or an untoward Reprefentation of them. And afte he has thus mifufed me, then to beat up for Voluntiers, and to endeavour to animate and ftir up the whole Clergy against me as a Common Enemy, who mean no harm to any Body But I will fay no more, than that by it he has utterly forfeited all the Thanks which perhaps he might otherwife pretend due to him for his kind Întentions and Endeavours. I confefs however, that I did not expect to be fo publickly affaulted by a Neighbour and a Friend, who whitty. methinks might with greater Decorum have left fo ungrateful a Work to another hand, especially at this time of Day, when we have no need of quarrelling among our felves for want of Adverfaries to try our Skill upon. But it feems, contrary to the Proverb, Neceffity has now too much Law; and Neighbourhood, Friendship, Peace, Decorum, and every thing muft be facrificed to that which is better than Sacrifice. But to the Point. In order to which be it premifed, that in all Perfonal Difputation or Controverfie an Objection carries in it this Addition to the Nature of an Argument in general, that 'tis an Argument against fomething before laid down or maintain d by the Party oppofed. So that an Objection is an Argument, and fomething more; and confequently there goes more to make an Objection good,than to make an Argument good. For to make an Argument good, 'tis fufficient that it be True as to Matter and Form; but to make an Objection good, it must not only be a Truth, but a Contradictory Truth. So that though a good Objection be alfo a good Argument (becaufe Objection includes Argument in it) yet a good Argument is not always a good Objection, and that becaute an Objection implies fomething more than bare Argument as fuch, as being not only an Argument, but a Contradictory Argument. And therefore though there be but one general way whereby an Argument may be Faulty, viz. by reason of the Untruth of it, either as to Matter or Form; yet an Objecti on may be Faulty two ways, either for want of Truth, or for want of Contradiction; that is, it may be Faulty either fimply as an Argument, or as an Objection, or if you will, either as to the Argument part, or as to the Objection part of it. Either the Thing Objected is not True, or if it be True, yet it is not a Contradictory Truth; and fo a bad Objection, though perhaps a good Argument. Accordingly there are two general ways of dealing with an Objection, according as the deficiency of it is in one or other of thefe refpects. It it be truly Contradictory, but not abfolutely true, as to the Matter or Form of it, then I have fomething to deny, the Syllogifm it felf if wrong in Form, or fome Propotition of it if wrong as to Matter, and that again either Major or Minor, or Contequence according to the Matter of the Propofitions, and the Form of the Syllogifm. But if the Objection be Abfolutely true both Materially and Formally, but not truly Contradictory, what is to be done then? Why in this Cafe B.Sanderfon fays in his Appendix de ufu Logi ce, pag. 273. that the Conclufion is to be denied. There are Three Things, fays he, that may be denied, the Conclufion, the Form, and the Propofition. The Conclufion if it be Forreign, the Form if Vitious, and the Propofition if Falfe. And again fays he, Si Opponcus aut in primo Syllogifmo non Contradicat Thefi Refpondentis, aut in reliquis non inferat propofitionem ab co proxime Negatam, Refpondens habet negare Conclufionem. But then The after explains what he Means by Denying, viz. by rejecting it as not to the purpofe, or (which he fays is all one) by admitting the whole Argument. In which Account tho' his meaning be right enough, if rightly understood, yet I think he has not exprefs'd him elf with either his ufual, or with Sufficient Clearnels. For a 'tis molt Certain in the general,that the Concluion can never be denied if the Premiles are allow'd to be True, (because the Conclufion is contain'd in the Premiles) and therefore the Denial when any is neceffary, properly falls upon one of the Premifes, not upon the Conclufion, lo 'tis alfo molt certain that in the prefent Cafe there is no need of denying any thing, there being indeed nothing at all to be denied. And therefore this great(and otherwife very Logical)Writer did not do fo well in ufing the word Deny, however Interpreted afterwards by Rejecting, in reference to the Conclufion, fince Denying is always applied to the Truth of the Objection, and that as to the Mutter, or as to the Form of it, in relation to the Former of which we fay Negatur Propofitio, and in relation to the Latter, Negatur Syllogifmus. But how here the Objection is supposed to be be Abfolutely True both as to the Material and alfo as to the Formal part of it. And therefore 'tis moft certain that here is nothing to be Denied, or that can be faid with any Propriety to be fo. And then again, whereas he fays, by Rejecting it as Impertinent, or (which is the fame) by admitting the whole Argument, I cannot think this neither to be a clear Account of the Matter. For Rejecting and Admitting are in themselves fo far from being the fame, that they are Formally Contrary, and Vertually Contradictory to each other, and are no otherwife to be reconciled than by the difference of Respects, which yet he has not here affign'd. Let us fee then whether this Matter may not be fer in a little clearer Light. The Queftion is what is to be done when the Objection is Abfolutely true, both Materially and Formally, but not truly Contradictory? To which it is anfwer'd in the first Place, Abfolutely and without any qualification, that here is Nothing to be Denied, the Matter and Form of the Argument being fuppofed to be True. And as there is nothing that can juftly be denied, because all is fuppofed to be true; fo neither has the Refpondent any Reason, Periwafive or Inducement to deny any thing, fince though a Truth 'tis yet an uncontradictory one, and fuch as though admitted does not concern him, nor affect the Thefis he Maintains. What then is he to do? Ianfwer Secondly, That he is e'n frankly to admit the whole. For what should he do elie ? He cannot deny it because it is True, and he need not deny it becaufe 'tis alfo an uncontradictory Truth. He must then, and may fafely grant it intirely. Not that the Admiffion is fo intire Neither, but that it Confequentially implies a Rejection too, though in a different