W. Griffiths, as the devisee and executor of Mary Morris, the plaintiff in the original suit; and prays to have certain deeds of gift delivered up to be cancelled, as having been obtained under such circumstances, that this Court will consider them to be void. It is said that the present plaintiff, Griffiths, applies under the effect of a similar influence, which he imputes to the defendant in the cause; but, upon the state of this record, I am to consider this cause as if Mary Morris herself was now the plaintiff before me. It appears that Mary Morris was upwards of eighty-four years of age; and at the period in question, blind, or nearly so, and altogether dependent on the kindness and assistance of others. Thomas Griffiths had married the niece of Mary Morris. She had entire trust and confidence in them; and it may be stated that they were the persons upon whose kindness and assistance she depended. They stood, therefore, in a relation to her, which so much exposed her to their influence that they can maintain no deed of gift from her unless they can establish that it was the result of her own free will, and effected by the intervention of some indifferent person. It appears that Mary Morris, being possessed of a very narrow income-a freehold house and premises of the value only of about |