(No. 4.) FOREIGN LAW. APPENDIX J. Extract from the Institutes of Public and Private Ecclesiastical Law, adapted to the modern Usages of the German Universities, by Father Dominick Schram, a Benedictine Monk at Bantz, formerly Professor of Divinity and the holy Canons. In 3 vols. Augsburg, 1774, with the permission and approbation of Superiors. WHAT THE ROYAL PLACET IS, AND THE JUSTICE OF IT. One of the prerogatives of the Gallican Church is the Royal Placet, or letters patent, by which the secular Sovereign allows and approves the publication and execution of Ecclesiastical Bulls and Rescripts, concerning the discipline and external policy of the Church, sent to his Dominions; it is also called Pareatis or Exequatur. The use of such a Placet has been adopted not only in France, Spain, Portugal, Savoy, in the kingdom of Naples and Sicily, in the Netherlands, and formerly in England; but its necessity in Germany and Bohemia appears also to be proved by the Rescript of Rudolphus II. emperor and king of Bohemia, of the year 1586, on the subject of the Bull in Coena Domini, in which the Emperor enacted in general, that in future no Papal Bulls should be published and executed without his knowledge and assent. The Emperor moreover promises in his capitulation on his accession to the Holy Roman Empire of Germany, that he will intercede in the best possible manner with the Holy Father, and the See of Rome, that nothing be obtained by improper graces, rescripts, &c. against the concordats of princes, and the treaties entered into between the Papal See and the nation, nor against the special privileges, statutes, THE ROYAL PLACET. ci usages and customs of Churches and Chapters. This Royal Placet is not required in Dogmatical Bulls, in which the Church has the perpetual assistance of the Holy Ghost, and is infallible. Dogmatical matters, besides, do not affect the state, or the rights and privileges of citizens, like points of discipline; the royal Placet is therefore justly excluded from Dogmatical Bulls as such, according to the most orthodox opinion, because it would be repugnant to the jurisdiction, infallibility, and unity of the Church. The Doctrine of Van Espen, in his Tract. de Promulg. Leg. Eccl. part v. c. 2. § 10. is not to be unconditionally received, when he admits the authority and use of the Royal Placet in the publication and external propounding of Dogmatical Laws and in public Articles of Faith, to prevent the solemn publication of new tenets, and to insist upon the continuance of the ancient articles of Faith. But the ecclesiastical jurisdiction ought to be allowed this prerogative in dogmatical points, in order that the decisions of the Church, in continuing unchanged the Discipline of the Altar, and enacting and publishing Dogmatical Laws, may be revered as independent and peremptory, and that the Royal Guardianship of the Church may serve to promote, and not to impede, the publication of the Dogmatical Laws of the Church, for the sole purpose of having a uniform profession of Faith amongst the faithful, in the exterior symbols of that Faith. The author just quoted, loco citato, § 2. and 4. has however very properly protected both the ecclesiastical jurisdiction and the royal authority, when he approves the Royal Placet, with regard to clauses inserted in Dogmatical Decrees, strongly affecting the rights of sovereigns and kingdoms, such as those establishing new tribunals, summoning subjects out of the country, introducing the Inquisition, or the execution of either secular or clerical punishments. The Royal Placet may likewise be admitted in Dogmatical Bulls, as far as they may contain articles of external discipline, prejudicial alike to the policy of the state and to public tranquillity. But with respect to the laws of the Church, which concern its discipline and external policy, the Royal Placet is perfectly consonant with justice. 1. By the right of supreme superintendence over the state, and by the concurrent power which belongs to the civil authority in cases of discipline and external policy. 2. It is likewise proved by the mode of proceeding in three kinds of questions that were agitated in the Synod of Francfort of the year 974, in which a point of Faith, viz. the confirmation of the condemnation decreed in the Synod of Rome against the heresy of Elipandus; and the explanation of the second Council of Nice, respecting the worship of images, was settled by the sole authority of the Bishops: but the Canonical regulations in matters of Church Discipline were made in the name of the Synod and of the King, Can. 6. and 7.; whilst civil cases, such as the pardon granted to Tassilon, Duke of Bavaria, and the article concerning coin (Can. 5.) were published in the name of the king alone. If it be objected, I. That the legislative power of the Church is not dependent on the civil power, we observe that in the examination of Ecclesiastical decrees in cases of discipline and external policy, the Sovereign uses his political right extra-judicially, to know whether they are suitable, or prejudicial to the state, that the ecclesiastical matter may be left to the jurisdiction of the Church, and the political to that of the State. See D. Barthel, de