LOGIC: DEDUCTIVE AND INDUCTIVE. BY ALEXANDER BAIN, LL. D., PROFESSOR OF LOGIC IN THE UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN. NEW AND REVISED EDITION. NEW YORK: D. APPLETON AND COMPANY, I, 3, AND 5 BOND STREET. 1880. General Library System Madison, WI 53706-1494 11903 Bh ·B16 PREFACE. 1408942 THE present work aims at embracing a full course of Logic, In an introductory chapter, are set forth such doctrines of psychology as have a bearing on Logic, the nature of knowledge in general, and the classification of the sciences; the intention being to avoid doctrinal digressions in the course of the work. Although preparatory to the understanding of what follows, this chapter may be passed over lightly on a first perusal of the work. The part on Deduction contains the usual doctrines of the Syllogism, with the additions of Hamilton, and a full abstract of the novel and elaborate schemes of De Morgan and Boole. The Inductive portion comprises the methods of inductive research, and all those collateral topics brought forward by Mr. Mill, as part of the problem of Induction; various modifications being made in the manner of statement, the order of topics, and the proportion of the handling. The greatest innovation is the rendering of Cause by the new doctrine called the Conservation, Persistence, or Correlation of Force. Mr. Mill's view of the relation of Deduction and Induction is fully adopted, as being the solution of the otherwise inextricable puzzle of the syllogism, and the means of giving unity and comprehensiveness to Logic. A separate division is appropriated to the Logic of the Sciences, with the view of still further exemplifying the logical methods, and of throwing light upon various points in the sciences themselves. The review comprises all the theoretical or fundamental sciences-Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Biology, and Psychology; the sciences of Classification, or Natural History; and two leading Practical sciences Politics and Medicine. The department of Definition is, for the first time, brought under a methodical scheme, and rendered of coordinate value with Deduction and Induction, as a branch of logical method. The modes of defining, as a generalizing process, are given under two canons, a positive and a negative; and attention is called to the chief obstaclesuncertainty in the denotation of words, and the gradual transition of qualities into their opposites. In discussing Fallacies, I have canvassed the grounds for the usual practice of detaching the violations of logical rules from the exposition of the rules themselves; and have endeavoured to show that the only portions of the subject proper to reserve for separate handling, are the Fallacious tendencies of the Mind, and Fallacies of Confusion, As these are subjects of great moment, and admit of wide illustration, both are considered with some minute ness. None of the controversies in the subject are overlooked; but it has been deemed advisable to separate them from the main body of the work. In an Appendix, are embraced the various Classifications of the Sciences, the Province of Logic, the Classification of Nameable Things, the Universal Postulate, the meanings of Analysis and Synthesis, the Theories of Induction, the Art of Discovery, and the maxims of Historical Evidence. To adapt the work to an elementary course of Logic, the parts to be omitted are the Additions to the Syllogism, the Logic of the Sciences, and the chapters in the Appendix. The junior student, or the candidate for a pass examination, without attempting to master or commit these reserved portions, might yet find their perusal of service in understanding the rest. There is a general conviction that the utility of the purely Formal Logic is but small; and that the rules of Induction should be exemplified even in the most limited course of logical discipline. I would suggest that an increased attention should be bestowed on Definition and Classification, with reference both to scientific study and to matters not ordinarily called scientific. As I may be open to the charge of presumption in appearing as a rival to Mr. Mill, I will venture the remark, that an attempt to carry out still more thoroughly the enlarged scheme of logical method, seems the one thing hitherto wanting to the success of his great work. ABERDEEN, March, 1870. |