between sons, or the exclusion of daughters by a son; and in the case put by Anderson, to have construed the word "heirs," and in Archer's case, the words "next heir male," or the words heirs of the body, in Doe v. Laming, to have been words of limitation, would have given to the word heir an effect, in direct opposition to a general and contrary intention, clearly and manifestly expressed, and which showed that a particular and limited series only of heirs were to be entitled. And, in the case decided by Lord Alvanley, the testator clearly intended such a disposition as was inconsistent with the course of descent under an estate-tail in the parent; and also intended that the persons whom he designated by the description of heirs of the body, should have an estate to them and their heirs and assigns for ever.

At the same time it is observable, from the adjudged cases,

First, That words of limitation which import a fee engrafted on words which would give an estate-tail (c); as to JR for life, remainder to trustees for his life, remainder to the use of the heirs males of the body of the said J R and their heirs: or,

Secondly, Words which of themselves import a general intail engrafted on

(c) Wright v. Pearson, Fearne, 187; see also Denn ex dem. Webb v. Puckey, 5 T. Rep. 299; Allpass v. Watkins, p. 348; Morris v. Ward, ibid.

words which might, under other circumstances, give an estate in special tail; as to R M and his heirs male of his body and their issue: and,

Lastly, In wills, words of clear and proper limitation, engrafted on words of the same extent and import, and which have not any determinate meaning, but may, according to circumstances, and indiscriminately, be words of limitation or of purchase; as to AB during his natural life, remainder to the issue male of his body lawfully begotten, and the heirs male of the body of such issue male (d), will not prevent the application or attachment of

the rule.

In all these and the like instances, the words of superadded limitation are understood and construed to be introduced for carrying the general intention more fully and more clearly into effect.

The instances last noticed, with the exception of Allpass v. Watkins, arose on gifts in wills.

The same rules of construction, as far as relates to the words of superadded limitation, (allowing for the difference of words requisite in deeds and wills, to limit estates,) apply to deeds, and this is evident from Allpass v. Watkins.

Perhaps it will not be too much to assume it as a general conclusion, deducible from the authorities which have been noticed, that the

(d) Dodson v. Grew, 2 Wils. 322; see 2 T. Rep. 299.

point of difference furnished by the cases (e), is, that whenever the SUPER ADDED WORDS OF LIMITATION do, intentionally, give a direction to the course of descent, different from that which must take place under the former branch of the gift, so often the words heirs, &c. in that branch of the limitation, will be words of PURCHASE, and not of limitation; but, as often as the superadded words are included in, and do not, in their extent, exceed the preceding words ; but the words heirs, &c. in the several parts of the gift, are in terms, or, at least in construction, of equal extent, the latter words are surplusage, and the preceding words, as connected with the limitation to the ancestor, will be taken to be words of LIMITATION.

Probably, in some of the adduced instances, the construction was influenced more by the rules of interpretation propounded in the chapter on Estates-Tail, than the rule treated of in the present chapter; since to have construed the words issue male to be words of purchase, would have defeated the general intention of the testator; either by giving the estate to a single individual, to the exclusion of other persons within the same description; or by giving the estate to several persons for their lives, with several inheritances, and thereby excluding the issue of each child from the aliquot parts of every other person besides his own parent. And in the late case of Candler v. Smith (f), Lord

Kenyon evidently treated Dodson v. Grew in that light.

The following cases further illustrate the rule, as it applies to words of superadded limitation.

A devise was to A for life, without impeachment for waste, and after his decease to the issue male of his body, and the heirs and assigns of such issue male; and, for default of such issue male, then to another for life, with remainders over, and it was decided that A had an estate in tail male (g). But the general intention governs cases of this and the like description; for, as Lord Kenyon observed, in Doe v. Collis (h), in a will, issue is a word either of purchase or limitation, as will best answer the intention of the devisor; though, in the case of a deed, it is universally taken as a word of purchase.

As a general proposition, and with the observation that the several limitations must both give legal or both give equitable interests, the rule extends as well to equitable estates, being trusts executed (i), as to legal estates; with the exception of those cases of trust which have circumstances indicative of an intention contrary to and incompatible with, the effect which would attend the construction that the heirs are to take by succession in a course of descent. In cases of executory trusts, and, in short, all other cases, the manifest intention, with apt

(g) King v. Burchell, Ambl. 379; Frank v. Stovin, 3 East, 548. (h) 4 T. R. 299.

(i) Bale v. Coleman, 1 P. W. 142.

words according to the form, precludes the application of the rule (ii).

In regard to trusts which are executory, and leave the direction of a conveyance to devolve on the Court of Chancery, by making it necessary that the trustees should act, and the Court may interfere to have that act properly done, that Court, which, exclusively, has jurisdiction over interests of this sort, will consider the object of the parties, and, notwithstanding the rule under consideration, will direct a conveyance, agreeable to the manifest intention; whether that intention can be collected from the nature of the instrument; as marriage articles, and the persons they generally have in contemplation, and for whom they at least intend, if they do not profess, to provide; as the children of the marriage; or from expressions which clearly demonstrate that the estate of the father is not to be enlarged by the limitation to his heirs; and that by the limitation to the heirs, sons, daughters children quatenus sons, daughters children, and their issue, and not hereditary successors, as a collective class of persons, are meant; the Court proceeding on the notion that the rule is controllable by arguments of intention, which, applied to legal estates, or even trusts which are executed, would not be of any avail (k).

Limitations in marriage articles are ALWAYS considered as raising executory trusts, unless the (ii) Burr. 1106, 1107. (k) Fearne, 71.