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employing them given a meretricious plausibility and popular vogue.
As has already appeared, realism is nevertheless in agreement with naturalism, idealism, and pragmatism respecting many important doctrines. With naturalism, for example, it maintains the unimpeachable truth of the accredited results of science, and the independence of physical nature on knowledge; with idealism it maintains the validity and irreducibility of logical and moral science; and with pragmatism, the practical and empirical character of the knowledge process, and the presumptively pluralistic constitution of the universe.
A new movement invariably arises as a protest against tradition, and bases its hope of constructive achievement on the correction of certain established habits of thought. Realism is as yet in a phase in which this critical motive dominates and affords the best promise of initial agreement. But war has developed a class consciousness, and the time is near at hand, if, indeed, it has not already arrived, when one realist may recognize another. This dawning spirit of fellowship, accompanied as it is by a desire for a better understanding and a more effective coöperation,' justifies an attempt to summarize the central doctrines of a constructive realistic philosophy.
§ 2. The crucial problem for contemporary philosophy is the problem of knowledge. It is upon this question that
its chief tendencies divide, and it is from their Fundamental Importance of several solutions of this problem that these the Problem
tendencies derive their characteristic interpreof Mind
tations of life. In giving a brief outline of a realistic philosophy, I shall therefore have to do mainly with the realistic theory of knowledge. I propose, how
· Cf. "The Program and First Platform of Six Realists," by E. B. Holt, W. T. Marvin, W. P. Montague, R. B. Perry, W. B. Pitkin, and E. G. Spaulding, Jour. of Phil., Psych., and Scientific Methods, Vol. VII, 1910; and the volume entitled The New Realism, by the same writers. Cf. also the author's “Realism as a Polemic and Program of Reform,” Jour. of Phil., Psych., and Scientific Methods, Vol. VII, 1910.
ever, to adopt a somewhat novel order of procedure. The problem of knowledge reduces, in the last analysis, to the problem of the relation between a mind and that which is related to a mind as its object. The constant feature of this relationship is mind. Instead, therefore, of dealing first with knowledge, leaving mind to be defined only incidentally or not at all, I propose first to discover what manner of thing mind is, in order that we may profit by such a discovery in our study of knowledge.?
Accounts of mind differ characteristically according as they are based on the observation of mind in nature and society, or on introspection. What is said of mind by historians, sociologists, comparative psychologists, and, among technical philosophers, most notably by Plato and Aristotle, is based mainly or wholly on general observation. Mind lies in the open field of experience, having its own typical form and mode of action, but, so far as knowledge of it is concerned, as generally accessible, as free to all comers, as the motions of stars or the civilization of cities. On the other hand, what is said of mind by religious teachers, by human psychologists of the modern school, whether rational or empirical, and, among technical philosophers, by such writers as St. Augustine, Descartes, and Berkeley, is based on self-consciousness. The investigator generalizes the nature of mind from an exclusive examination of his own.
The results of these two modes of inquiry differ so strikingly as to appear almost irrelevant, and it is commonly argued that it cannot be mind that is directly apprehended in both cases. It is assumed, furthermore, that one's own mind, or the mind at home, must be preferred as more genuine than the mind abroad. The conclusion follows that the
· Cf. my article "A Division of the Problem of Epistemology,” Jour. of Phil., Psych., and Scientific Methods, Vol. VI, 1909. The remainder of the present chapter is reprinted in part from a series of articles entitled "The Hiddenness of Mind," "The Mind's Familiarity with Itself,” and "The Mind Within and the Mind Without,” Journal of Phil., Psych., and Scientific Methods, Vol. VI, 1909, Nos. 2, 5, 7.
