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ply of present wants the resources of the future were anticipated. The privilege, too, of entering upon the direct collection of the revenues of the districts assigned in pledge, as often as the payments fell into arrear, had been found to be very ineffectual: for as the Company's management was to be of a short duration, it was impossible to make suitable arrangement for the many minute details, on which success in realizing the taxes greatly depended, and vain to expect that the agents and the people would run the risk of displeasing the native government by co-operating with functionaries, the period of whose authority would soon be over. So firmly had Lord Hobart, when President of Madras, been convinced of these evils, that he urged very warmly the necessity of taking the districts assigned in pledge into the Company's immediate management, and was prevented from carrying his plan into effect, only by the interposition of the authority of the Supreme Board. Lord Wellesley, immediately upon his arrival, resumed the scheme, and proposed it to the Nabob's acceptance. The Nabob, however, stood upon the faith of the existing treaty, and would not agree to any deviation from it. The GovernorGeneral's views soon became more extensive, and grasped at the sovereignty, not of part of the Carnatic, but of the whole. A proposal was accordingly made to the Nabob, that he should resign his authority; and, when it was clear that he would never accede to such a measure, the resolution of dethroning him was adopted. Further proceedings were for a time delayed, on account of a mortal disease under which he then laboured, and of which he died on the 15th July, 1801. The proposal of a transference of authority was then made to his eldest son, whom he had appointed successor in his will. It was rejected by the young prince and his guardians. A nephew of the late Nabob was forthwith raised to the musnud, who, satisfied with an empty title and a yearly pension, resigned to the Company both the civil and the military powers of government. The motive of this transaction was a love of dominion; the effect of it was advantageous both to the British authority and to the people of the Carnatic; the pretext for it was weak. The Governor-General justified the steps which he had taken, by the alleged criminality of certain communications of the two preceding Nabobs with Tippoo. But in these communications, notwithstanding the strict scrutiny to which they were subjected, nothing was found which was not easily justifiable.

With respect to the Vizir, it was the desire of the GovernorGeneral that he should disband his own troops, and trust his defence entirely to a British force, for the maintenance of which more than one half of his dominions was to be ceded in full sovereignty to the English. This project was brought forward in

the beginning of 1799, but was not accomplished till November, 1801; when Saadut Ali, after trying every resource of entreaty, of appeal to compacts, and of obstinate refusal, was forced to submit to the terms proposed. Even in the small portion of territory which remained to him, British troops were to be stationed; and in the administration of it, he bound himself to act in conformity to British councils. The reason assigned for these proceedings, was the gross misgovernment of Oude. But did the misconduct of the sovereign give us a right to interfere? Was the substitution of our soldiers for his an adequate cure? And if it was just to strip him on such grounds of nearly two thirds of his dominions, why was he not deprived of the whole? To the charge of having violated Sir John Shore's agreement by which the number of troops to be maintained in Oude was ascertained, Lord Wellesley answered, that one clause expressly provided, that, when the troops exceeded the specified number, the additional expense should be borne by the Nabob; and that consequently the Governor-General possessed by implication the power of increasing them to what amount he pleased. The defence is weak. The treaty contemplated the possible occurrence of circumstances, in which it might be expedient to exceed, for a short time, the ordinary limits of the subsidiary force; and it was to such a situation that the clause alluded to had a reference. But the ordinary military establishment was fixed, and this Lord Wellesley almost doubled. The treaty, if we admit his Lordship's interpretation, is a mere nullity.

The policy which Lord Wellesley pursued with respect to the independent native states, was to bring them under our control, by inducing them to entrust their defence to a subsidiary British force stationed within their territory, and maintained by the revenues of lands ceded for that purpose to the Company. The Nizam, in consequence of his fears and his apprehensions of the Mahrattas, was, without much difficulty, prevailed upon, in 1801, to accede to the Governor-General's plan. From that time he may be regarded as erased from the list of sovereigns: for is he to be deemed a sovereign, who has no army of his own, and who is bound in all his concerns to follow the directions of a foreign power? The Peshwa, who was then under the control of Scindia, and Scindia himself, were much less tractable. The former had no objections to a subsidiary force, but he would not allow it to be stationed within his dominions, or assign a convenient district to defray the expense; the latter constantly professed his desire, that the relations of amity between him and the English should remain as they were. The internal dissensions of the Mahrattas enabled the Governor-General to accomplish what he could not effect by art or persuasion. In

October, 1802, Holkar, who had been for some time at war with Scindia, defeated that chieftain and the Peshwa, in the neighbourhood of Poonah. The Peshwa fled to Concan, and thence to Bassein, where, in conformity with the terms which on the very day of his defeat he authorized his ministers to accept, he bound himself to establish permanently within his dominions a force hired from the Company, to cede a suitable portion of territory for its support, and to have no intercourse with other states, except in concert with the English. It was both natural and just that the Mahratta chieftains should be dissatisfied with a measure, which reduced the head of their nation to be the mere puppet of a foreign state, and which the Governor-General expected (and others therefore might dread) would terminate in the destruction of their own independence. They did not, however, immediately express their dissatisfaction. The Peshwa was restored to his throne, Holkar retreating as we advanced, and Scindia remaining inactive. Soon afterwards Scindia and the Rajah of Berar formed a junction, and, without declaring their purpose, occupied a commanding position on the Nizam's frontier; where it was clearly their intention to remain, till the approach of the season favourable for their operations. That they might not have the benefit of choosing their own time, the Governor-General ordered hostilities to commence. On the 17th of August, 1803, General Lake opened the campaign in the north. A slight conflict at Allyghur was followed by the dispersion of the army, organized by French officers, in which Scindia's strength chiefly lay. The battle of Delhi gave us possession of that capital, with the person and family of the Emperor; and the victory at Laswarree completed the destruction of the armies opposed to us in that quarter of India. In the mean time, General Wellesley in the south, by the victory of Assye, and the capture of some fortresses, had compeiled Scindia and the Rajah of Berar to separate. To the former he granted an armistice; the latter he pursued and defeated at Argaum, so that he was glad to purchase peace on the 17th of December, by surrendering Cuttack to the English, and extensive districts to the Nizam. On the 27th of the same month, Scindia concluded a treaty, in which he was obliged to make great sacrifices for the aggrandizement of the Company and their ally. The region between the Ganges and the Jumna was the most important of our acquisitions, and was highly prized by the Governor-General, as enabling him to accomplish his favourite project of forming the petty states in that neighbourhood into a barrier against the Mahrattas. Two months afterwards, the connexion with Scindia was drawn closer, by an agreement to allow him the use of a body of the Company's troops, who were neither to be maintained by him nor stationed within his boundaries.

