judges would not be responsible to the executive Government, either individually or collectively, but would only be removable upon an address to her Majesty from both orders of the Legislature; and it is to be observed that even if both orders of the Legislature should coincide in asking for the removal of a judge, that the consent of her Majesty would also be required. This power of consenting to or refusing the removal of a judge is no doubt one of the prerogatives the exercise of which might be delegated to the Lord-Lieutenant by her Majesty. If it is not so delegated, then the effect would appear to be this-the consent of the Queen to the removal of an Irish judge would have to be given through and by one of the members of the Imperial Cabinet. If it should be delegated, it would no doubt be contended that the Lord-Lieutenant would be bound to accept the advice of the Irish Ministry in regard to giving or withholding his consent to the removal of a judge. If, however, this prerogative be not delegated, the independence of the Irish Bench of the control of the Irish Ministry would be secured.

The most remarkable provision of the Bill as to the judicial authority was, however, that giving jurisdiction to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. * The practical subordination of the Irish Courts, and indeed the Irish Legislature, in case of any dispute as to the validity of Irish statutes, secured by the scheme * See the 25th clause, providing for the decision of constitutional questions.

of Mr. Gladstone, has not received the attention which its importance warrants.

We have now briefly considered the nature of the executive and judicial authorities for the Government of Ireland which would have resulted from the passing of this Bill.

It might, perhaps, be urged that the Bill is defective because it did not more specifically and completely deal with and define the relations between the English and Irish executives, and those between officers or ministers of the Irish executive and the Lord-Lieutenant, as representing the Queen in Council. The answer to such criticism is that the Constitution of England itself is not a written Constitution; that the laws of this country have never been completely expressed in any code or Acts of Parliament; and that it would be almost impossible to create a constitutional code for Ireland without at the same time entering on the almost insuperable task of doing the same for Great Britain. The fact is, that the English Constitution has grown, and has not been made, and it would be difficult, if not impossible, to write down what is the British Constitution at the present moment. "En Angleterre," said an acute observer of politics, "la constitution peut changer sans cesse; ou plutôt elle n'existe pas." Though the latter part of De Tocqueville's remark is not accurate from the lawyer's point of view-for the law does exist, and is ascertainable by the competent prac

titioner in most cases with reasonable certainty-yet the observation is substantially just, for the practical working of the political machine depends on many rules by which men allow themselves to be guided which are not rules of law recognised in the courts.

6. THE ACTUAL EFFECT OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME.

Such being the effect of the suggested scheme of Irish government from the purely legal point of view, we have to consider next whether it or any similar plan would diminish that control of Ireland, that effectiveness of sovereignty which, as has been shown above, is necessary to complete the true conception of a united empire.

It will be remembered that the very first condition of effective imperial supremacy is the maintenance of law and order in every province; and that where the form of government is democratic the creation of the law-abiding character on which the maintenance of law and order depend is only possible under at any rate the three conditions mentioned above.

In Ireland at the present time it is only too clear that the law is obeyed and respected only by a small proportion of the people. The existing government and the existing body of rulers are out of harmony with the views of the bulk of the community. The English laws are not deemed just; the Imperial Parliament, which is the source of their authority,

does not command the confidence of the Irish people; and the executive and judicial officers are looked on as the servants of a hostile power. The very consequences which, in the more general consideration of the question above, I ventured to anticipate from a disregard of these conditions, have been found to happen in Ireland. Widespread disaffection to English rule, hatred for the officers of the law, contempt for the decisions of the courts, the use of fraudulent means for controlling the verdicts of juries, and general disorder are proved every day to exist in a large part of the country.

This state of things is said to be due to the terrorism of the National League. To assert this is, however, only to carry the problem a step further back, and not to afford any real explanation. We are told that the National League has two phases of existence-one an overt phase as a lawful combination of voters for party purposes; another a secret phase as a powerful organisation, performing in the dark most of the functions of sovereignty, trying and passing sentences on members and non-members, making rules for the conduct of life, and enforcing its decrees partly by a system of "boycotting" not easily to be suppressed by authority, and partly by bold defiance of the criminal law. We are informed that it is a society analogous to those which have existed, and are alleged to exist, on the Continent for overthrowing the whole organisation of modern society.

Assuming that the picture is not overdrawn, one cannot help remarking in the first place that the existence of such a body implies political capacity of a high order in the Irish mind; and that a wise statesman must be filled with regret at the misdirection of such constructive power on the part of its leaders and of such a faculty for cooperation and subordination on the part of its members. In the next place one notices that the relations between the governing body of such a League and its members or those who are controlled by it, are precisely such as are found, when the three conditions I have mentioned are fulfilled, to subsist between a regular government and its subjects. The decrees of the National League are according to the moral standard of those they control substantially just; the governing body commands the confidence of its members; and its officers are their friends and not their foes. To say its influence is due to "terrorism" is a very inadequate explanation of its power. Individuals here and there may be moved to obey it by fear alone; but that the majority of a community can be coerced into obeying a secret society by the "terror" created by a few individuals is impossible in a country where a regular government assisted by a constabulary and an army has long existed. The power of such a society must be derived from the sympathy of the larger part of the people.

There is nothing to show that the Irish mind has