...was concerned to establish a monism which is prior to both the mental and natural orders. He says4 "my thesis is that if we start with the supposition...composed, and if we call that stuff pure experience," we reach such and such results. But of course it can not be the intention of those who uphold the relational...

...association-systems, by means of which our object of focal attention is being defined,— should be the ' one primal stuff or material in the world, a stuff of which everything is composed.'15 But we are told that this is only a manner of speaking, and that genuinely 'there is no...

...from his list of first principles must still provide in some way for that function's being carried on. My thesis is that if we start with the supposition that there is only one_pjrimal stuff or material in the world, a stuff of which everything is composed, and if we call...

...bien that if we start with thé supposition that there is only one primai stuff or material in thé world, a stuff of which everything is composed, and if we call that stuff a pure expérience », then knowing can easily be explained as a particular sort of relation towards...

...for he leaves the domain of psychology and enters the domain of metaphysics. "My thesis is" he writes "that, if we start with the supposition that there...call that stuff 'pure experience' then knowing can only be explained as a particular sort of relation towards one another into which portions of pure...

...for he leaves the domain of psychology and enters the domain of metaphysics. "My thesis is" he writes "that, if we start with the supposition that there...we call that stuff 'pure experience' then knowing cr only be explained as a particular sort of relation towir_ one another into which portions of pure...

...for he leaves the domain of psychology and enters the domain of metaphysics. "My thesis is" he writes "that, if we start with the supposition that there...world, a stuff of which everything is composed, and 391 if we call that stuff 'pure experience' then knowing can only be explained as a particular sort...

...taken twice over in different contexts, now as thought and now as thing.9 In his own words we find : "My thesis is that if we start with the supposition...easily be explained as a particular sort of relation into which parts of experience may enter. The relation itself is a part of experience; one of its 'terms'...

...consciousness must still provide in some way for that function's being carried on. "My thesis," he continues, "is that if we start with the supposition that there...we call that stuff 'pure experience,' then knowing [said above to be the function for which consciousness stands] can easily be explained as a particular...

...exist?" In this article, reprinted in the volume called Essays in Radical Empiricism, he set out the view that "there is only one primal stuff or material in the world", and that the word "consciousness" stands for a function, not an entity. He holds that there are "thoughts",...