During this war, Holkar, contrary to his engagements with Scindia, had remained inactive. Now that the chieftains, who were at once his confederates and his rivals, were reduced to submission, he rose high in his demands upon the English government, and opened a communication with Scindia anew. On the 16th of April, 1804, operations were ordered to be-commenced against him: he was so vigorously pressed, that in spite of some partial successes, he was soon deprived of his dominions in Deccan and Malwa. In April, 1805, he found himself obliged to take refuge with Scindia, who had been, for some months, complaining of the conduct of the British authorities, and, without renouncing the relations of amity, had assumed an attitude that seemed to forebode hostility. Such was the situation of affairs, when Lord Wellesley was, on the 30th of July, 1805, succeeded by Lord Cornwallis. That aged Governor, seeing in the war only a ruinous expense, without the possibility of solid advantage, even from the most complete success, resolved to restore tranquillity by yielding to the claims of Scindia, by giving back his dominions to Holkar, and by breaking the connexion which had been formed with the minor princes on the Jumna. His death, which happened on the 5th of the following October, prevented him from accomplishing his designs: but his ideas were adopted and carried into effect by Sir George Barlow, upon whom, as senior member of the Council, the supreme power devolved. With this general pacification, Mr. Mill concludes his history; to resume it, we hope, whenever access to documents shall furnish him with sufficient materials.

We have already had occasion, in examining the several parts of this elaborate work, to express our opinion of its merits. The labour which has been employed in collecting and examining materials, the skilful distribution of the facts into proper compartments, the high tone of moral feeling, and the enlarged philosophy which every where pervade the narrative, entitle the History of British India to be regarded as a valuable addition to our national literature. It gives a clear, connected view of a series of transactions, peculiar in their nature, and important in their consequences, which till now were involved in obscurity, but which cannot be made familiar to the mind without enriching our intellectual stores with new views of society and of individual character.

Mr. Mill, if we may judge from the sentence of Lord Bacon quoted in the title page, has very accurate notions of what the style of history should be: "Hoc autem," says the motto, with uncommon felicity of expression, "pressè et distinctè excutiamus, sermone quodam activo et masculo, nusquam digrediendo, nil amplificando." The style, however, is not the distinguishing

excellence of his work. Phrases of an awkward stiffness occur not unfrequently. Scriptural, for instance, is used as synonymous with written; exploration sometimes usurps the place of the more common word examination. The principle of duplicity is said to be a characteristic of the English law, meaning by duplicity not deceit, but a double set of contrary maxims. He speaks of the sort of government that was performed by the Nabob: "to perform government," is not English idiom. The construction of the sentences is sometimes perplexed. They (certain documents) were not before the public, and by the very nature of the case within the reach of a number comparatively small. The reader, naturally applying the negative particle to both clauses, at first imagines that the number, within whose reach the documents were, was not small: it is only the incongruity of this meaning with the context, that leads him to discover that the negation is limited to the first clause. But though Mr. Mill's style cannot in general boast of peculiar elegance, it is at least plain and manly, and is never deformed by an unseasonable ostentation of ornament. We could almost imagine, that, conscious of having good matter to express, he is not very solicitous to recommend it by exterior decoration. Of the two qualities alluded to in Lord Bacon's phrase of "sermone quidam activo et masculo,” Mr. Mill's language has attained to the quality denoted by the latter epithet, so far at least as the absence of feminine ornaments can exempt from the charge of effeminacy; but it has seldom any portion of the elastic energy denoted by the term

activo.

Mr. Mill's narrative, in consequence of a superabundant detail of circumstances, becomes occasionally tedious. It would have gained in force and vivacity, had he dwelt more exclusively upon the great features of affairs, and less upon their minutiæ. His pages, particularly in the latter half of the work, contain too many long quotations from official papers. In his mode of commenting upon documents, and upon the language of individuals, he forgets the character of an historian in that of a judge summing up evidence. As illustrations of what we mean, we refer to his criticism on the evidence adduced by Mr. Hastings to prove that the Begums were concerned in fomenting a public commotion, and to his account of Lord Wellesley's negotiations with the Vizir and the Mahrattas. This peculiarity arises from the desire of interweaving in his page a full exposition of the grounds of his opinions, as well as the opinions themselves. Classical precedent, however, is at variance with such a practice; and there are besides several good reasons, why the historian, instead of entering into a minute detail of the steps of his inquiries, should limit himself to the statement of their results. The dis

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