already made on limitations of the freehold to one, and to the heirs or heirs of the body of that person, and of one or more persons in addition to him, will apply: and the case of Gossage v. Taylor (qq) will lead to the interpretation of the effect of the gift to the heirs. When the limitations to the ancestor and the heirs are immediate, or eventually become so, by the determination or failure of intermediate estates, the several interests imported by these limitations will consolidate, and, by merger, become one entire estate, giving one undivided time of continuance. When other estates are limited intermediately, the limitation to the heirs will, during the existence of these estates, give to the ancestor an estate in remainder, to take effect in possession, according to the order in which it is limited; but in subordination to, and after the determination of, the intermediate estates by which it is preceded, excepting those instances only which are the same in principle or in circumstances, as the case of Lewis Bowles (r). In that case, all the remainders limited mediately between several gifts, one to a man and his wife for their lives, and the other to their heirs of their bodies, were contingent; and it was held, that an estate-tail, executed in the husband and wife, and entitled them to be deemed tenants of an estate-tail in possession; but sub mado, so that on the vesting of (99) P. 343. (r) 11 Rep. 80. the contingent remainders, the husband and wife should be tenants for their lives, with a remainder in tail. In those instances in which there are superadded words of limitation, taking notice of the heirs of the heirs, the influence of the words descriptive of the immediate heirs of the ancestor, must depend on the collective interpretation of the instrument (s). Some observations will now be offered, in explanation of this point. The general rule is, that although in deeds and wills, words of limitation are added to the gift to the heirs, yet if the ADDITIONAL WORDS ARE OF THE SAME IMPORT, or rather not at variance, with the former words of limitation, and are virtually included in and expressed by these words; the words of limitation, as used in the first instance, will, notwithstanding the words of superadded limitation, enlarge the estate of the ancestor, and will vest in him the interest imported by the limitation to his heirs. Thus, in Shelley's case (t), (the identical case from which the rule takes its denomination,) a fine was levied by a man to the use of himself for life, remainder to the use of the heirs male of his body lawfully begotten, and the heirs males of the body of such heirs males (s) 7 T. Rep. 533. (t) Supra; and see Gulliver and Ashby, 1 Black. Rep. 607; 1 Burr. 1928. lawfully begotten; and yet he had an estatetail. Also, in Goodright v. Pullin (u), a devise was to N, for his life, remainder to the heirs males of the body of the said N lawfully to be begotten, and his heirs for ever; with a limitation over, if the said N should happen to die without such heir male; and he took an estate-tail. Also, in Allpass v. Watkins (x), arising on a marriage settlement, the uses were declared in favour of the intended husband for life, remainder to the wife for life, remainder to the heirs of the body of the said intended wife, by the said intended husband lawfully begotten, and their heirs and assigns for ever; and for default of such issue, to the right heirs of the said intended husband; yet the wife was tenant in special tail. Also, in Morris v. Ward, generally cited by the name of Morris v. Legay (y), the devise was to the testator's daughter, for her natural life, and then the testator proceeded in these words: "Item, I bequeath to the heirs of the body of my said daughter, begotten, or to be begotten, and to his or her heirs for ever, after my daughter's death, all my before-mentioned plantation, &c.; but, for want of such heirs of the body of my daughter, I give," &c. and it was decided that the daughter was tenant in tail. (u) 2 Lord Raym. 1437; Str. 729. (x) 8 T. Rep. 516. (y) 2 Burr. 1102. And in all these, and in many similar instances, it was held, that the superadded words of limitation, being of the same import and extent as those first introduced, and not inconsistent with the nature of the descent, to be pursued in conformity with the provision they made for the heirs, the word heirs, in the superadded clause of limitation, should be a WORD OF LIMITATION, and not of purchase. On the other hand, when the words engrafted on the limitation to the heirs, describe, in point of general intention, an order of succession, totally different from that which must take place under the limitation to the heirs as originally named, and will not admit of the construction, that by the heirs secondly named are meant the heirs in succession of the heirs first named, as the heirs of the ancestor; the words heirs, &c. in the first branch of the limitation, will be words of purchase. This exception is instanced by a gift to a man for life, remainder to his heirs and the heirs females of their bodies (z): also, by a devise to A for life, remainder to his next heir male, and the heirs male of the body of such next heir male (a): also by a devise to A, and the heirs of her body lawfully begotten or to be begotten, as well females as males, and to their heirs and assigns for ever, to be divided equally, share and share alike, as tenants in common, and (x) 1 Rep. 96; Per Anderson, in Shelley's case, (a) Archer's case, 1 Rep. 66 b; see also Loddington & Kime, 1 Salk. 224. as joint-tenants (b): also, by a gift in a settlement by deed, to the use of A for life, remainder to IV for life, remainder to the heirs male of the body of the said A by the said W lawfully to be begotten, and his heirs; and for want of such, then to the use of all and every the daughters, &c. Lord Alvanley decided (bb), that the words heirs male were words of purchase, and gave a contingent remainder in fee to the person who was heir of WA the wife at her death. And these and the like cases have very properly been allowed to be exceptions to the rule, or rather not within its extent. In the first instance, the heirs, described to be inheritable as heirs to the intail, were to be females; and in Archer's case, the heirs to take in succession were to be those heirs only which should be the issue of the body of a particular person, described by the designation of the next heir male of the tenant for life; and in Doe v. Laming, females, as well as males, were to take at the same time, and to hold as tenants in common with each other; and the succession, as the inheritable quality of the estate, was not, in Doe v. Laming, to be confined to males, or to be conducted at all through them; nor, in Archer's case, to be extended to all the heirs of the body of the tenant for life; nor, in Doe v. Laming, to admit of the right of primogeniture (b) Doe v. Laming, 2 Burr. 1100, |