derson and Rhodes, there is a difference between an interruption of the time by the act of the party, and by the act of God. Though, under a limitation to a man and his heirs, tenants of the manor of Dale, the estate does, by a change of the tenancy, determine, never to revive; yet, under a limitation to a man and his heirs, as long as A B shall have issue of his body (t), the birth of a child after the death of a parent will have relation to the death of the parent, and in consideration of law, the estate will have had continuance in the mean time.

And this distinction is perfectly consistent with the general rule now established, that a child en ventre sa mere (mother's womb) is to be considered as in existence (u), for every purpose connected with the benefit of the child.

In this place, however, it may be observed, that though it is a general rule that an estate cannot cease at one time and be in existence at another time, yet an estate may cease as to one person and continue as to another person (x). For example, a term, depending partly on an estate tail, and partly on the reversion or remainder in fee, may be defeated as to the issue in tail, and continue in force as against those in remainder or reversion. So if A be tenant for life, remainder to B for life, remainder to A in fee, and A lease for years, the term will cease

(t) 1 Leon. 74.

(u) See Buller's Observ. 2 H. Black.; Doe v. Clark, 399(x) See Baker v. Willis, Cro. Car. 476; Beaumont's case, 9 Rep. 138.

on the death of A as against B, though it will continue in force as against the heirs and assigns of A. But if, under similar circumstances, the fee is granted, then the grantee has, till union and merger, two estates, one for the life of A, the other in fee, with an interposed estate in B for his life.

Also, under the learning of executory devises andof uses, estates may be suspended, revived, postponed, accelerated, and undergo many other changes not allowed by the rules of the common law.

On all limitations, whether they pass an estate of a freehold or of chattel real quality, it is observable that the estates they convey will actually expire, and, as a consequence, determine, as soon as the event, which is a boundary to the limits of these estates, shall arrive.

A condition has its effect, in defeating the estate to which it is annexed, before the end of that period to which the estate is extended by the limitation (y).

Between a limitation and a condition there is this important difference:

A limitation marks the utmost time of continuance; a condition marks some event, which, if it take place in the course of that time, will defeat the estate (z).

Thus A demises land to B for twenty years:

(y) 4 Reeves, 510; Shep. Touch. 114; 2 Bl. Com. 154. (z) Shep. Touch. 118; W. Jones, 58; Co. Litt. 214 b; Cro. Eliz. 360.

the estate may continue to the end of that period, and that period may be fully completed under the lease. The space of twenty years is the period for which the right of enjoyment is to continue, and the words fixing this time of continuance are called the limitation, from their ascertaining the boundary of the estate. Suppose a clause to be added, providing, that if some act be done, or omitted, by either of the parties, or any other person, in the mean time, then the term of twenty years shall cease and be void; this is a clause of condition, and on the rise of the event on which the term is to cease, or be avoided, and a pursuit of title by entry, or, if no entry can be made, by CLAIM, the condition will defeat the estate of the person to whom the limitation is made, and of all persons claiming under him, notwithstanding the period to which the estate is extended in its limitation is not yet arrived. The necessity of actual entry is now superseded by the mode in which ejectments are brought to trial by a confession of lease, entry, and ouster. On the other hand, an estate ceases, ipso facto, when it has completed the measure of its continuance, whether marked by a direct or collateral limitation. No entry or claim is or ever was requisite. The former owner, if he continue the possession, is merely a tenant by sufferance, or occupier; the seisin, in law at least, is in the person who has the estate. Perhaps he has even a seisin in fact, by the con

tinuance of the possession of his tenant, especially if the tenant had only a particular estate. To gain an adverse seisin against the rightful owner there must be an intrusion by a stranger, or some act on the part of the former owner continuing the possession, to claim the fee, in opposition to, and in denial of the title of the rightful owner (aa).

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The properties, the nature, and the effects of a limitation and condition are so very different, that when a condition is annexed to an estate, with a view to defeat the estate in the event which is the boundary to the time of continuance, the condition will be rejected, on the ground that it is repugnant and inconsistent (a). For as it was very justly observed by Lord Chief Justice Hobart, in the case of Stukely v. Butler (b), "A condition annexed to an estate is a divided clause from the grant, and therefore cannot frustrate the grant precedent; neither in any thing expressed, or in any thing implied, which is of its nature incident to, and inseparable from the thing granted." This observation is in its general tendency applicable to the point last advanced. In short, as far as a condition is repugnant to the grant, the condition will be rejected, on the ground of inconsistency. You cannot defeat an estate already at an end by its limitation. The con

(aa) Doe v. Perkins, 3 M. & S, 271. (a) 1 Inst. 224 b. (b) Hob. 170.

dition is inapplicable to an estate already determined.

Again, an estate of freehold limited, subject to a condition which is to defeat the same estate, and by express words to make the estate void, will continue till entry or claim by the person entitled to the possession, notwithstanding the condition shall not be performed (c).

The law on leases for years was formerly considered to be different. These leases are considered as contracts, and when it is stipulated they shall be void, unless some particular act shall be done, or event take place, the estate was deemed to cease immediately after the condition shall be broken (d). But this distinction seems to have been overruled by a recent decision.

And it is also observable, that an estate of freehold, arising under a conveyance to uses, may by a proviso, introducing a springing or shifting use, be determined without actual entry; for in this respect the proviso partakes of the nature of a limitation rather than of a condition (e).

A condition and a collateral limitation are, apparently, of the same nature.

(c) Manning's case, 8 Rep. 95; 10 Rep. 43; 6 Rep. 62, the same observation applied to a bargain and sale, and Com. Dig. Uses, 1. 4.

(d) 1 Inst. 214 b.

(e) Driver and Edgar, Cowp. 379; Gulliver v. Ashby, 4 Burr. 1929; Page v. Hayward, 2 Salk. 570.