Refpect. That is, he Admits it as a Truth, but then by doing to docs by Confequence Reject it as an Impertinent unconcerning Truth, (ince if it were to the purpofe, and against him, he would not Admit, but Deny it) or if you will Admits it as an Argument, but Rejects it as an Objection, because not a Contradictory Argument, as every good Objection should be. But then it may be further Confider'd (which is all that can be faid in this Matter) that as in denying any part of an Argument, either as to Matter or Form, the Refpondent may be fometimes Obliged to align fome Reafon of his Denial (for otherwife there would be no End of Difputation, fince one Fool may deny more than a Hundred Wife Men can prove) fo likewife in this Second way of dealing with an Objection by admitting the Argument as True, but rejecting it as Imperti pent, the Refpondent may fometimes be concern'd to affign a Q4 Realon Reason of his Procedure, which is to be done only by Stating his own Thefis, and by fhewing that the Conclufion of his Oppolers Argument does not really Contradict it. This indeed' is a fhort Cut,but 'tis all that can or need be done in this Cafe; and when he has done this, he has done as much as his Oppofer can justly demand, and though in this way of proceeding he has nothing of Denying Solving Refuting &c. he has yet anfwered his Objction as fullyas fuch anObjection is Capable of being Answer'd. Now thus itands the Cafe between me and my late worthy Oppofers, who have both of them (efpecially the Second) taken a gread deal of Pains not to contradict me. They pretend to write against me, and feem not to doubt but that they have Confured me, and yet do not fo much as attaque me. Not attending fufficiently to the Principles, nor to the Conclufion of the Difcourfe they offer to oppose, nor duly confidering the exact Hate of the Queftion, they misapprehend my Meaning, and fo fuppofing me to hold what indeed I do not, they run on upon a wrong Ground, very elaborately fet themfelves to prove a Conclufion that is not Contradictory to mine, and fo fight, not with me, but with a Shadow of their own. In short, they both harp all along upon the fame falfe String, and beltow great Pains to prove a wrong Propofition: Wrong I mean,not abfolutely in it felf, but in relation to me, as not being truly Contradictory to what I maintain; and fo are guilty of that Fallacy which in Logick is call'd fgnoratio Elenchi, as St. James would have been in relation to St. Paul, (fuppofing he had intended to contradict him) when he fays that a Man is not juftified by Faith only, he not taking Faith in the fame Senfe, when he lays a Man is not juftified by Faith only, as St. Paul does when he fays that he is; and fo rot truly Contradicting him, because not denying the fame thing that the other affirms, whereas all Contradiction fhould be ad Idem. And therefore I look upon my felf to be no further concern'd with my prefent Adverfaries (it I may fo call them) than only to grant then, without any more ado, the main body of their Argument, allowing it to be True, but at the lame time rejecting it as an Uncontradictory, and therefore not Pertinent Truth. I fay I have no more upon my hands than this, unless it be for their Satisfaction to give them fome Account why I do thus, which may be done in a little room. I remark then that the whole Argument of the prefent Controversie is a mere Equivoque upon these two Terms, Love and Good, which my Adverfaries (I hope they will pardon me for giving them a wrong Title) are pleafed to take in the most large and popular Senfe, and not according to that due ftrictnefs wherein I do, and wherein they fhould take them to contradict me: me. Thus as to the term (Good) they ufe it according to the urmoft Latitude, as it comprehends all that which any manner of way contributes to our good, minifters to our conveniency, and is better for us to have than to be without. And taking (Good) in this large popular Sense, they contend that the World is good, that the Creatures are good, that Meat is good, and Drink is good, &c. and for the truth of this appeal to Experience. And no doubt all this is true. But herein they do not Contradict me, who use the term (Good) in a stricter, and as I think more Philofophical Senfe, meaning by it that which really and truly does us good, or is the efficient Caufe of Pleasure to us. In which Senfe it is that I deny the World, or any Creature in it, to be a Good to us, truly and properly fpeaking; because not efficient Causes of the leaft degree of Happiness or Good to us, wherein I am not at all contradicted by their faying that the Creatures are good in the other larger Sense; especially contidering that at the fame time that I deny them to be Efficient Causes, I allow them to be Occafions of Good to us. Then again as to the term (Love) this also they use in the large and popular Acceptation, as it extends even to the willing the ufe of a thing, as fuppofe of Fire when we are Cold, or Meat and Drink when we are Hungry and Thirfty, and the like. But now I use the term (Love) more ftrictly, and it may be more Philofophically, for the Souls uniting it felf to any thing as its true Good, Beatifick Object, or the Caufe of its Good or Happinels. And accordingly in this ftrict and rigorous Senfe of Love I make God the only due Object of it; and deny that the World, or any Creature in it, is to be loved by us; and that becaufe God only, not the Creature, is our true Good, Beatifick Object, and Efficient Cause of all our Happiness. Whereas they taking the word (Love) more largely and popularly, as it comprehends within its Latitude even the willing the ufe of a thing, contend that God is not the only Object of our Love, but that the Creature may alfo be loved by us. Wherein indeed they fay true,but do not Contradict me; especially confidering that at the fame time that I deny that the Creatures are to be loved as p. 52 our Good, I allow that they may be fought Serm. Of the and used for our Good. And indeed setting afide the Paffage laft quoted, which fully expreffes my meaning, and feveral others which I might quote both from the Difcourfe it felf, and the Letters which Comment upon it, to the like purpofe; the very Principles I go upon, my way of arguing upon thofe Principles, and the whole Current of the Difcourfes themselves do all fo jointly combine to de termine |