it is to be simply an authority limited to the discharge of administrative functions. Its form and the restrictions upon its power must depend on the settlement of this question. If the principle of Home Rule— i.e. that the proposed Irish Government should have the right of dealing with matters coming within the sphere of private law in Ireland, as well as with some departments of public law-is granted, the next step is to settle what are Imperial as distinct from Irish affairs. The former must then be excepted from the legislative power of any Irish Parliament. The best plan is then to take the principal divisions of the corpus juris from any such work as Professor Holland's on jurisprudence, and to consider as to each division what powers of legislation shall be delegated. In regard to private law, it will probably be found that the least objectionable means of limiting the actions of the proposed Irish Legislature will be, not to except certain branches from its powers but to lay down certain general principles which none of its laws shall infringe (e.g. that no law shall be valid which impairs the obligation of contracts, or attacks the fundamental bases of the law of property, or invalidates any title to real property existing at the time of the passing of the Act, without compensation, &c.) leaving it to the courts of justice to say, as cases arise, whether any particular enactment is or is not a violation of these principles and ultra vires. Coming, then, to public law, we have first to deal with the

matters relating to the constitution of the proposed Irish Government. Is it to have power to alter its own constitution, and if so to what extent? Is it to be allowed to change the existing local government and the laws relating to the position of judicial and administrative officers? Are the laws relating to the relief of the poor, education, prisons, railways, highways, &c., to be left to it? Is the substantive portion of the criminal law and the regulation of procedure to be entrusted to it? It is upon the answers given to these and similar questions that the determination of the best method of drafting a Bill for granting Home Rule, and the constitution of the proposed subordinate Government, ought to rest. If Mr. Gladstone's Bill be tested carefully, by applying these questions to it, it will be found that in the main, wherever a doubt could fairly be raised as to the powers of the Irish Government (the principle of Home Rule being of course assumed), it was settled rather in favour of the Imperial Government than of the subordinate authority.

11. THE BEARING OF THE SCHEME ON FEDERATION.

There are many indications that a remarkable change has taken place in public opinion as to our relations with the colonies, which may lead to great alterations in the constitution of the Empire, and there has been of late considerable discussion of the feasi

bility of plans for making the union of the Empire closer and more effective by "federation." It has been supposed by some that the passing of a Bill for Home Rule on the lines of Mr. Gladstone's measure would tend to defeat this movement. This idea arises partly from the erroneous view that the Bill destroyed the supremacy of Parliament, and partly from a misconception of the term federation.

A federal government is formed by the union of sovereign states for the promotion of the interests common to all. For this purpose the states desiring to be united abrogate certain of the powers of sovereignty, and by agreement confer on a federal government the powers so abrogated. The result is that neither the federal government nor the government of such state is supreme in internal affairs, though the former may be so in regard to foreign relations. The United States of America of course afford the example of a federal union which will occur most readily to the mind. Congress, which is sometimes supposed to be a legislature with absolute powers, is not supreme, and in reality can only legislate on eighteen classes of subjects; and an Act of Congress may be pronounced by a court of justice to be ultra vires and void. The supremacy of a legislative body is impossible in a federal union of states, and before the British Empire can be federated, in the proper sense of the term, the sovereignty of Parliament must be

* Constitution of United States, Art. 1, sec. 8, Farrar's Manual, p. 6.

extinguished. Though the passing of a Bill such as we have been discussing would still leave the Empire a state held together jure imperii, and not jure societatis, yet it would be a step towards federation in the proper sense of the term; for before there would be any chance of the success of a federal union of the territories now subject to Parliament, the United Kingdom would have to be divided into at any rate three states. One of the first conditions of a successful union on a federal basis is that there shall be no very marked inequality between the states. The United Kingdom is a great deal too powerful, in regard to the colonies individually, for a federal union in which it would be a single state to be stable and efficient.

But the term "federation" is obviously often used loosely to mean either the extension of the right of representation in the Imperial Parliament to the colonies, or the creation of some new representative body elected from all the territories of the Empire, with power of legislation on imperial concerns. The House of Commons is already so numerous and so over-weighted with business that the adoption of the first of these alternative plans simply, without the devolution of a large proportion of the work to legislative bodies for England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland, would be impracticable. Even if it could be carried out by the diminution of the number of the members for the United Kingdom, it would be felt with justice by the

See Mill," Representative Government," c. 17, as to this.

English people very unfair for a majority composed possibly mainly of Canadian, Australian, Irish, and Scotch representatives to control purely English affairs. It is not unusual even now to hear complaints that the influence of the other parts of the kingdom in the House of Commons is so great that the wishes of the English counties are overborne; and the feeling that prompts these expressions would be intensified by the presence of colonial members. The only practical plan on which the colonies could be allowed a direct voice on imperial policy by representation in Parliament would be by the delegation of the domestic affairs of the different portions of the United Kingdom to subordinate governments, and the reservation by Parliament to itself only of the matters in which the whole Empire has a common interest. It is clear enough that the passing of such a Bill as Mr. Gladstone proposed, far from tending to defeat any change in the direction of federation, either in its strict sense or in the popular signification just mentioned, would mark a distinct advance towards the realisation of the project.

§ 12. CONCLUSION.

The general conclusion which it is believed ought to be drawn from this inquiry is, that the establishment of such a Government at Dublin as would result from a bill drawn on the principles of that of