export. The 'law' in question may have been the American Neutrality Law of 1794 or the rule given above in the words of the Hague Convention. If it were the latter, a doubt is permissible, whether, in view of the principle of 'hostile expedition,' which underlies the rule, the case was really within it.

Contraband, Absolute and Conditional.-In order that sea-borne goods may, even though still neutral property, be seized by a belligerent, they must be destined for the military purposes of his enemy. If arms and ammunition are found going to enemy territory, the inference as to their intended use is irresistible; they are always contraband. But there are other goods which, if going to an enemy may as well be meant for his peaceful as for his military purposes. With regard to these a new practice sprang up a little over a century ago in the British Prize Court. When captured goods of this kind (e.g. cheeses) were brought before Sir William Scott, he would ask what kind of a port the ship was on her way to; if to a commercial port, he would release the goods; if to a port of military or naval equipment, he would condemn them. Hence came the division of Contraband into two kinds, Absolute and Conditional (or Relative or Occasional). Goods in the former class are liable to condemnation if found in a ship with any kind of enemy destination, but goods in the latter class only if the ship has a special kind of enemy destination, namely, a destination from which it may be presumed that they would be put by the enemy to a military and not a civil use. Much adverse criticism has been directed against the doctrine of Conditional Contraband; and the practical difficulties which it presents render its survival doubtful. It was, however, accepted by the Conference of London in 1909. The Declaration of London contains three lists (1) Absolute Contraband; (2) Conditional Contraband; and (3) Goods which never may be Contraband, the last-named being spoken of as the free-list. The Declaration also provided that additions might be made to its 'Absolute' and 'Conditional' lists; but nothing was to be added to the former which was not exclusively used for war. The fate which this proviso and the free-list have met with in the proclamations of the belligerent Powers justifies the remark made at the Hague

in 1907 by Baron von Bieberstein: 'It would be well not to issue rules the strict observance of which might be rendered impossible by the force of things.'

It is customary for belligerents to issue their own lists of goods which they propose to treat as contraband. In the present war the Declaration of London, though unratified, has been proclaimed by both sides to be operative 'with additions and modifications' or 'so far as may be practicable.' On each side, therefore, the lists given in the Declaration have been adopted-as a starting-point. But the heads of the list of Absolute Contraband have become more than double the original eleven; no raw material was on it at first, but copper, tin, aluminium, tungsten, etc., are there now; it has received additions not only from the 'Conditional' list-e.g. barbed wire and motor spirit but also from the free-list-e.g. wool and rubber. The 'Conditional' list has grown on the same scale. This expansion originated with Great Britain, followed by her allies, and later, 'in retaliation,' by Germany* (London Gazette,' May 11).

So long as German ports continue to be blockaded by the Allies the question whether goods which are going to a German port are or are not on our list of contraband is only of importance as regards German trade with Scandinavia; but the question may be important in connexion with goods going to Germany through a neutral port. True, the Order in Council of March 15 provides that such goods may be captured; but, as we have seen, the legality of this part of the Order is denied, with good reason, by the United States. An enquiry how the matter stands apart from the Order in Council brings up the topic of 'continuous voyage or transport.'

'Continuous Voyage. Continuous Transport.'-The circumstances in which this doctrine, in its modern form, may operate are as follows. A neutral vessel, carrying

* Wood appears on the German list, but not on the lists of the Allies. Prof. Ramsay wrote to the 'Morning Post' of June 13, urging that we should include wood, because wood-pulp might be used by Germany as a substitute for cotton in the manufacture of explosives.

When Germany issued her revised lists, she also added a free-list ('London Gazette,' May 11). Now, a unilateral free-list is of no value, and so this might seem futile. But the explanation is obvious when we note that the first item among 'the things which can never be made contraband' is cotton.

contraband or intending to run a blockade, interposes a neutral port of call between its port of sailing and the ultimate enemy destination of ship or cargo. It then alleges, as against the belligerent, that during the first part of the voyage (sc. when between two neutral ports) neither ship nor cargo is liable to seizure. The belligerent refuses, however, to allow any effect to a merely colourable visit of the ship to, or a temporary deposit of the goods in, the second neutral port, and, treating the journey from its commencement in the first neutral port as one and continuous to the enemy destination, will seize the vessel or cargo even during the first part of this continuous voyage or transport.'