jur. ref. antiq. a. 8. § 24. II. That because the Church has the right to declare Civil Laws unjust in consequence of their containing a manifest sin, it does not follow that the Civil Laws require the approbation of the Church; therefore there is no occasion for a Royal Placet in disciplinary Church Laws. Further, that many think even the indirect power of the Pope in the temporal concerns of princes repugnant to the majesty of their authority, and that therefore the Royal Placet is equally repugnant to the supreme ecclesiastical power. But in answer to these two objections, we observe respecting the first, that there is no parity, since Civil Laws can contain a sin only by chance, but that the subjects of disciplinary Church Laws are necessarily mixed on account of their connection both with the ecclesiastical and political state: and respecting the second objection, that the indirect power of the Pope in the temporal concerns of princes, is a temporal right, not conformable to the spiritual object of the Church: but the Royal Placet is grounded GIANNONE'S HISTORY OF NAPLES. ciii in the right of supreme superintendence, for the good of the state and the prerogatives of majesty, which leaves the liberty and independence of the Church uninfringed. III. If it be said that the Royal Placet opens to the civil power the road to ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and disturbs the harmony of the temporal and sacerdotal authorities, we answer that the Royal Placet does not open to the civil power the road to ecclesiastical jurisdiction in concerns merely spiritual, and articles of faith, since it is limited to cases of discipline and external policy, and if these proper limits be observed, it does not impair the union between Church and State. IV. Lastly, to the objection that the Royal Placet is simply a prerogative granted by the See of Rome, we answer in the negative. It is a part of royal majesty so intimately and essentially connected with it, that no prince can abdicate or renounce it to the prejudice of his successor and of the state. APPENDIX K. Extract from Giannone's History of Naples, book 33. ch. 5. The Exequatur Regium*, which is given in the kingdom, not only in collations of prelatures, and other benefices of the kingdom sent from Rome, but to all the Pope's bulls and rescripts, even to the briefs of jubilees and indulgences, and to whatever other provision comes from Rome, does not proceed from this principle, nor did it begin in the troublesome times of war, when the contending princes were frequently driving one another out, and therefore had reason to be cautious in receiving bishops. Its origin is more ancient; it had its beginning not only in the kingdom of Naples, but in all the dominions of Christian princes, with principality itself, and belongs to them titulo sui principatus, or jure regaliæ, as the above-mentioned Van Espen † fully proves. It was con * Chiocc. tom. iv. de Regio Exequatur. † Van Espen, Tract. de Promulgat. Legum Eccl. pars 2. cap. 3. trived for the preservation of the state, and to prevent an inlet to commotions and disorders from foreign parts; therefore it has always been lawful for princes, and commendable in them, that whenever foreign writs came within their dominions, whereby it was pretended to exercise jurisdiction, either spiritual or temporal in them, to examine such writs before they were put in execution; so much the rather, that the Court of Rome, for a very long time, had assumed an authority far exceeding the bounds of a spiritual power, and often took upon them to decide points belonging to the temporal power of princes, and not within their province: whence the custom was introduced, that if writs from Rome are to be executed against laicks, they cannot be put in execution without applying to the secular magistrates for their concurrence, who, not as bare executors, but after having considered and examined the affair, if they find it just, they give their concurrence, otherwise they put a stop to the execution. If the writ concerns ecclesiastical affairs only, or if it relates to things merely spiritual, and that its being put in execution will not be prejudicial to the King's prerogatives, the state, or his subjects, or does not clash with the usages and customs of the country, it gets the Exequatur Regium; so that it is not pretended thereby to add force to, or undo what the Pope has done, as if in ecclesiastical and spiritual matters he stood in need of the authority of secular princes*; but it is required only, that the prince, who ought to be careful and vigilant that the government of his dominions be not disturbed, may know what is contained in writs that come from abroad into his territories, that under that colour or pretence, nothing be introduced that may disturb the peace and tranquillity of his state; and this is all that is intended by the Exequatur Regium, as Van Espen, in his treatise De Placito Regio† has at large demonstrated, which was very well understood by Bishop Covarruvias ‡, Belluga §, and the Cardinal Di Luca ||, * Salgad. in Tract. de Retent. Bull & Reg. protect. Covar. Pract. Qu. cap. 10. num. 56. § Belluga in Speculo Principis, rubr. 13. verb. restat. |