term "Unity of the Empire" some more precise meaning than it has in ordinary conversation. The word " empire" and the ideas it has from time to time connoted have played a great part in political history. But we need not now concern ourselves with tracing back its meaning to its application to the special powers of certain Roman magistrates. An empire now means either the territories governed by a person styled "emperor," or more generally any extensive political dominion. The ideas which upon analysis it involves are these:

(I.) It is a society of men permanently established for a political end by common subjection to some sovereign authority.

(II.) It possesses a definite territory.

(III.) It is independent of external control, i.e. its sovereign authority is not subject to any other political authority.

These three ideas are essential; but they are common to the conception of an empire and any other sovereign state. As generally used, the term empire is only applied to sovereign states large in point of population and extent of territory, with a monarchical form of government, generally having under their control subordinate states.

Now if this analysis is considered, it will be found that the unity of an empire in the last resort depends on the common subjection of all its members to a supreme political authority. It is this subjection

which forms the connecting link between all its parts. The rules of conduct which the Sovereign lays down. are laws, and a common obligation to obey these laws is the most salient tie between the different men coming within the scope of the Imperial authority. Identity of laws is not necessary; for the Sovereign may enact one set of laws for one part and another set for another part of the Empire. It is, then, a legal bond which unites an empire. Common subjection to a sovereign authority is the mark which distinguishes an empire or state in modern times from other societies of men.

These remarks are of course elementary to the jurist trained in the school of Austin; but it is very surprising to observe how little they are understood or borne in mind by those who attempt to enlighten the public mind on political questions, and for that reason it has been deemed well to state them clearly at the outset. If this analysis is applied to the British Empire, it will be found that the Unity of the Empire really means the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament. But for practical purposes it is, owing to the peculiar theories of the Constitution, better to amplify the matter a little and say that the Unity of the Empire means:

(I.) That allegiance is due from all British subjects to her Majesty.

(II.) That all executive and judicial power is derived from the Queen in Council.

(III.) That the Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland can make laws at its absolute discretion binding throughout the whole or any part of the Empire.

So long as we are dealing with political questions any attempt to base the Unity of the Empire on anything but this common duty to obey the commands of the sovereign power ends in confusion. For instance, in regard to race, religion, habits of life, laws, in fact in regard to everything which can form a bond of union between men, except subjection to a common sovereign, there is more similarity between us and the people of the United States than between us and the people of India. Neither community of race, of religion, of habits, of morals can be predicated of England and India. The only fact (apart from those which are common to all men) that cements the people of Bengal with those of Canada is that both are subject to the authority of the Imperial Parliament at Westminster. There may be other ties than the legal tie between individual Hindoos and individual Canadians; but the only tie common to them all is subjection to the supreme authority of the Empire. It is not asserted of this conception of the Unity of the Empire that it is universally true; nor that the sovereignty of the Imperial Parliament is the cause in the scientific sense of that term of the existence of the Empire. All that is claimed for it is that, assuming the current ideas of political powers, of the functions of sovereignty, and

of the effect and operation of laws, which influence us in carrying on the business of government, to be true— taking these ideas for granted, then the Unity of the Empire does depend on the sovereignty of Parliament, and that the Union can only be preserved by the effective assertion of that sovereignty when necessary, followed by the acquiescence of all the parts of the Empire, even when the policy of Parliament runs counter to the interests or the wishes of individuals or parties or colonies.

It is now very common to compare the state to a living being; to describe it as an organic body, created and kept alive by natural laws as uniform and inflexible as those which guide the movements of the planets. The comparison is felicitous but not very new. Its rigid and complete application to the art of government is, however, apt to lead to political fatalism, and to be destructive of all those qualities in individuals by which democracy at any rate can alone hope to succeed. But I am far from saying that the generalisations of modern thinkers are unsound, or that there may not come a time when the phenomena connected with the government of men may not become an exact science, and the consequences of particular lines of policy or laws foretold with accuracy. That time is not yet, and government as a practical art is founded on the freedom of the individual will. Every legislator and every judge assumes that those to whom the laws are addressed are free to regulate

their conduct by them. Every statesman acts on the assumption that he can control the future of his country-that wise measures will lead to prosperity and a foolish policy to discontent and ruin. We all, in fact, in discussing political questions and discharging our duties as citizens, do so on the hypothesis that we have a choice of action, and that our determination affects the attainment of the end we have in view. Taking this standpoint, there is no objection to defining law as the command of the Sovereign, and making the bond of union among the members of a state the relation of Sovereign and subject.

But a union founded on this relationship is only real when the claim of the Sovereign is acknowledged. A mere theoretical claim such as was formerly asserted by the English monarchs to the kingdom of France or by Spain to the Western World gives rise to no real unity. It is sovereignty de facto as well as de jure, and not merely de jure, that is an actual coherent force. An empire is only united when its sovereign authority is generally obeyed. Whatever makes for obedience makes for union.

But what does make for obedience? We here touch on one of the most obscure and difficult questions connected with human society-the sources and nature of the influence exercised by the will of one human being on that of another; and it must be remembered that the question why one set of men forming a sovereign political authority are able to