Contraband and Continuous Transport.'-During the Crimean war the French Prize Court condemned saltpetre which a neutral Hanoverian ship, the Vrow Houwina,' was carrying to the neutral port of Hamburg; the ground of the condemnation was that from Hamburg the saltpetre was to be forwarded (by sea) to Russia. This was novel doctrine, and its soundness has been impugned; it was, however, to receive almost at once a wider application, namely, to cases where the onward carriage of the cargo from the neutral port which was the destination of the ship was to be by land and not by The extension was first made by the United States (in circumstances to be presently explained), but it has since been adopted by Italy and Great Britain, when these Powers were at war with Abyssinia and the Boer Republics respectively. The controversy concerning the legality of this extension was acute; and the Conference of London arrived at a compromise on the whole matter, whereby the doctrine of 'continuous transport' was to apply to Absolute Contraband but not to Conditional Contraband, except where the belligerent country of ultimate destination has no seaboard. We believe this compromise impracticable and ill-founded.

sea.

This is a topic of great moment to-day in view of the British Order in Council of March 15, for the Order threatens all neutral oversea trade (say that of the United States) which has a German destination, even though it be carried on through a neutral port (say Rotterdam). It is desirable, therefore, to refer to the position of the United States in the matter apart from the Declaration

of London. The western limit of the blockade of the southern coast during the American Civil War was the point off the mouth of the Rio Grande where the boundaries of Texas and Mexico met; forty miles up this boundary-river were two towns, Matamoras on the Mexican side and Brownsville on the American. Matamoras (which was, of course, unblockaded) did a brisk business in contraband with Brownsville. A British vessel, the 'Peterhoff,' carrying a cargo for Matamoras, part of which was contraband in quality, was seized by a Federal cruiser at sea. The question whether the cargo could be condemned came in time before the Supreme Court of the United States; the judgment was against the cargo and contains the following passage:

'It is true that these goods, if really intended for sale in the market of Matamoras, would be free of liability, for contraband may be transported by neutrals to a neutral port, if intended to make part of its general stock-in-trade. But there is nothing in the case which tends to convince us that such was their real destination, while all the circumstances indicate that these articles were destined for the use of the rebel forces then occupying Brownsville and other places in the vicinity. . . . The trade of neutrals with belligerents in articles not contraband is absolutely free unless interrupted by blockade; the conveyance by neutrals to belligerents of contraband articles is always unlawful and such articles may always be seized during transit by sea. Hence, while articles not contraband might be sent to Matamoras and beyond to the rebel regions where the communications were not interrupted by blockade, articles of a contraband character destined in fact to a State in rebellion or for the use of the rebel military forces, were liable to capture though primarily destined to Matamoras.' (Chase, C.J., 5 Wallace's Rep. p. 59.)

The present-day importance of this judgment is obvious. We shall return to it later, when speaking of foodstuffs.

Blockade and Continuous Voyage.'-It was in the same courts and at the same time that the doctrine of 'continuous voyage' was first applied to a case of blockade. Vessels sailed from the neutral port of (say) Liverpool with a cargo for (say) Galveston, a blockaded port. They made, however, a slight detour to some neutral port adjacent to Galveston, (say) Cardenas in

Cuba or Nassau in the Bahamas; possibly the cargo was transhipped in this neutral port; anyhow the allegation was made that during the first part of the voyage the ship was not liable to capture. Nevertheless such vessels were captured by Federal cruisers while thus sailing between two neutral ports; and they were condemned by the United States Courts on the ground that there was in reality but one continuous voyage from Liverpool to Galveston. Against Great Britain there would be more basis for this contention than against France, for the British theory of blockade places the offence of the blockade-runner in the intent, and considers the vessel liable to capture from the time when it sails with that intent. But the more logical French theory is that, inasmuch as the essence of blockade is an actual investment, so the essence of breach of blockade is an actual attempt with knowledge to break through the investing line. On this latter view the extension of the doctrine of continuous voyage' to blockade was erroneous. Doubly erroneous was it when it was never planned that a neutral vessel should cross the line of investment and when the transport of the cargo to belligerent territory was to be by land from a neutral (and therefore unblockaded) port; the vessel never was a blockade-runner, the goods reached the belligerent without crossing a line of investment. On several occasions in the year 1801 Sir William Scott refused to condemn a neutral vessel for breach of a British blockade when it traded between neutral ports only and the communication with the enemy from one of these ports was by inland carriage only. In one of these cases, the 'Stert,' he said:

'The blockade of Amsterdam was a mere maritime blockade, effected by a force operating only at sea. . . . As to interior navigation, how is it a blockade at all? where is the blockading power? . . . It is argued that, if this course of trade is allowed, the object of the blockade, which is to distress the trade of Holland, will be defeated. If that is the consequence, all that can be said is that it is an unavoidable consequence. It must be imputed to the nature of the thing,

* See the Ocean,' 3 C. Robinson, p. 297, and the Jonge Pieter,' 4 C. Rob. p. 79.