latter is not mind at all, but a mere exterior of mind, serving only as a ground for inference. Thus we reach the widely popular view that mind is encased in a non-mental and impenetrable shell, within which it may cherish the secret of its own essence without ever being disturbed by inquisitive intruders. Now one might easily ask embarrassing questions. It is curious that if its exterior is impenetrable a mind should give such marked evidence of itself as to permit the safest inferences as to its presence within. It is curious, too, that such an inward mind should forever be making sallies into the neighborhood without being caught or followed back into its retreat. It must evidently be supplied with means of egress that bar ingress, with orifices of outlook that are closed to one who seeks to look in. But rather than urge these difficulties, I shall attempt to obviate them. This is possible only through a version of the two minds, the mind within and the mind without, that shall prove them to be in reality one. To unite them it is necessary to replace them by the whole mind, in which they appear plainly as parts. The traditional shield looks concave on one side and convex on the other. That this should be so is entirely intelligible in view of the nature of the entire shield and the several ways in which it may be approached. The whole shield may be known from either side when the initial bias is overcome. Similarly, I propose to describe the mind within and the mind without as parts of mind, either of which may assume prominence according to the cognitive starting-point; the whole mind by implication lying in the general field of experience where every initial one-sidedness may be overcome.
In addition to this difference of method, there is another distinction that it will prove not only convenient to employ, but important to emphasize — the distinction between the action and the content of consciousness. Every type of consciousness exhibits this duality. There is 'thinking' and thought,' 'perceiving' and 'percept,' 'remembering' and 'memory.' A similar duality between sensing and sense-content accounts for the ambiguity of the term 'sensation. In the discussion that follows I shall employ first the method of introspection and then the method of observation; examining by each method, first, the contents of mind, and second, the action of mind.
II. THE METHOD OF INTROSPECTION
$ 3. It is well known that much the most convenient method of discovering what is in my mind is to consult me. Mental Content
I can affirm the fact with superior ease and as Revealed by certainty. At the same time, of course, I may Introspection
be absolutely ignorant of the meaning of the fact. The subject of a psychological experiment is best qualified when he has no ideas concerning the nature of his mind. He is called on to affirm or deny awareness of a given object, to register the time of his awareness, or to report the object (not given) of which he is aware. Introspection thus yields an identification and inventory of mental contents.
Suppose my mind to be an object of study. In the first place, it is necessary to collect my past experiences. For this purpose the method of introspection is convenient and fruitful. I have myself been keeping a record of my experiences automatically, and by virtue of the capacity of recollection I can recover them at will. This method is reserved for the use of the mind that originally had the experiences. This does not mean that the facts cannot be known except in so far as remembered by me. It would be absurd to say that the fact that I saw the King of Saxony in the year 1903, is lost to knowledge except in so far as I can retrospectively recover it. An observant bystander would have known it at the time, or it may be a matter of general knowledge. But the convenience afforded by my memory is apparent. For in this way I may recall and verify the experience in question, and thus
secure something approximately equivalent to its empirical presence; and, furthermore, my memory preserves not only this, but also other experiences likewise mine, and so already selected and grouped with reference to a study of my particular mind.
Or, suppose that the study of my mind requires knowledge of its present content. I, who must in the nature of the case be having the object in mind, can have before me simultaneously the additional fact of its being in my mind. Such an introspective experience is commonly available, and while it is not a penetrating or definitive knowledge of the fact, it is a discovery of the fact.
It is doubtless true, then, that a record of the contents of a mind is most conveniently obtained by introspection. This superior or even unique accessibility of certain facts to certain observers is not unusual; indeed, it is a corollary of the method of observation. Every natural object has what may be called its cognitive orientation, defining vantage points of observation. Data concerning the surface of the earth are peculiarly accessible to man, and data concerning the twentieth century to those alive at the time. But this does not mean that man knows the earth best, or that we of the present day know the twentieth century best. Still less does it mean that our knowledge is exclusive. It means only that we are so situated as to enjoy certain inductive advantages. If a man were to add up his property as he accumulated it, he would always be in a position to report promptly on the past and present amount thereof; but it would not be profitable to argue that property is, therefore, such as to be known only, or even best, by its owner. So any individual mind is most handily acquainted with its own experiences, past and present. The circumstances of its history and organization are such that without any exertion, or even any special theoretical interest, it is familiar with the facts. But this argues nothing unique or momentous. It may easily be that while introspection is the best method of collecting